In Re the Marriage of Pundt

CADY, Judge,

dissenting.

I respectfully dissent. The trial court correctly placed all the children with Jeaniee, and I would affirm the trial court’s decision without modification.

The majority opinion recognizes the presumption, etched into our law, that siblings should not be separated following the divorce of their parents. Yet, it has seriously diluted its importance, as well as its underlying purposes, by permitting it to be overcome by evidence which is far from compelling. The concurring opinion openly acknowledges the presumption should be abandoned.

The strong public policy of keeping sibling together following divorce is based on sound considerations. We have long recognized split physical care deprives children of the important benefit of growing up together. In re Marriage of Will, 489 N.W.2d 394, 398 (Iowa 1992). Moreover, separation of siblings only adds to the trauma of parental divorce, and further destroys the remaining semblance of familial ties. Jay M. Zitter, Annotation, Child Custody: Separating Children by Custody Awards to Different Parents — Post-1975 Cases, 67 ALR 4th 354, 360 (1989). The presumption against separation is overcome only when the circumstances demonstrate separation will promote the long range interests of the children. Id. Factors to consider include the caretaking abilities of the parents, the difference in age between the children, whether the children would have been together if split physical care was not ordered, the relationships between the children, and the likelihood one of the parents or children would turn the other children against the other parent.

The evidence presented at trial to support the separation of siblings really boils down to a strong father-son attachment. Yet, that circumstance, nor any of the other circumstances mentioned by the majority, fails to supply the good and compelling reasons needed to overcome the legal presumption. Most of the circumstances mentioned by the majority to support the decision to separate the children are no different than the normal circumstances experienced by children when one parent moves from the community where the family resided during the marriage. Evidence presented also illuminated the detrimental effect the split custody would have on Derrick’s attitude toward his sisters. The district court also questioned Ricky’s maturity level and his abilities to parent his son. We are directed to give weight to the finding of the trial court. Iowa R.App.P. 14(f)(7). In this light, the strong presumption against children being separated from one another has not been overcome.

A strong father-son relationship is no more important than a strong mother-son relationship or a strong sibling-sibling relationship. This is an equitable principle that strikes at *248the core of this case, and reveals the fundamental flaw in the decision of the majority. The driving reason custody of these children was split was the close relationship between Derrick and his father. This is not the factor I would use to split children, nor is it one I believe our law endorses.

Like the majority, I too have the best interests of Derrick in mind, but no less than the best interests of Danielle and Devin. The interests of these three children have been written into our governing legal principles, and motivate my departure from the majority. Those interests should not be overcome by the desires of a pre-adolescent boy or those of a father who singles out one of his children as his best friend.