concurring in result.
Under the guidelines it is apparently acceptable for the obligor who holds a “plum” job, i.e., a well paying job, to, without consequences except to the child, freely leave the job, accept a similar job at a lower pay rate but at a rate which nevertheless is not significantly less than the prevailing amounts earned in the community for persons with similar work history and qualifications. The holder of the plum job can leave it for a job that pays the average in the community and the obligor’s support payments will be reduced accordingly.
Unless there was good reason to do so, the obligor could not leave the good paying job and have child support payment reduced under Olson v. Olson, 520 N.W.2d 572 (N.D. 1994). The “rule of reason” apparently no longer applies and, except within the first year after a support order, the reason for leaving the good-paying job is immaterial, even if the reason is to spite the custodial parent and guardian, so long as the obligor leaves for an average-paying position. Perhaps, as the majority states, it is the Department of Human Services’ “effort to balance an obligor’s freedom to make reasonable employment decisions with his duty to support his children diligently.” But if the employment decision must be reasonable, the rule of reason applies. It appears to me the decision to leave a high paying job for an average paying job may, in fact, be unreasonable but it will make no difference if the obligor is not underemployed as defined by the guidelines.
Under the guidelines as promulgated, I cannot disagree with the majority opinion. I concur in the result.
SANDSTROM, J., concurs.