(dissenting). In my opinion, the majority misinterprets the relevant testimony to reach its conclusion that the trial court’s admission of alleged rebuttal evidence was not erroneous. Furthermore, the majority impermissibly imposes its evaluation of witness credibility, and that on the wholly insupportable basis of mere quantitative superiority, to conclude that any error was harmless. Accordingly, I dissent.
i
Defendant was charged with, and ultimately convicted of, breaking and entering an occupied dwelling with the intent to commit felonious assault,1 and was sentenced to a term of seven to thirty years.2
A
It was conceded at trial that defendant illegally entered the home of the complainant, his ex-wife. The contested legal issue at trial was defendant’s intent in doing so. The prosecution’s theory was that defendant broke into the home with the intent to assault the complainant. Defendant’s theory was that, after numerous unsuccessful attempts at reconciliation, he realized their relationship was over and that he went *408to his former wife’s residence solely for the purpose of reclaiming items of his personal property.3
The prosecution theory also included the allegation that defendant attempted to assault the complainant with a hammer. Defendant’s version of the incident was that the hammer simply fell out of his tool belt and he picked it up, but that he never raised it in an attempt to assault the complainant.
The following excerpt from the prosecutor’s cross-examination of defendant sets forth the context relevant to resolution of the specific legal question before us in this appeal:
Q. Mr. Figgures, you were friendly then in the month of July; is that true?
A. Pardon me?
Q. You were friendly with Linda. You were on a good, congenial, happy relationship with her in July.
A. No, we weren’t. Our relationship ever since our separation has been quite rocky- Our whole marriage for the last few years has been quite rocky.
Q. So you are not saying that you were rocky — In July you were rocky, also?
A. Yes. We were having a rocky relationship, but Linda always tended to come back to me or find me or come over to my house.
Q. What do you mean when you say “rocky”?
A. What do I mean when I say “rocky”?
Q. Uh-huh.
A. We had our ups and downs.
Q. Isn’t it true in fact that you have been harassing her over the past year?
*409A. No, it is not trae.
Q. That you have been following her?
A. No, I haven’t been following her.
Q. That there have been several police reports made?
A. There has [sic] been police reports.
Mr. Hermanson: I am going to object, Your Honor. I don’t know if that’s relevant to this proceeding. I think it’s improper to be raising that.
The Court: Overruled. Go ahead.
By Ms. Mulder:
Q. That there have been several police reports made as to Linda complaining that you have been harassing her.
A. Yes. There have been some police reports made.
Q. In fact, on July 20th of 1989 a police report was made because you slugged her in the nose and caused her to bleed.
A. No.
Q. Do you recall that?
A. No, I don’t.
Q. How about — Do you recall July 24th of ‘89 when you took her wallet at a restaurant, slashed her tires?
Mr. Hermanson: Your Honor, I don’t think — I don’t believe that kind of questioning is proper. If in fact there is . . .
The Court: What’s your objection?
Mr. Hermanson: If in fact there’s some report that’s filed — I am not sure what this is being offered for. I think he’s testified that there had been a rocky relationship. He’s indicated there are police reports filed. I don’t know that the nature or the extent of the police reports are admissible. If there was any conviction from that, they may have— that may have been an issue or a question, but I think that was discussed previously and there were none.
The Court: What purpose are they . . .
Ms. Mulder: I am offering for the purpose to rebut his testimony. He said that they were peaceful together during the period of July through January.
The Court: I will allow that for that purpose.
*410Mr. Hermanson: He also testified yes, there were police reports filed..
The Court: I will allow .that for the purpose — because he indicated they were reconciling during that period of time and they were friendly. So go ahead.
Defendant was found guilty by the jury of breaking and entering an occupied dwelling with the intent to commit felonious assault.
B
In affirming defendant’s conviction, the Court of Appeals stated:
Although the trial court abused its discretion in permitting the prosecutor to engage in improper rebuttal, we conclude, on the record before us, the error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.
In dissent, Judge Griffin expressed his opinion that
[t]he inadmissible hearsay statements referred to in the police reports and in the ex parte injunctions were profoundly prejudicial to defendant. Under thé circumstances of this case, I believe that there is a reasonable probability that the evidentiary errors affected the outcome of the trial.
I agree with the unanimous opinion of the Court of Appeals panel that the trial court abused its discretion by admitting improper rebuttal evidence. I also agree with Judge Griffin’s conclusion that the error was not harmless.
n
“Rebuttal testimony may be used to ‘contradict, repel, explain or disprove evidence produced by the other party and tending directly to weaken or *411impeach the same.’ ” People v Kelly, 423 Mich 261, 281; 378 NW2d 365 (1985), quoting People v DeLano, 318 Mich 557, 570; 28 NW2d 909 (1947), cert den 334 US 818 (1948). The other generally applicable rule4 governing the admission of rebuttal testimony is that “the device of eliciting a denial on cross-examination may not be used to inject a new issue into the case. Similarly, cross-examination’ cannot be used to revive the right to introduce evidence that could have been, but was not, introduced in the prosecutor’s case in chief.” People v Losey, 413 Mich 346, 352; 320 NW2d 49 (1982), citing People v Bennett, 393 Mich 445, 449; 224 NW2d 840 (1975). This rule against division of the prosecution’s evidence is well established in our case law. See People v Quick, 58 Mich 321, 322-323; 25 NW 302 (1885), setting forth the rule that the prosecution may not divide the evidence supporting its case by saving some of it for rebuttal.
m
A
I am persuaded, as were all three judges on the Court of Appeals panel, that the trial judge’s admission of the police reports and ex parte injunctions as *412rebuttal evidence was clearly erroneous. The prosecutor offered the police reports “for the purpose to rebut [defendant’s] testimony. He said that they were peaceful together during the period of July through January.” The court then ruled: “I will allow that for that purpose . . . because he indicated they were reconciling during that period of time and they were friendly.”
As the transcript excerpt clearly shows, the trial judge mistakenly characterized defendant’s testimony. Defendant testified that he was trying to reconcile with his ex-wife, not that they were in fact reconciling.5 And, more importantly, in response to the prosecutor’s statement, “You were friendly with Linda [defendant’s ex-wife]. You were on a good, congenial, happy relationship with her in July,” defendant immediately responded, “No, we weren’t. Our relationship ever since our separation has been quite rocky. Our whole marriage for the last few years has been quite rocky.”
Defendant never indicated that he and his ex-wife were friendly. In fact, his testimony was directly contrary to the trial judge’s characterization of it. Therefore, the trial judge committed a clear error and his admission of the rebuttal evidence was an abuse of discretion.
The majority cites an excerpt from defendant’s testimony on direct examination that contains the following exchange:
“Q. Did you ever try to reconcile with Linda?
*413“A Oh, yes. We tried to reconcile a number of times, and what would seem to happen was that we would get back together and it would be ten, twenty days or so and we would be separated again.” [Ante, p 395.]
Unaccountably, however, the majority ignores defendant’s actual words and asserts that he “testified at length that he and [his ex-wife] were reconciling . . . .” (Emphasis added.) Id., p 397. The majority notes defendant’s statement that the interludes of attempted reconciliation were “just like being back in my marriage,” id., p 398, but alters defendant’s meaning by asserting that defendant “described these times in a favorable light,” id., thereby putting its own idyllic gloss on defendant’s statement, a gloss not borne out by the actual marital history, as the majority is aware: “Unfortunately, the marriage was a troubled one . . . .” Id., p 393. On the basis of defendant’s actual testimony and intended meaning, the evidence at issue here was improperly admitted.
B
Plaintiff’s argument that even if the police reports and ex parte injunctions were improperly admitted as rebuttal evidence, their admission was proper under MRE 404(b) and People v VanderVliet, 444 Mich 52; 508 NW2d 114 (1993), is without merit. Plaintiff asserts that this “evidence was relevant to Defendant’s motive, the truth of his testimony on direct examination, and credibility of the complaining witness.”
Even assuming the admitted rebuttal evidence is relevant to motive (which I do only for purposes of this analysis), it would still violate the prohibition *414against division of the prosecution’s evidence. And because, as plaintiff is obviously well aware, “[t]he ex-wife’s refusal to release Defendant’s property back to him, and Defendant’s knowledge that his ex-wife was dating another man provide motive for Defendant to commit the [alleged] assault,” the rebuttal evidence constitutes “needless presentation of cumulative evidence,” and, in this case, “its probative value is substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice . . . .” MRE 403.
The same analysis applies to the alleged admissibility of this evidence as being relevant to the issues of the truthfulness of defendant’s testimony on direct examination and the. credibility of the complaining witness.
The mere fact that the complainant filed ex parte police reports and obtained ex parte injunctions does not directly rebut any portion of defendant’s testimony. That testimony was that they were “trying to reconcile,” always unsuccessfully, and not, as the majority would have it, that they had in fact reconciled and recovered some never-existent connubial bliss. Furthermore, the reports and injunctions are substantively inadmissible because they are hearsay. And to the extent the evidence at issue here relates to the credibility of the complainant, who was called as a witness only in the prosecutor’s case in chief, it violates the rule of Losey, supra, and is therefore improper.6
*415IV
Plaintiff argues that the issue of the admission of the ex parte criminal injunctions is not properly before this Court because defendant failed to object specifically to those documents. Were I forced to confront this argument, I would find defendant’s objection readily discernible from the relevant context.7 MRE 103(a)(1). However, I rely on the following provision of the Michigan Rules of Evidence:
Nothing in this rule precludes taking notice of plain errors affecting substantial rights although they were not brought to the attention of the court. [MRE 103(d).]
A
This Court recently acknowledged “that the distinction between issue preservation and harmless error has not been clearly defined.” People v Grant, 445 Mich 535, 552; 520 NW2d 123 (1994). We then established a rule “which first requires assessing the merits of an issue presented for the first time on appeal,” id., and ultimately held that “a plain, unpreserved error may not be considered by an appellate court for the first time on appeal unless the error could have been decisive of the outcome . . . .” Id. at 553 (emphasis in original). Therefore, because witness credibility *416was the crucial factor in the evidence presented to the jury, I would hold that the plain error committed by the trial court could have been decisive of the outcome. Accordingly, this issue is properly before this Court. See also People v George, 213 Mich App 632; 540 NW2d 487 (1995), holding that substantial rights of the defendant were affected because credibility was the critical issue.
The majority misreads the rule articulated in Grant. The standard is not whether the error was decisive of the outcome (as the majority would have it), ante, p 402, but whether the error could have been decisive of the outcome (as five members of this Court established in Grant, 445 Mich 553). And regardless of the standard used, the majority’s application of it would be flawed because of the improper incursion on the exclusive realm of the factfinder: evaluation of credibility. The majority quotes prosecution witnesses at length and simply asserts that the testimony of these witnesses substantially and irrefutably disproves defendant’s version of events. This is an inappropriate exercise of appellate review.8
*417B
In detennining whether the trial court’s plain error was harmless, “[o]ur responsibility is to determine how the error might have affected the jury’s decision. The inquiry is ‘what effect the error had or reasonably may be taken to have had upon the jury’s decision.’ ” People v Young (After Remand), 425 Mich 470, 505; 391 NW2d 270 (1986). If it is clear that the erroneous admission of the evidence did not prejudice defendant, then the error is harmless. Id. And the burden of proving that defendant suffered no prejudice must be borne, as it has been since the formulation of the original common-law harmless error rule, by the beneficiary of the error. See Chapman v California, 386 US 18, 24; 87 S Ct 824; 17 L Ed 2d 705 (1967), stating that, at common law, the “beneficiary of the error [had] either to prove that there was no injury or to suffer a reversal of his erroneously obtained judgment.”
c
This case presented a classic credibility contest. In quantitative terms, defendant was at an obvious disadvantage because he was the sole witness testifying in support of his version of events, while the prosecution had the complainant and three other persons with obvious loyalties to the complainant as witnesses. Therefore, defendant’s credibility was the crux of his defense, a fact that heightens the prosecutor’s burden to prove that there clearly is no reasonable possibility that the challenged evidence might have contributed to the conviction.
I would hold that plaintiff has not met its burden. I think it manifestly reasonable to assume that the offi*418cial nature of “police reports” and “criminal injunctions” might cause the average juror to give such evidence substantial credence, which, in this case, would have significantly undermined defendant’s credibility, thereby contributing to the conviction. And I also think it reasonable to assume that the jurors would not be aware of the ex parte nature of these documents.
The majority opines that the jury could not have improperly used this erroneously admitted evidence “because of the cautionary instruction given by the trial judge.” Ante, p 400. The judge instructed the jury as follows:
I want to make something clear to the jury. It gets confusing here. These restraining orders — He is not charged with violation of the restraining order. He is not charged with any violation in connection with that. That’s a different matter. That’s a different court. The only purpose that these restraining orders were offered and the only reason I allowed them' — to rebut his testimony that he said that we were reconciling and were getting along fine. That’s the only purpose they’re offered as to what was filed. [Emphasis added.]
In fact, this instraction virtually ensured that the jurors would improperly use this evidence because it instructed them to treat the evidence as substantive proof rebutting defendant’s consistently mischaracterized testimony.
D
My opinion in this regard should not be read as an assertion that the improperly admitted evidence did contribute to the conviction, but, rather, only that plaintiff has failed to meet its burden of proving that *419it is clear there is no reasonable possibility that this improperly admitted evidence might have contributed to the conviction. Accordingly, the trial court’s error was not harmless.
v
I would reverse the decision of the Court of Appeals and remand this case to the trial court for a new trial.
Brickley, C.J., and Levin, J., concurred with Cavanagh, J.MCL 750.110; MSA 28.305.
Defendant originally received a sentence of seven to fifteen years for the underlying charge, but, after pleading guilty to the supplemental information charging him with habitual offender, third offense, that sentence was vacated and defendant was resentenced to the seven- to thirty-year term.
On cross-examination, the complainant testified that defendant had left some record albums and a television set at the residence, but claimed that they became her property when defendant failed to pick them up by a date allegedly established by a Judge Kobza.
The majority refers to my alleged “insinuation” that the test for whether rebuttal evidence was properly admitted is whether that evidence could have been offered in the prosecutor’s case in chief. Ante, p 399. This aspect of the majority’s analysis is regrettable in three respects.
The word “other” signifies to any objective reader that the referent of that word, in this case the word “rule,” is only one of two applicable rules.
Second, the majority’s alternative statement of the rule conveniently ignores the fact that I had already cited the rule that rebuttal evidence must respond to evidence actually offered by the opposing party.
Finally, the majority neglects the fact that in support of my citation of this “other generally applicable rule” I cite opinions of this Court (of both recent and venerable vintage), whereas the majority relies on decisions of the intermediate appellate court.
This is true of defendant’s testimony on both direct and cross-examination. See majority opinion, ante, pp 395-396.
The majority’s contention that Losey and Bennett are “simply not relevant to the case at hand,” ante, p 401, cannot stand unless one accepts the majority’s characterization of defendant’s testimony.
Referring to the criminal injunctions, defense counsel stated:
If they are in fact admissible in regards to what she is trying to impeach, then I will not object.
The injunctions, like the police reports, were offered to rebut defendant’s alleged testimony that he and his ex-wife were “friendly” or "peacefully living together” during the relevant periods of time. As already noted, this characterization of defendant’s testimony, subscribed to by the trial judge, the prosecutor, and the majority of this Court, is erroneous.
In support of the improper conclusion that “the error was not decisive of the outcome,” the majority also emphasizes that “[i]t is undisputed that defendant broke into complainant’s home. Defendant himself admitted this fact.” Ante, p 402. The majority then dramatically concludes that “there can be little dispute that defendant violently broke into complainant’s bedroom.” Id., p 403. It is of course true that defendant admitted breaking into his ex-wife’s home. However, the majority’s inference that this fact is probative of defendant’s alleged intent to commit felonious assault is wholly inappropriate, as indeed is any inference by an appellate court from facts that can support an alternative theory. In this case, defendant’s admitted act of breaking into the home is equally probative of his theory that he was merely attempting to reclaim items of his personal property. This is especially true in the specific factual context of this case where it is equally undisputed that there were items of defendant’s personal property in the home and that defendant was refused admission into the home.