concurring.
I respectfully concur in the court’s judgment but I disagree with parts of the majority’s analysis.
The trial court correctly determined that it had no jurisdiction over defendant/appel-lee Texas Workforce Commission (“TWC”), as noted in the majority opinion. However, appellant Donald Wayne Hull’s petition also includes a claim against defendant/appellee Dicarlos Davis/Datasor-seonsulting, L.L.C. (hereinafter “Davis”) for breach of a promissory note. Construing the petition liberally and in Hull’s favor, this claim is not covered by the Texas Payday Law. Although the trial court improperly rendered a take-nothing judgment on this claim, Hull has not briefed any argument complaining of this disposition. Therefore, even though this court relies on the wrong rationale, it reaches the right result in affirming the trial court’s judgment.
Hull’s Claims against TWC and His Texas Payday Claim against Davis
The court correctly affirms the trial court’s dismissal for lack of jurisdiction as to Hull’s claims against TWC and Hull’s Texas Payday claim against Davis, but the court errs in determining that all of Hull’s claims against Davis are Texas Payday claims. See ante at pp. 462, 465. Hull’s original petition, entitled “Plaintiffs’ Donald Wayne Hull [sic] Complaint On A Promissory Note Or Contract,1” names Davis and TWC as defendants. In this petition, Hull not only makes allegations under Chapter 61 of the Texas Labor Code,2 but also states in this pleading that his suit includes “an [sic] civil action complaint on a promissory note or contract under the Texas Payday Law.” Because no special exceptions were asserted or sustained as to Hull’s petition, this court should construe Hull’s petition liberally and in his favor. See Horizon/CMS Healthcare Corp. v. Auld, 34 S.W.3d 887, 897 (Tex.2000). Giving Hull’s pleading this liberal construction, Hull asserts a claim against Davis for beach of a promissory note, a claim not covered by the Texas Payday law and, as explained below, one the trial court did not dismiss on jurisdictional grounds.
Hull’s Other Claims
Although the trial court granted TWC’s plea to the jurisdiction and dismissed Hull’s claims against TWC for lack of jurisdiction, it rendered judgment that Hull “take nothing against [Davis]” on the other claims. The majority ignores this fact and instead acts as if the trial court dismissed all claims on jurisdictional grounds when, in fact, the trial court disposed of the note claim against Davis on substantive grounds. On appeal, Hull has not briefed any argument challenging the “take nothing” part of the trial court’s judgment. In his second issue, however, Hull contends that the trial court erred in rendering a final judgment against him and that the final judgment is defective because it is “silent” as to the disposition of his claims against Davis. Hull’s argument fails because the judgment is not silent regarding his claims against Davis. In the judgment, the trial court clearly ordered that Hull take nothing as to these claims.
After reviewing all of Hull’s appellate brief and presuming that Hull preserved *468error regarding the take-nothing judgment, Hull has waived any complaint regarding this part of the judgment by failing to present argument, authorities, and record citations supporting his contentions. See Tex.R.App. P. 38.1(h). Texas Rule of Appellate Procedure 38.1(h) requires that appellate briefs “contain a clear and concise argument for the contentions made, with appropriate citations to authorities and to the record.” Id. Appellate courts must construe the Texas Rules of Appellate Procedure reasonably, yet liberally, so that the right to appeal is not lost by imposing requirements not absolutely necessary to effect the purpose of a rule. Republic Underwriters Ins. Co. v. Mex-Tex, Inc., 150 S.W.3d 423, 427 (Tex.2004). Nonetheless, Hull’s appellate brief fails to satisfy even this very liberal standard. See San Saba Energy, L.P. v. Crawford, 171 S.W.3d 323, 338 (Tex.App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 2005, no pet.). Therefore, this court should affirm the trial court’s judgment as to Davis on the basis that the trial court rendered a take-nothing judgment on Hull’s claims against Davis and Hull has not briefed any appellate argument challenging this judgment.
Conclusion
In sum, today the court correctly affirms the trial court’s dismissal for lack of jurisdiction as to Hull’s claims against TWO and Hull’s Texas Payday claim against Davis, but the majority misses the mark in its analysis as to Hull’s promissory-note claim against Davis. Nonetheless, for the reasons explained above, the court reaches the correct result in affirming the trial court’s judgment.
. The petition states that it is based on a promissory note or contract, but there is no note or contract attached to the pleading.
. See Tex. Lab.Code Ann. § 61.001 et seq. (Vernon 2006).