(dissenting). I respectfully dissent. Dianne Niemi relies on §§ 767.32(lm) and 767.32(lr), Stats., to prohibit the circuit court from granting any credits for payments not made through the clerk of court. Section 767.32(lm) provides that the circuit court may not revise the amount of child support due under an order or judgment for support prior to the date that the notice of a petition to revise support is given to the custodial parent. This section eliminated a child support obligor's right to petition for retroactive modification of support and thereby redefine his or her obligation with respect to accumulated support arrearages. Schulz v. Ystad, 155 Wis. 2d 574, 598, 456 N.W.2d 312, 321 (1990). What is important to note is that § 767.32 is directed at an obligor parent's efforts to revise the amount of child support payments. Section 767.32(lr) also refers to an action to revise the amount of child support and prohibits the circuit court from giving credit against the support payment other than payments made through the clerk of court.
*817However, Dianne Niemi's motion was filed pursuant to § 767.30(3)(c), Stats., which provides:
If the party fails to pay a payment ordered under sub. (1). .. the court may by any appropriate remedy enforce the judgment, or the order as if it were a final judgment, including any past due payment and interest. Appropriate remedies include but are not limited to:
(c) Money judgment for past due payments.
Here, Niemi's original motion alleges "that said Respondent failed to maintain regular child support payments as ordered by the aforementioned divorce judgment, and accordingly, he has accrued an arrears _"In short, the purpose of these hearings in response to Niemi's motion was not to revise the amount of a child support order, but rather to obtain a money judgment for the child support payments not made, the arrears.
The factual issue before the trial court was whether Robert Fisher made the required child support payments. Fisher contended that his payments were made directly to Niemi while she contended that the few payments he made were for health insurance. Rejecting Niemi's testimony, the trial court found that Fisher made a substantial number of child support payments by check or money order directly to Niemi. It also concluded that Fisher's support payments were not required when their youngest son lived with Fisher. The evidence more than amply supports the trial court's findings. Consequently, I would reject the application of § 767.32, STATS., to this proceeding which was solely for the purpose of obtaining a money judgment for the unpaid child support.
*818Additionally, I would conclude that even if § 767.32, STATS., applies, Niemi is equitably estopped from asserting this statute, and the trial court is permitted to consider the support payments made directly to Niemi. Here, the trial court found that for years Fisher made his support payments by check or money order directly to Niemi and that she accepted these payments on a regular basis without objection. This is understandable because both parents were living in California when Fisher started paying Niemi directly, making it less practical to pay through the clerk of circuit court in Douglas County, Wisconsin. Niemi also consented to their youngest son living with Fisher for about five months shortly before the son reached age eighteen.
I recognize that in Schulz the supreme court permitted the circuit court to allow credit against the support payments to avoid a manifest injustice or unjust enrichment. However, the court was reviewing the general rule existing prior to the adoption of § 767.32(lm), Stats. Because we are now dealing with a statute, I also recognize that we must not refuse to apply a statute because its strict application would create a hardship. It is our duty to expound the statute as it stands, even if the consequence is a hardship.
However, as the supreme court recognized in Schulz, we cannot close our eyes to reality. To conclude that these repeated payments were not made with Niemi's express or implied consent ignores reality. Similarly, the reality of the circumstances suggests that Niemi consented to their youngest son living with Fisher. The trial court's findings are clear and amply supported by the evidence. Except for the sum of $3,000, Fisher made his court-ordered child support *819payments directly to Niemi, who repeatedly accepted these payments without objection.
Therefore, I would conclude under these circumstances that Niemi is equitably estopped from asserting § 767.32(lm) and (lr), STATS., which under the majority's analysis prevents the trial court from considering the payments made outside the clerk of court's office.1 To require Fisher to pay again for the child support payments results in a manifest injustice to Fisher and an unjust enrichment for Niemi. A custodial parent should not be permitted to directly accept the child support payments and then later recover a money judgment for those same payments simply because they were not made through the clerk of court.
Finally, I would also construe § 767.32(lr), STATS., to only prevent the trial court from giving credit against the required support payments when it involves gifts or other voluntary expenditures made on behalf of the child, not support payments made directly to the custodial parent. The purpose of this statute is to prevent unilateral modifications of court orders, which tend to interfere with the right and responsibility of the custodial parent to decide how the support money should be spent. When the support money is given directly to the custodial parent, this consideration is no longer applicable.
I do agree with the majority however that Fisher must pay interest on the unpaid child support pay*820ments. That interest should be on the $3,000 of unpaid payments.
Fisher did not raise this particular equitable estoppel argument because the purpose and focus at the hearing was to determine what support payments Fisher made and, accordingly, any arrearage. Although Fisher never presented this particular argument, I would conclude under the circumstances it is appropriate for this court to address this issue.