dissenting.
Somehow the majority concludes that the “two essentials of substantial compliance” set forth in Whitten v. State, 587 S.W.2d 156 (Tex.Crim.App.1979, Opinion on State’s Motion for Rehearing), were present in this case, even though neither essential was complied with. Whitten established the minimum requirements for an admonishment: (1) the trial court must give the admonishment; (2) the admonishment must be given directly to the defendant. Id. at 158. Without these two basic ingredients, substantial compliance with the statute cannot be shown.
It is patently obvious from the statement of facts that if any admonishment was given to appellant in this case, it was given by the prosecutor, not the court, and was directed to the court, not to appellant. This is not a case where the court attempts to directly admonish the accused but cannot succeed because of some communication difficulty, and must employ an agent to relay the message. The court in this case made no attempt to admonish appellant; instead, he relied on the statement by the prosecutor that clearly was not intended or formulated as an admonishment. Moreover, there was no problem of communication between the court and appellant that would necessitate the use of an agent to convey the admonishment.
Completely disregarding this Court’s recent effort in Whitten to draw a bottom line for substantial compliance in admonishing the accused, the majority now finds a way for trial courts to substantially comply with the substantial compliance requirement. It is not that difficult to admonish an accused, especially when the requirements are explicitly laid out in Article 26.13 of the Code of Criminal Procedure. The consequences for the accused are great, especially in a case such as this. It is entirely reasonable for this Court to require the trial courts of this State to meet certain basic and minimum requirements in order for them to show substantial compliance with the statute. The majority decision encourages substandard work in an area where precision is important and certainly not difficult to achieve. I see little to gain and much to lose in lowering the minimum standard set in Whitten.
The Whitten essentials were not complied with, and that is sufficient cause for reversal. Perhaps more important however, we are not assured from this record that appellant was intelligently admonished at all, or that he understood the alleged admonishment. The prosecutor’s statement to the trial court was not intended as an admonishment; The halting phraseology employed did not properly serve to inform appellant of the legal consequences of his actions. The prosecutor’s words served only as an abbreviated reminder to the court, who presumably was familiar with the law in this area, to fully inform appellant, presumably a layman to the law, of the full range of punishment.
To see the problem more clearly, picture the judge directly admonishing appellant in the words of the prosecutor:
JUDGE: Assuming [you] are found guilty, habitual, assuming [you] are the same person, two previous convictions, it would be automatic life.
Is this sufficient to admonish appellant that the State had alleged two prior convictions in the indictment, and that if the court found both allegations to be true, appellant’s punishment would necessarily be set at life imprisonment? Can we understand the affirmative response to mean that appellant was made aware of this? Can we assume, as we expressly refused to do in Whitten, that appellant listened to the prosecutor when he made this statement? I cannot accept this as a proper admonishment. There is an insufficient showing in the record that appellant was intelligently admonished as to the full range of punishment or that he understood the alleged admonishment.
*832I dissent; the State’s Motion for Rehearing should be overruled.
CLINTON, J., joins in this dissent.