concurring.
I concur with Chief Judge Irwin’s opinion, but I wish to point out that because of Tyler’s conduct, the court properly concluded the hearing. However, the judge stated, “Mr. Tyler, you’re in contempt of court,” but did not impose any sanction in Tyler’s presence which is referenced in the bill of exceptions. The judge merely noted the sanction in what appears to be an unsigned trial docket note: “Based on plaintiff’s contemptuous conduct during this hearing, this case is dismissed.” I have serious doubts as to the validity of the order, but if valid, Tyler was punished for contempt without being present. In my opinion, the proceedings used by the trial court was too “summary,” and amounted to no proceedings at all.
The lack of a formal order containing findings in accordance with the following authority is in my opinion also a fatal error. In Gonzalez v. State, 119 Neb. 13, 226 N.W. 801 (1929), the Supreme Court stated, in significant part: “A judgment of *562[direct] contempt must state the facts constituting the contempt, and a judgment which merely states the conclusion of the court will not sustain a sentence of imprisonment for contempt.” (Syllabus of the court.) This case is cited in Tastee Inn, Inc. v. Beatrice Foods Co., Inc., 167 Neb. 264, 92 N.W.2d 664 (1958). In the latter case, the Supreme Court reviewed several cases involving direct contempt. The Tastee Inn, Inc., case recognized that no complaint or charge was filed and then states:
“It is not sufficient to state in a general way the conclusions of fact on which the conviction is based. The facts themselves must be stated, from which the reviewing court can see that the ultimate fact of guilt is properly and justly found. The findings of the court fail to meet this requirement. The record contains a bill of exceptions setting forth the proceedings in which the plaintiff was adjudged guilty of contempt. This does not aid the findings or supply such facts as should be contained therein.”
167 Neb. at 267, 92 N.W.2d at 666. The conviction was reversed. While this case is probably without merit, it is at least theoretically possible that it is of great importance. In my opinion, the case must be reversed because no proper order was entered.
At the time of the contempt, the trial court was merely giving Tyler the benefit of a discretionary telephonic hearing under Neb. Rev. Stat. § 24-734(3) (Reissue 1995). The easy solution would have been for the court to end the hearing as it did and then to rule upon the motion before it without offering Tyler further opportunity to be heard by telephonic conferences. If Tyler would be unable to appear at the next hearing because of his imprisonment, so be it. Such would be a more appropriate procedure in my opinion than the one used by the trial court.
In my opinion, the sanction levied by the trial court merely manifests that Tyler succeeded in seriously bugging the trial judge and tying up the court system with his senseless vulgarity. I am sure that that is all he intended by his contempt.