joined by Justices Griffin and Smith and Chief Justice Hickman, dissenting.
I disagree with the majority opinion in holding that the *552jeep used by petitioner, under the record in this case, is not a private passenger automobile “exclusively of the pleasure car type,” and that the petitioner is not entitled to recover under the double indemnity provision of the policy of insurance.
Petitioner filed this suit against respondent to recover monthly disability benefits, plus double indemnity benefits, attorney’s fees, costs, etc., under an accident and health policy issued by respondent. It is undisputed that the policy provided for payment at the rate of $100.00 per month, not to exceed five years, for accidental injury resulting in total loss of time, and double that amount” * * * if ‘such injury’ is sustained by the Insured (1) while driving or riding within any private passenger automobile exclusively of the pleasure car type as an owner or passenger, * * * if the injury causing the loss is due directly to the damaging of such automobile or passenger car.” The jury returned answers to the special issues submitted in favor of petitioner. Upon this verdict the trial court entered judgment for petitioner for $200.00 per month from the date of the accident to the date of trial, after allowing credit of $1200.00 previously paid by respondent to petitioner, but plus $2500.00 attorney’s fees and penalty on past due installments. ■The Court of Civil Appeals, by a divided court, reversed the judgment of the trial court, and held “as a matter of law that the jeep involved here is not a private passenger automobile ‘exclusive of the pleasure car type,’ and therefore not within the coverage of the double indemnity provision of the policy,” and rendered judgment for respondent on that question. 238 S. W. 2d 602.
The evidence shows that petitioner at the time of his injury was a rural mail carrier; that he used the jeep for all family purposes and as a means of transporting the mail; and that it was his private automobile. He testified in detail regarding the mechanism and construction of the jeep; and it was also shown that the jeep had no attachment or compartment for freight, and if any freight was to be carried, necessarily it had to be put in the rear seat designed for passengers.
Mr. Williams testified that after the injury to petitioner he purchased the automobile from him, and used it for carrying the mail over a 50-mile rough road; that he purchased it to replace a 1936 2-door Ford sedan, which he had been using for such purpose.
Mr. Brown, a Chief Deputy for the Highway Department of Grayson County, testified that since January 1, 1947, he has *553been custodian of the records for registration in that county, and in 1947 and 1948 petitioner registered a “Willys Jeep 1946 model, classification as passenger car.”
Mr. Tuffer, general manager of a motor company handling Hudsons, Packards, Willys Jeeps, and Reo trucks, testified as an expert witness for respondent. He stated that the only difference between a Willys jeep and the other pleasure cars is that a jeep has a 4-wheel drive, and the other cars only a 2-wheel drive, and that the jeep make-up or appearance is different and there is some difference in the construction of the springs. He further testified that he sells many jeeps to mail carriers for carrying mail, due to the fact that jeeps get around in the mud and over rough roads better than automobiles, and that he also sells some to farmers for the same reason. He further testified that a jeep is a passenger car, and that it hauls passengers, and that there are some passenger cars not of the pleasure type. He enumerated buses and trucks as not being pleasure cars. He stated that a truck is not a pleasure type passenger car, but it is a passenger car. He explained the difference between the Hudsons and the Packards, and that there was a difference in the construction of the springs, the horse power, and the construction of the seats, and that there is a slight difference in all types of automobiles; that there are many types of cars exclusive of the pleasure type; and that one difference between the jeep and other pleasure type cars is that the jeep has a 4-wheel drive, which gives it more power.
Mr. Shiflett tstified as an expert on automobiles for respondent as to the differences between the constructural features of a jeep automobile and other passenger automobiles, and in effect gave his opinion that the jeep was not exclusively a pleasure type car. He also testified that he owned a jeep for his personal use, primarily to hunt and fish, and that he got pleasure out of its use; that he had friends who owned jeeps for personal use, and some used them to hunt and fish.
The trial court submitted several special issues to the jury which were answered in favor of petitioner. Among the special issues submitted was Special Issue No. 7, as follows: “Do you find from a preponderance of the evidence that the motor vehicle which Paul Pennell was driving on the occasion in question was a private passenger automobile exclusively of the pleasure car type?” To which the jury answered, “It was.”
The precise question for determination is whether this record *554presents as a fact issue that the jeep in question was a private passenger automobile exclusively of the “pleasure car type.”
The determination of the rights of the parties to this suit depends upon the construction of the policy of insurance involved here, in the light of the record before us. The policy does not define what is meant by “any private passenger automobile exclusively of the pleasure car type,” nor does it define the term “pleasure car type” nor the term “private passenger automobile.”
There are several classes of automobiles, — such as trucks, busses, and other vehicles. The jeep in question was owned and operated by petitioner at the time of his injury as a private passenger automobile, and it was designed exclusively for the transportation of passengers. It was a “pleasure car type” to the insured and his family. The jeep, like most other automobiles, has undergone changes: It was used in the army whereever the army went, both in combat and noncombat areas, by many classes of soldiers, as a passenger car. The car in question is a 1946 model, similar in design to the wartime jeep. In Union Pacific R. Co. v. United States, 91 Fed. Supp. 762, 765, 117 Ct. Cl. 534, the Court of Claims gave an extensive theory of the wartime jeep: That case turned on whether or not the jeep should be classified as a passenger vehicle. The court said: “We find that the wartime jeep was primarily a passenger car.”
The policy of insurance does not define what is meant by “any private passenger automobile exclusively of the pleasure car type,” and we have found no case construing same. Therefore we are compelled to look elsewhere to try to ascertain its meaning. Webster New International Dictionary gives various definitions of “Pleasure,” as follows:
“1. State of gratification of the senses or mind; agreeable sensation or emotion; the excitement, relish, or happiness produced by expectation or enjoyment of something good, delightful, or satisfying; delight; enjoyment; joy.
“2. What the will dictates or perfers as gratifying or satisfying; hence, will; choice; wish; purpose — with a possessive.
“3. That which pleases or delights; a cause, source, or object of pleasure; a delight; joy; gratification.
“4. Pleasure-giving quality; pleasantness.
*555“5. Sensuous gratification for its own sake; amusement; sport; diversion; self-indulgence; frivolous or dissipating enjoyment; sensual gratification.”
The word “pleasure,” as shown by the definitions just quoted, has many meanings. It is quite obvious that in attempting to construe “any private passenger automobile exclusively of the pleasure car type,” in the light of the various definitions of the word “pleasure,” inevitable confusion results, and it is impossible thereby to classify any car. Certainly the language used is not clear. In other words, looking at this provision of the policy from a practical standpoint, the term becomes meaningless.
The construction of insurance policies, as well as ordinary contracts, is governed by certain general rules. The language used in the policy should be given a fair and reasonable construction, in order to sustain the insurance and not defeat it. Terms of ambiguous meaning appearing in the policy are to be construed in the insured’s favor. Respondent wrote the policy, and if its terms are not clear they will be construed against the insurer. The insurance company could have defined the meaning of the provisions quoted above, and such meanings so defined would ordinarily be enforced by the courts. The policy should be construed and applied in the light of the facts of the case. Kemper v. Police & Firemen’s Ins. Assn., (Tex. Com. App.) 44 S. W. 2d 978, 981, reversing (Civ. App.) 28 S. W. 2d 1111; Fidelity Union Fire Ins. Co. v. Barnes, (Civ. App.) 293 S. W. 279, 281, writ of error refused; Old Colony Ins. Co. v. Hardaway, (Civ. App.) 14 S. W. 2d 372, 374; Piper v. Dennis, (Civ. App.) 274 S. W. 307, 308; 24 Tex. Jur., p. 701, sec. 25.
This Court, in the case of McCaleb v. Continental Casualty Co., 132 Texas 65, 116 S. W. 2d 679, said: “In construing the language used in a policy, if it is ambiguous or contains inconsistent terms, in order to arrive at the true intention of the parties expressed therein, the well-known rule that insurance contracts should be construed strictly against the insurer, and in favor of the insured, will control.” See 29 Tex. Jur., p. 705, sec. 29; Tex. Jur., Ten Year Supp., 1937-1947, Vol. 6, p. 153, sec. 29.
A very cogent and persuasive reason for sustaining the judgment of the trial court is furnished by the acts of respondent. With full knowledge of the facts, respondent admitted liability, and voluntarily elected to-pay petitioner under the *556double indemnity provision of the policy. It is undisputed that respondent paid to petitioner the sum of $1,340.00, evidenced by four checks payable to Paul Pennell, as follows: (1) one for $325.00, dated November 12, 1948; (2) one for $200.00, dated December 12, 1948; (3) one for $200.00, dated January 12, 1949; and (4) one for $615.00, dated April 12, 1949. In making said payments under the double indemnity provision of the policy, respondent placed its own construction upon the wording of the provision of the policy and by its own definition and classification of the vehicle involved here same was considered a “passenger automobile exclusively of the pleasure car type.” During the trial respondent did not request that the term be defined for the jury, and failed to except because such definition was not included in the charge of the court.
In Cyclopedia of Insurance Law, by Couch, Vol. 1, p. 330, the rule relating to the construction to be given a contract of insurance which has been construed by .the insurer is stated as follows: “Where the parties have, by certain acts of their own, placed a construction upon doubtful terms of a contract of insurance, this construction generally will be adopted by the courts as against them.” This rule is supported by many decisions. See Travelers’ Protective Association of America v. Ziegler, (Tex. Civ. App.) 250 S. W. 1115; 44 C. J. S., Insurance, p. 1152, sec. 292.
The recent case of Superior Oil Co. et al. v. Stanolind Oil & Gas Co. et. al., 150 Texas 317, 240 S. W. 2d 281, involved a mineral lease claimed to be ambiguous and construed by the parties.-In the opinion this Court said:
“The parties have construed this lease, and since it is ambiguous, the courts will follow the construction given by the parties.
“This court said in Lone Star Gas Co. v. X-Ray Gas Co., 139 Texas 546, 164 S. W. 2d 504; loc. cit. (5-7) 508:
“ ‘The original parties to the contract, and also the trial court construed such contract as contended for by the defendant; while the Court of Civil Appeals, with considerable difficulty, construed it as contended for by plaintiffs. If there is any doubt as to the meaning of a contract like the one before us, the courts may consider the interpretation placed upon it by the parties themselves. In this instance the acts of the parties themselves indicate the construction they mutually placed upon the contract at the time, including the acts done in its performance, and same .is entitled to great if not controlling *557weight. Courts will generally follow the interpretation of the ties themselves indicate thee onstruction the mutually placed upon a contract by the parties themselves constitutes the highest evidence of their intention that whatever was done by them in the performance of the contract was done under its terms as they understood and intended same should be done.’ ”
The fallacy in the reasoning of the majority opinion, as I see it, is in assuming that passenger cars of other makes than Willys Jeeps are “exclusively of the pleasure car type.” There is no car in common use on the highways which is “exclusively of the pleasure car type,” if that language be strictly construed. We must assume that it was intended that the policy should cover some type of cars. Should we hold, as a matter of law, that it was intended to cover, for example, a Ford car, and not a Willys Jeep, I can find no solid basis for such a conclusion of law.
In view of the ambiguous language relating to the double indemnity provision of the policy, and the construction of such provision by the insurance company in favor of petitioner, an issue of fact was raised for determination by the jury. Since the issue of fact was raised by the evidence on that question, and was answered by the jury favorably to petitioner, the Court of Civil Appeals erred in holding that no such issue, as a matter of law, was raised.
The judgment of the Court of Civil Appeals should be reversed, and the judgment of the trial court should be affirmed.
Opinion delivered October 24, 1951.
Rehearing overruled December 5, 1951.