concurring.
The majority concludes that because Kilgore’s putative second marriage was void, it has no legal effect and does not terminate Watts’ alimony obligation. The majority overlooks this court’s recent adoption of the putative marriage doctrine.
The putative marriage doctrine provides that, when a marriage is declared a nullity, the civil effects of a legal marriage will continue to flow to the parties who contracted the marriage in good faith. ... In other words, a putative spouse will have many of the rights of an actual spouse. . . . The putative marriage doctrine enlists justice and equity to protect those who participate in a “marriage ceremony in the good faith belief that the marriage was valid and proper, when it was actually null due to some impediment.”
Hicklin v. Hicklin, 244 Neb. 895, 901, 509 N.W.2d 627, 631 (1994) (quoting Christopher L. Blakesley, The Putative Marriage Doctrine, 60 Tul. L. Rev. 1 (1985)).
In Hicklin, the putative wife entered into the marriage in good faith. The marriage lasted approximately 8 years and produced two children. When the marriage ended, the putative husband sought to avoid any responsibility to provide spousal support solely because the marriage was void. We held that although the parties’ marriage was void, the putative wife was entitled to be compensated as in the case of the dissolution of marriage under Neb. Rev. Stat. § 42-378 (Reissue 1993) and in accord with the putative marriage doctrine.
Therefore, Hicklin provides that void marriages do have a legal effect between the parties contracting the marriage if the marriage was entered into in good faith by at least one putative spouse. The void-voidable marriage distinction, relied upon by the majority, is no longer valid in that context. I question whether the void-voidable marriage distinction should be given any validity in this context. Further, the majority opin*45ion undermines our holding in Hicklin, which was mandated by statute.
In a similar context, the Supreme Court of Iowa, in questioning whether alimony obligations are terminated by the ex-wife’s participation in a void marriage, rejected the use of the void-voidable marriage distinction as positing an inflexible rule in derogation of ordinary principles of equity. Peters v. Peters, 214 N.W.2d 151 (Iowa 1974).
The draconian effect of an inflexible rule can been seen in a review of Nebraska cases.
For example, in Copple v. Bowlin, 172 Neb. 467, 110 N.W.2d 117 (1961), a woman participated in a marriage ceremony 1 day before her divorce from her first husband became final. The second marriage lasted 6 years and produced one child before the husband died in a work-related accident. Since the marriage was void, the woman was not entitled to workers’ compensation benefits.
In another case, the voidness of her marriage deprived a woman of any right to alimony or a portion of the marital estate despite the fact that the putative marriage had lasted for approximately 20 years. Randall v. Randall, 216 Neb. 541, 345 N.W.2d 319 (1984). However, even under the putative marriage doctrine, the woman would not have been granted any relief, because she knew her husband’s 6-month waiting period had not expired when she participated in a marriage ceremony in Mexico with him. Therefore, the essential element of good faith required by Hicklin would not have been met.
In Peters v. Peters, supra, the Iowa Supreme Court, after rejecting the inflexible void-voidable distinction, adopted a practical approach which begins with an inquiry into the intent of the dissolution court as revealed by the divorce decree. The Iowa court would also examine equitable and public policy considerations. I believe that the Peters approach is in accord with the direction this court took when it adopted the putative marriage doctrine in Hicklin v. Hicklin, supra.
Although I respectfully depart from the majority for the foregoing reasons, I concur in the result as to modification of the divorce decree. The scant evidence before us in this case *46suggests that Kilgore participated in the ceremony with Metoyer with the good faith belief that she was free to contract a valid marriage. It is therefore possible under the putative marriage doctrine that Kilgore has some remedies against Metoyer. However, the proceeding below was a garnishment action, and the issue of Kilgore’s remedies against Metoyer was not before the court — more importantly, neither was the issue of modifying the divorce decree between Watts and Kilgore.
Gerrard, J., joins in this concurrence.