OPINION ON PETITION TO REHEAR
Cumberland Capital1 has filed an elaborate petition to rehear taking exceptions to the holding of the Court and rearguing the issues. Additionally it invokes the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the Constitution of the United States, as well as the “commerce clause” (article I, section 8, clause 3).
Petitioners, in their zeal, seemingly have overlooked that this matter came before us on interlocutory appeal. The jurisdiction of *538this Court was invoked under Sec. 27-305, T.C.A., upon the basis that it involved “a controlling question of law as to which there is substantial ground for difference of opinion.” Two questions were certified, viz.:
1. Are the terms of Tennessee Code Annotated Section 45-2007 violative of Article XI, Section 7 of the Constitution of the State of Tennessee?2
2. [If so] is the original complainant entitled to a computation of interest at the rate prescribed by Article XI, Section 7 of the Constitution of the State of Tennessee?
We elected to take jurisdiction of the appeal and answered both questions fully and finally. Further comment upon the various ramifications of the opinion is improper and would be sheer dicta. It is unfortunate that the nature of the appeal and the established principles of appellate review have combined to produce a narrow consideration of limited issues resulting in many questions, the resolution of which is not before this Court. We cannot give advisory opinions.
Our resolution of the issues thus presented came as a result of painstaking research, intensive study and intra-court conferences, during which all phases of the controversy were vigorously debated and discussed. The finished product represents the considered judgment of this Court. Further consideration would serve no useful purpose. We, therefore, overrule, without extended discussion, and as without merit, all questions presented except that relating to the single issue of retroactive versus prospective application.
The leading case on the subject of the prospective application of decisional law is Great Northern Ry. Co. v. Sunburst Oil & Ref. Co., 287 U.S. 358, 53 S.Ct. 145, 77 L.Ed. 360 (1932). Justice Cardozo’s discussion of this issue has come to be known as the “Sunburst” doctrine or technique:
A state in defining the limits of adherence to precedent may make a choice for itself between the principle of forward operation and that of relation backward. It may say that decisions of its highest court, though later overruled, are law none the less for intermediate transactions. Indeed there are cases intimating, too broadly (citations omitted) that it must give them that effect; but never has doubt been expressed that it may so treat them if it pleases, whenever injustice or hardship will thereby be averted. (Emphasis in original). 287 U.S. at 364, 53 S.Ct. at 148.
In Linkletter v. Walker, 381 U.S. 618, 85 S.Ct. 1731, 14 L.Ed.2d 601 (1965), the Court makes it clear that:
. the accepted rule today is that in appropriate cases the Court may in the interest of justice make the rule prospective. 381 U.S. at 628, 85 S.Ct. at 1737.
We think it beyond doubt that this Court, acting in its judgment and discretion, and within the framework of established legal principles, may apply the holding of the instant case either retroactively or prospectively.
Vigorously competing principles of law are involved. Petitioner urges a rule of complete prospective application based on the “presumption of validity” theory, while respondents urge the application of the “void ab initio” doctrine. A discussion of these legal principles is appropriate.
Under the “void ab initio” approach the statute is given no effect and treated as though it never existed, whereas under the “presumption of validity” approach, it must be presumed valid until invalidated by a court of competent jurisdiction. The progenitor of the “void ab initio ” approach in American jurisprudence is Norton v. Shelby County, 118 U.S. 425, 442, 6 S.Ct. 1121, 1125, 30 L.Ed. 178 (1886), wherein the Court formulated the theory thusly:
An unconstitutional act is not a law; it confers no rights; it imposes no duties; it affords no protection; it creates no office; it is, in legal contemplation, as inop*539erative as though it had never been passed.
The Supreme Court of the United States, however, has retreated, at least partially, from this broad formulation where necessary to achieve a more equitable or practical result.
It was first questioned in Chicot County-Drainage Dist. v. Baxter State Bank, 308 U.S. 371, 374, 60 S.Ct. 317, 318-319, 84 L.Ed. 329 (1940), where the Court speaking through Chief Justice Hughes, said:
[S]uch broad statements as to the effect of a determination of unconstitutionality must be taken with qualifications. The actual existence of a statute, prior to such a determination, is an operative fact and may have consequences which cannot justly be ignored. The past cannot always be erased by a new judicial declaration. The effect of the subsequent ruling as to invalidity may have to be considered in various aspects, — with respect to particular relations, individual and corporate, and particular conduct, private and official. Questions of rights, claimed to have become vested, of status, of prior determinations deemed to have finality and acted upon accordingly, of public policy in the light of the nature both of the statute and of its previous application, demand examination. These questions are among the most difficult of those which have engaged the attention of courts, state and federal, and it is manifest from numerous decisions that an all-inclusive statement of a principle of absolute retroactive invalidity cannot be justified.
In Lemon v. Kurtzman, 411 U.S. 192, 93 S.Ct. 1463, 36 L.Ed.2d 151 (1973), Norton came under further critical scrutiny. There Chief Justice Burger said:
However appealing the logic of Norton may have been in the abstract, its abandonment reflected our recognition that statutory or even judge-made rules of law are hard facts on which people must rely in making decisions and in shaping their conduct. This fact of legal life underpins our modern decisions recognizing a doctrine of nonretroaetivity. (Emphasis supplied). 411 U.S. at 199, 93 S.Ct. at 1468.
Notwithstanding the seeming demise of Norton at the hands of its creator, it continues to have at least limited validity in Tennessee.
It was cited, and the pertinent language quoted, in Beaver v. Hall, 142 Tenn. 416, 217 S.W. 649 (1919); however, the Court declined to follow it.
In Roberts v. Roane County, 160 Tenn. 109, 23 S.W.2d 239 (1929), Norton was cited as “the general rule”, but the court introduced an element of estoppel by adding
But it is recognized that parties may so deal with each other upon the faith of such a statute that neither may invoke the aid of the courts to undo what they themselves have done. 160 Tenn. at 124, 23 S.W.2d at 243.
Norton was cited and followed in Henry County v. Standard Oil Co., 167 Tenn. 485, 71 S.W.2d 683 (1934).
It was again followed in State v. Hobbs, 194 Tenn. 323, 250 S.W.2d 549 (1952), and in O’Brien v. Rutherford County, 199 Tenn. 642, 288 S.W.2d 708 (1955).
In State v. Collins, 528 S.W.2d 814 (Tenn.1975), we applied the rule to a case “wherein the question before the court was the appropriate statutory punishment for the criminal offense with which defendant was charged.”
However, in Capri Adult Cinema v. State, 537 S.W.2d 896, 899 (Tenn.1976), the latest pronouncement of this Court, the Court, without citing Norton, but citing State v. Hobbs, supra, with its qualifying language, in effect declined to follow the Norton rule, holding instead:
The principle is well settled in civil litigation that when parties have dealt with each other at arms’ length upon the basis of an unconstitutional statute, they are bound by the results of their actions.
The dissenting opinion Capri cited the Norton rule as set forth in Henry County v. Standard Oil Co., supra; however, this reliance was in the context of a conviction *540under a criminal statute subsequently declared unconstitutional.
No reported Tennessee case has discussed the “void ab initio ” approach in the context of the retroactive versus prospective application of a declaration of the unconstitutionality of a statute. While Norton may have some continuing validity under some circumstances, we do not consider it authoritative or dispositive of the issues at hand.
We think the better, more equitable and more realistic rule is that “an unconstitutional act ‘is not void, but voidable only,’ until condemned by judicial pronouncement.” Roberts v. Roane County, supra. As phrased in Bricker v. Sims, 195 Tenn. 361, 368, 259 S.W.2d 661, 664 (1953):
Every act of the Legislature is presumptively constitutional until judicially declared otherwise .
The decisional law of Tennessee has followed the “presumption of validity” rule in numerous reported cases.3
In the case of Perkins v. Eskridge, 278 Md. 619, 366 A.2d 21 (1976), the Maryland Court of Appeals, in a most excellent opinion, focuses upon the issue thusly:
. . it seems clear that the modern trend has been away from the doctrinaire void ab initio approach toward the more realistic views which have applied tests of reasonableness and good faith to determine the consequences flowing from conduct undertaken pursuant to an unconstitutional act. 366 A.2d at 29-30.
Numerous reported cases deal with the issue of prospective application of decisional law declaring state statutes to be unconstitutional. See, e. g. Deltona Corporation v. Bailey, 336 So.2d 1163 (Fla.1976); Barnett v. Develle, 289 So.2d 129 (La.1974); Westbrook v. Mihaly, 2 Cal.3d 765, 87 Cal.Rptr. 839, 471 P.2d 487 (1970); and Austin v. Campbell, 91 Ariz. 195, 370 P.2d 769 (1963).
In the landmark case of Linkletter v. Walker, 381 U.S. 618, 85 S.Ct. 1731, 14 L.Ed.2d 601 (1965) the Court established criteria for determining whether new constitutional rulings, in both civil and criminal cases, would be applied retrospectively or prospectively. The Court said:
Once the premise is accepted that we are neither required to apply, nor prohibited from applying, a decision retrospectively, we must then weigh the merits and demerits in each case by looking to the prior history of the rule in question, its purpose and effect, and whether retrospective operation will further or retard its operation. 381 U.S. at 729, 85 S.Ct. at 1738, 14 L.Ed.2d at 608.
Many considerations enter into a determination of whether to apply a decision of this nature retroactively. A foremost consideration must be fundamental fairness. The Court, in Cipriano v. City of Houma, 395 U.S. 701, 89 S.Ct. 1897, 23 L.Ed.2d 647 (1969), recognized this:
[where] a decision of this Court could produce substantial inequitable results if applied retroactively, there is ample basis in our cases for avoiding the “injustice or hardship” by a holding of nonretroactivity. 395 U.S. at 706, 89 S.Ct. at 1900, 23 L.Ed.2d at 652.
The Supreme Court in Chevron Oil Company v. Huson, 404 U.S. 97, 92 S.Ct. 349, 30 L.Ed.2d 296 (1971), set forth standards or factors in cases dealing with retroactivity:
First, the decision . . . must establish a new principle of law, either by *541overruling clear past precedent on which litigants may have relied . . . or by deciding an issue of first impression whose resolution was not clearly foreshadowed. . . . Second, it has been stressed that “we must * * * weigh the merits and demerits in each case by looking to the prior history of the rule in question, its purpose and effect, and whether retrospective operation will further or retard its operation. Finally, we have weighed the inequity imposed by retroactive application.” . . . . 404 U.S. at 106-107, 92 S.Ct. at 355, 30 L.Ed.2d at 306.
The Sixth Circuit, in Rivera v. Rose, 465 F.2d 727, 729 (1972), listed the criteria for determining prospective application as follows:
. (1) the purpose to be served by the new standard (2) the extent of the reliance by law enforcement officials upon prior decisions on the subject, and (3)the effect on the administration of justice of a retroactive standard.
Finally, in Lemon v. Kurtzman, supra, the Court, in a matter of equitable cognizance, determining against retroactivity, saying:
In equity, as nowhere else, courts eschew rigid absolutes and look to the practical realities and necessities inescapably involved in reconciling competing interests, notwithstanding that those interests have constitutional roots. 411 U.S. at 201, 93 S.Ct. at 1469, 36 L.Ed.2d at 162.
The most excellent case of United States v. Benitez Rexach, 411 F.Supp. 1288 (D.Puerto Rico 1976), relying upon Chevron, supra, adds the important factor of “foreseeability of the lack thereof, that the legal doctrine or statute in question would be declared unconstitutional.”
Prompted by these authorities and motivated by our concept of fundamental fairness, we believe the controlling considerations in determining whether to apply a declaration of the unconstitutionality of a statute on a retrospective versus a prospective basis are these:
(1) The prior history of the rule in question, its purpose and effect. Linkletter, supra; Chevron, supra.
(2) Whether retrospective operation will further or retard its operation. Linkletter, supra; Chevron, supra; Rivera, supra.
(3) Whether retrospective operation would produce substantial inequitable results. Cipriano, supra.
(4) Whether litigants and others similarly situated have relied upon the unconstitutional statute. Chevron, supra; Rivera, supra.
(5) Whether the declaration of unconstitutionality was foreseeable. Chevron, supra.
(6) The effect on the administration of justice. Rivera, supra; Benitez Rexach, supra.
While strictly speaking, we have not declared any statute to be unconstitutional,4 we apply these criteria to the case at bar, and with specific reference to Industrial Loan and Thrift Companies.
The history of the constitutional and statutory provisions of Tennessee relating to interest are set forth in great detail in the main opinion. The purpose and effect of the qualified declaration of unconstitutionality was to bring the laws of Tennessee relating to interest rates charged by Industrial Loan and Thrift companies into harmony with the pertinent provisions of the Constitution of Tennessee. This purpose and effect will be accomplished irrespective of its application. In our view, general retroactive application will only serve as a penalty and will neither further nor retard the effective operation of the decision reached.
Wholly retrospective operation will produce substantial inequitable results. Cum*542berland Capital asserts in its petition to rehear that “[millions of transactions involving billions of dollars have been undertaken in reliance on it.” While we do not know the specifics, we are persuaded that the impact of general retroactive application would be enormous.
While we are only concerned in this action with the constitutionality of Sec. 45-2007(f) T.C.A., it is possible that the rationale of this opinion will apply to other statutes, however, they are not before the Court for consideration, and it would be improper for us to make an advance determination on financial institutions not parties to this controversy.
Industrial Loan and Thrift Companies have relied upon the constitutionality of Sec. 45-2007(f) T.C.A.
Applying this decision on a wholly retroactive basis would not only result in financial disaster to the affected lending agencies that have loaned in the manner and at the rate authorized by the Industrial Loan and Thrift Act, but would clog the courts for years to come with untold lawsuits brought by those who would seek to avoid their solemn contractual commitments.
We apply the decision in this case to all notes, contracts, and obligations signed, or incurred, on and after August 23, 1977, and to all interest accruing on and after that date, irrespective of the date the instrument was signed, or the obligation was incurred. However, we apply it retroactively to all cases wherein there has not been strict compliance with the Industrial Loan and Thrift Company Act as set forth in Section 45-2001 through Section 45-2021, T.C.A.; (Main volume and 1976 Supplement).
Consideration of fairness and public policy, along with the criteria herein discussed, command this conclusion.
As indicated in our main opinion, we apply the decision retroactively to the instant suit.
We fully realize that there are other litigants now in various stages of trial or appellate process who will be foreclosed by the rule of limited prospective application we have announced. This is an unavoidable consequence of the basic principle that this Court may not give advisory opinions. If we do not apply the rule we announce to the case at bar, everything we have said becomes advisory in nature and is pure dicta. If we do not apply it to Industrial Loan and Thrift Companies that have not fully complied with statutory provisions, we would be legitimating unfair lending practices.
The Supreme Court of the United States faced this problem in Stovall v. Denno, 388 U.S. 293, 87 S.Ct. 1967, 18 L.Ed.2d 1199 (1967), and said:
Inequity arguably results from according the benefit of a new rule to the parties in the case in which it is announced but not to other litigants similarly situated in the trial or appellate process who have raised the same issue. But we regard the fact that the parties involved are chance beneficiaries as an insignificant cost for adherence to sound principles of decision making. 388 U.S. at 301, 87 S.Ct. at 1972, 18 L.Ed.2d at 1206.
Further, and on somewhat less esoteric grounds, we find that “the party who brings about the change in law may not properly be deprived of the fruits of his victory”. Schaefer, “The Control of ‘Sunbursts’: Techniques of Prospective Overruling," 42 N.Y.U.L.Rev. 631 (1967), reprinted in R. Leflar, Appellate Judicial Opinions, at 141 (1974).
And as the California Supreme Court said in Li v. Yellow Cab Co., 13 Cal.3d 804, 119 Cal.Rptr. 858, 876, 532 P.2d 1226, 1244 (1975):
[T]he new rule here announced should be applied additionally to the case at bench so as to provide incentive in future cases for parties who may have occasion to raise “issues involving renovation of unsound or outmoded legal doctrines.”
Hence, we apply the new rule to the case at bar, but prospectively to all present or future litigants, except in those cases where the lender did not comply with the Industrial Loan and Thrift Act.
*543COOPER, C. J., and FONES, J., concur.
HARBISON, J., dissenting in part, concurring in part.
. An Indiana corporation, erroneously identified in our opinion as a Tennessee corporation.
. No issue was presented under the Federal Constitution.
. Collier v. Montgomery County, 103 Tenn. 705, 54 S.W. 989 (1900) (a contract made between county and sheriff under a law later declared unconstitutional held binding upon the parties and sheriff not permitted to disaffirm and collect greater amount); Beaver v. Hall, 142 Tenn. 416, 217 S.W. 649 (1919) (an unconstitutionally created court was a de facto court until there was a judicial determination of its invalidity); Roberts v. Roane County, 160 Tenn. 109, 23 S.W.2d 239 (1929) (county es-topped from recovering money paid to sheriff under a void statute); Claybrook v. State, 164 Tenn. 440, 51 S.W.2d 499 (1932) (criminal liability may not be predicated upon conduct lawful under a statute subsequently declared unconstitutional); Rust, et al. v. Newby, 171 Tenn. 127, 100 S.W.2d 989 (1937) (The presumption in favor of the validity of statutes requires that they be observed until declared void by an authoritative tribunal); State v. Hobbs, 194 Tenn. 323, 250 S.W.2d 549 (1952) (county not permitted to recover salary paid under an unconstitutional act).
. The main opinion holds that “Sec. 45-2007(f) is unconstitutional and void, insofar as it is applied to any note or obligation, discounted at Th% per annum and payable in monthly installments, or to any other transaction, regardless of how payment is programmed, if the end result is an effective rate of interest in excess of ten percent.”