(dissenting):
The first of this series of related cases concerning the apportionment of the Congressional districts of Illinois, Kirby v. Illinois State Electoral Board, 65-C-75, was filed in this court in January of 1965. That case challenged the Congressional districts which were enacted by the Illinois legislature pursuant to statute and purportedly on the basis of population (Illinois Rev.Stat., Ch. 46 § 156 f.1) in its 1961 session. The districts so drawn were not substantially equal in population and as such were constitutionally invalid. Wesberry v. Sanders, 376 U.S. 1, 84 S.Ct. 526, 11 L.Ed.2d 481 (1964). The Kirby case and a later filed case, Kusek v. Kerner, 65-C-81, were consolidated before me as the judge to whom the lower numbered case had been assigned by lot. (See local Rule 10 of this district). Shortly after the case was assigned to me, I determined that this was a matter which must be heard -by a three judge court pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2284. Subsequently and pursuant to § 2284 Chief Circuit Judge Castle and District Judge Decker were designated to complete the three judge panel.
Similar litigation was pending at that time in the Supreme Court of Illinois, see People ex rel. Scott v. Kerner, 32 Ill.2d 539, 208 N.E.2d 561 (1965). By order of the Supreme Court of Illinois and of this court the two political factions which make up the State Electoral Board were granted an opportunity to settle this controversy in an orderly fashion in pre-trial conference in this court. Accordingly and pursuant to that order and with the approval of the Illinois Supreme Court and Judges Castle and Decker, I conducted lengthy Rule 16 (F.R.Civ. P.) conferences with counsel for both parties and subsequently reached an agreement on districts which fully complied with the then Supreme Court standards in terms of “one man-one vote.” See Kirby v. Illinois State Electoral Board, 251 F.Supp. 908, N.D.Ill. Again with the approval of the Illinois Supreme Court simultaneous decrees were entered and promulgated as the redistricting plan for the Illinois Congressional districts. See Kirby and People ex rel. Scott, supra.
In fashioning the relief in that case we stressed in our opinion, as did the Illinois Supreme Court in its opinion, that all of the districts originally established by the legislature, including those admittedly malapportioned, constituted a nucleus around which constitutional congressional districts can be and were constructed without drastic change. As stated in my opinion: “I have furthermore with the approval of the Illinois Supreme Court, after studying the maps of the parties and considering the areas of divergence, prepared a congressional reapportionment plan utilizing the nucleus of each existing congressional district and enlarging or decreasing it to comply with the one man one vote principle.” 251 F.Supp. at 910.
In its simultaneous decree, the Illinois Supreme Court also stressed the same considerations:
We believe the provisional plan so adopted to be just, equitable and constitutionally valid. As stated in the Federal district court’s pretrial memorandum, this plan utilizes the nucleus of each existing congressional district, * * * enlarging or decreasing it to comply with the ‘one man, one vote’ principle, thereby according the greatest possible effect to the 1961 legislatively devised apportionment plan which should heretofore govern congressional representative elections.” (33 Ill.2d at 462, 211 N.E.2d at 737).
The Illinois Supreme Court added that it considered our resolution of this problem an accomplishment it deemed “conducive to the best interests of the people of this State.”
Both courts also stressed that, “Since apportionment problems are pre-eminently legislative responsibilities, the plan described in this opinion is required only by legislative nonfeasance and is therefore provisional in nature.”
The provisional judicial plan was thus put into effect and governed the con*855gressional elections of 1966 and 1968, due to continued legislative nonfeasance.
In 1969, in the wake of two decisions of the United States Supreme Court, Kirkpatrick v. Preisler, 394 U.S. 526, 89 S.Ct. 1225, 22 L.Ed.2d 519 (1969), and Wells v. Rockefeller, 394 U.S. 542, 89 S.Ct. 1234, 22 L.Ed.2d 535 (1969), plaintiffs filed this latest case alleging that the provisional judicially drawn districts of 1965 exceeded constitutional standards promulgated in those new cases. In Kirkpatrick deviations of only 3.13 percent above and 2.83 percent below the average were held invalid. In Wells the court rejected deviations ranging from 6.6 percent above to 6.8 percent below the average. The provisional judicially drawn map of Illinois contained deviations as high as 7.5 percent above the average and 6.1 percent below. Because the allegations of plaintiffs’ complaint brought into question the validity of our continuing provisional decree entered mutually with the Supreme Court of Illinois, the cause was assigned to my calendar and to this panal as being related to the original Kirby case.
Upon a hearing we concluded that the relief we fashioned in our provisional plan in the light of recent and subsequent Supreme Court cases did not go far enough in the adjustments that we had made in the original legislative districts. We therefore concluded that the provisional plan was itself not constitutional, and that further modifications were necessary. 307 F.Supp. 698. We further concluded that because the 1960 census figures were no longer reliable, the most appropriate relief would be to permit the election of 1970 to proceed under the provisional plan still in effect and await the computation of reliable and accurate census figures which would be available after the 1970 census. In our order we specifically stated we assumed that the General Assembly of Illinois would at long last do its duty and enact a valid plan for the districting of Illinois Congressional districts based on the 1970 census. If it failed so to do we specifically stated that, “this court shall undertake approprate relief”, obviously thus anticipating possible further adjustments in the 1961 legislative plan.
When viewed against this background it is clear to me that the jurisdiction of this panel under our general retention order was and is limited to making our provisional plan constitutional under changing Supreme Court decisions and population census changes until the Illinois legislature exercises its primary constitutional function of drawing new districts for the election of members to the United States House of Representatives. We have, in my judgment, no authority at this stage of these seven year old “provisional” proceedings to usurp the legislative function and draw entirely new districts to favor one geographical segment of the state, to reduce minority representation, to gerrymander politically to the benefit of one party or for any other reason.
When the legislature failed in its duty to redistrict during the 1971 session we invited all parties, and all those who sought to become parties, to file with the court any proposal they might have to validate our provisional plan until the legislature should finally act. In response to that order four plans were timely filed; one by the plaintiff; one by the Illinois Congressional Delegation; one by the Republican Leadership of the Illinois House of Representatives;1 and a fourth by one Aram Hartunian, a private citizen and attorney who sought leave to intervene. The Illinois Democratic State Central Committee and Democratic Central Committee of Cook County (“Democratic Party”) also filed a plan in support of their argument at the hearing.
A hearing was held, evidence submitted and arguments heard as to the merits or lack thereof in each of the plans submitted. Upon said evidence as submitted and pursuant to Rule 52, F.R.C.P., I make *856the following Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law.
The teachings of Kirkpatrick v. Preisler and Wells v. Rockefeller, supra, require mathematical exactness in the drawing of congressional districts, and any variance, however so slight, must be justified. In light of those teachings it is apparent that in any apportionment case where there are alternatives before a court the court must approve the plan which appears to be the most perfect in terms of population or find specific facts as to why the most perfect plan was rejected in favor of another proposal. This proposition is illustrated in a recent decision of Chief Justice Warren Burger denying a stay order in a school segregation case, Board of Education v. Scott, No. 71-274, Oct. Term 1971, decided August 31, 1971. In that case, the Chief Justice cites and quotes a prior decision in the case rendered by the Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit: “If the district court approves a plan achieving less actual desegregation than would be achieved under an alternate proposed plan, it should find facts that are thought to make impracticable the achieving of the greater degree of integration.”
In this case it is stipulated by all parties and I now so find that the most perfect plan before this court in terms of mathematical exactness is that submitted by the Democratic Party in its argument before us. Accordingly under the teachings of Kirkpatrick and Wells, supra, we are bound to accept that plan or find facts which indicate that the acceptance of that plan is impracticable or that the acceptance of another is for some reason justified.
In my consideration of the plan submitted by the Democratic Party I find that partisan inspired plan unacceptable as it goes well beyond the limited provisional relief anticipated in our prior decrees and orders, and presents an entirely new plan both in theory and in practical result.
I find the plans submitted by plaintiff Skolnick, Mr. Hartunian and by the Republican leadership (generally referred to as the “Blair” plan) unacceptable for the same reasons. I further find and conclude that the only map presented to the court which complies or even attempts to comply with our limited power to alter the provisional decree is that expertly drawn plan submitted by the Illinois Congressional delegation. That plan is supported by all incumbent Congressmen from Illinois (12 Republicans and 12 Democrats). In terms of mathematical equality between districts, it is clearly superior to the maps of the plaintiff, of Hartunian and of the Republican leaders of the House which follow in that order. Most importantly, however, the Congressional delegation has in a statesmanlike fashion submitted a plan which totally utilizes the nucleus of each existing congressional district and enlarges or decreases a district only in so far as it is necessary to do so to comply with our directive of mathematical exactness. In this regard it causes the least drastic changes in the provisional plan heretofore promulgated by this court and the Illinois Supreme Court and accomplishes exactly what in my judgment this panel has the limited jurisdiction to do.
In adopting the Congressional Delega- . tions’ proposal as the only valid plan before the court, I conclude that a court, no less than a legislature, should, where possible, avoid doing “unnecessary violence to the heart of existing districts”. Maryland Citizens Committee for Fair Congressional Redistricting v. Tawes, 253 F.Supp. 731 (M.D.Md.1966). For continuity in government is a valid consideration in legislative redistricting. See Skolnick v. City Council, 319 F.Supp. 1219 (N.D.Ill.1970).
I am gratified that James P. Chapman, Esq., who is Executive Director of the Independent Precinct Organization, an active force in independent politics, and who was appointed by the Chicago Bar Association to act on its behalf as Amicus Curiae and as counsel for the class, i. e. the voters of Illinois, appears to agree with my analysis of the various proposals. *857Mr. Chapman,2 speaking only as our appointed Amicus Curiae summarized for us at our hearing the various proposals.
As to the proposal of the Congressional Delegation, Mr. Chapman in substance stated that this proposal has merit in that it grows on something the Courts have approved in the past and something originally approved in the process of political give and take, i. e., the 1961 statute.
The adoption of the Congressional Delegation’s plan will also preserve the harmony and good relations this Court has enjoyed with the Courts of Illinois. The history of judicial reapportionment in Illinois thus far records close cooperation between this court and the Illinois Supreme Court thus avoiding any disruption of state-federal relations in this ultra sensitive subject. The mutual involvement of the Illinois Supreme Court and this Court in the subject of reapportionment is discussed in detail by Professor Robert G. Dixon, “Democratic Representation-Reapportionment in Law and Politics,” (Oxford University Press 1968). Stated briefly, in 1965 cases involving the apportionment of the Illinois State Senate were filed in both the Illinois Supreme Court and this Court. See People ex. rel. Engle v. Kerner, 32 Ill.2d 212, 203 N.E.2d 33 (1965), and Germano v. Kerner, 241 F.Supp. 715 (N.D.Ill. 1965). Because of the potential controversy between this Court and the Supreme Court of Illinois, the Supreme Court of the United States wisely directed our Court to defer to the Illinois Supreme Court in our reapportionment efforts. After extensive Rule 16 (F.R.C.P.) conferences were held by me, agreement was reached on the Illinois Senate Reapportionment and the map in that case was jointly promulgated by this Court and the Illinois Supreme Court. These Congressional redistricting cases immediately followed and, as above stated, agreement was again accomplished on the same basis. See Kirby v. State of Illinois Electoral Board, and People ex rel. Scott v. Kerner, supra. I think it quite apparent from reading our decision in Kirby and the decision of the Supreme Court in People ex rel. Scott that this harmony was preserved only by our adoption of a plan which was provisional in nature and which utilized the nucleus of existing districts based on the last valid legislative plan. I conclude that any drastic deviation from the provisional plan approved by the Illinois Supreme Court breaks faith with that Court and is totally inconsistent with the directive of the United States Supreme Court to defer to the Illinois Court in these reapportionment issues.
My distinguished brothers constituting the majority of this panel approve entirely, without any changes even to accomplish the mathematical perfection of the other plans before us, and as a new provisional plan, the proposal submitted by the Republican leadership of the Illinois House of Representatives referred to as the Blair Plan. I regret that I must at this point part company with them in this case.
The Blair ’Plan I find is a purely partisan effort by the Republican leadership in the Illinois House. I further find its only distinction to be the extent to which it achieves the utmost in political gerrymandering. It is not mathematically the best plan. It has no relationship whatsoever to the plan adopted by this court jointly with the Supreme Court of Illinois as a provisional plan in 1965. It completely abandons the “nucleus of existing congressional districts” and thereby gives no effect, “to the 1961 legislatively devised apportionment plan.”
The Blair Plan is all but identical to the proposal introduced into but not passed by the Illinois Legislature. (H.B. 2907, 77th General Assembly). The bill did pass the House of Representatives in the last hours of the last session, but only as a vehicle for negotiations in the Senate. Those negotiations of course failed and the bill did not pass the Senate. *858Furthermore, the bill as passed also contained a complete plan for the reapportionment of Illinois Senate and House districts. Its passing the House is thus totally irrelevant. Indeed, the weakness of the majority opinion herein is demonstrated by its reliance on this thin reed.
We were told by their counsel that the Blair Plan is a desirable one because it “recognizes existing political boundaries,” that is as many districts as possible are completely contained within the City of Chicago. Ironically in the rest of Cook County the plan completely disregards the territorial integrity of cities and villages. Instead, antiquated township lines are followed, which guarantees that municipalities will be divided. On cross examination, Representative Madigan, the chief architect of the Blair proposal, admitted that the City of Chicago was the only city whose boundaries were considered in the preparation of his proposal.
By Mr. Hartunian:
Q. You found it appropriate in drawing the map that you submitted to differentiate the City of Chicago’s population from all the suburban population of Cook County. That is what your map does, isn’t it ?
A. Yes, sir.
Q. Is that because you find that it’s advisable to keep cities as much as possible separate, separate from suburban areas, on the basis of community of interest?
A. It is an expression of a desire on my part to recognize the existing political boundaries wherever that can be done without causing population variances, and I believe that we have done that.
Q. In the 12th District and in the 10th District, for example, you used township lines, didn’t you ?
A. That’s right.
Q. You are aware that township lines run right through various municipalities ?
A. Yes, sir.
Q. Do you know whether or not the northern boundary of Maine Township runs right through the Village of Glen-view?
A. No, I do not know that.
Q. Well, do you know whether or not the township boundaries of Maine Township run through several municipalities ?
A. No, sir, I do not know that.
Q. Do you know that it’s typical, at least in Cook County, for township lines to run right through municipalities?
A. Are you asking me if I know—
Q. If you know that.
A. (Continuing): —that that type of situation exists generally throughout Cook County?
Q. Yes.
A. Yes, I’m aware of that.
Q. So in using township lines, you necessarily divide municipalities ?
A. That’s correct.
On the basis of the evidence I find that the sole reason the geographic boundaries of Chicago are adhered to in the Blair proposal while all others are disregarded is that by containing as many districts as possible totally within the City of Chicago — where votes are predominantly Democratic — the number of seats that party can win in Congress is limited and the voices of the many minorities residing in Chicago are diluted.
Blair proponents also urge that the “suburbs” are entitled to mote representation because population trends indicate a movement of population from the city into the suburbs. But any map approved on the basis of one-man one-vote will insure equal representation to every voter no matter where he lives.
Finally, the Blair proposal is said to be without any political motivation whatsoever. I find that suggestion to be completely dispelled in the following colloquy which occurred after Representative Madigan explained that in their proposal there was only one district (the 17th) *859where he was sure there was no present incumbent congressman.
Q. Now, does the Speaker of the Illinois House presently reside in District 17?
A. In proposed District 17, yes.
Judge Campbell: That is Mr. Blair?
Mr. Reuben: Mr. Blair.
By Mr. Reuben:
Q. Old District 17 is Mr. Arends’ district, is it not ?
A. That’s right.
Q. Present District 17. And he would be — under your proposal, he would be no longer — no longer reside in new District 17, correct?
Mr. Wexler: I object to that, because Representative Arends can change his address at any time.
Mr. Reuben: Assuming he doesn’t.
Judge Castle: Overruled. He may answer.
By the Witness:
A. Assuming that Representative Arends continues to live in Melvin, he would live in proposed District 15.
By Mr. Reuben:
Q. Did the Speaker of the House name you as chairman of the reapportionment committee?
Mr. Wexler: Objection.
Judge Castle: Overruled.
By the Witness:
A. Yes.
Furthermore, I find that while counsel urging the Blair proposal vigorously attacks the Congressional delegation map as an attempt to protect incumbents, in the Blair proposal no incumbent Republican is threatened with loss of his seat in Congress. It seems that in the opinion of the Blair proponents protection of incumbents can be either vice or virtue depending upon the political affiliation of the incumbent.
In sum, the Blair proposal — which passed the Illinois House of Representatives only as a vehicle for negotiations which failed in the Senate — is but a poorly disguised attempt to segregate the voters of the City of Chicago from the rest of Cook County in an effort thereby to dilute the overall voting strength of the large Democratic majorities that reside within that City. It has the ancillary benefits of preserving the seats of all incumbent Republicans and assuring for the Speaker of the House a seat in Congress for him or his designate. In my judgment it has no other merits which lend itself to adoption by this court.
Again paraphrasing our Amicus, Mr. Chapman, the Blair proposal in its effort to separate the City of Chicago from the remainder of Cook County has an obvious devisive effect and is founded on political considerations not in the public interest.
I mean no criticism of the Republican leaders of the Illinois House for their preparation and presentation of their plan, both in the General Assembly and before this Court. On the contrary, I commend them for their partisan advocacy. I do take issue with my brothers on this Court however to the extent that they may adopt such partisan advocacy in their decree.
In my view, by adopting the Blair plan the majority completely disregards the sole function of our self extended and outworn jurisdiction in this case and becomes legislators in their own right. In his celebrated dissenting opinion in Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 82 S.Ct. 691, 7 L.Ed.2d 663 (1962), the landmark case thrusting our courts into this political thicket of legislative reapportionment, Mr. Justice Frankfurter forewarned that the incursion by the judiciary into the traditional domain of the legislature would, “invite legislatures to play ducks and drakes with the judiciary.” 369 U.S. at 268, 82 S.Ct. at 738. Justice Frankfurter’s words have indeed proven prophetic.
In their drastic departure from the provisional plan the majority not only breaks faith with the Supreme Court of Illinois but in my view seriously misleads the parties to this litigation. This cause *860came to this panel as a related case— related to the 1965 Kirby case, in which the provisional plan was promulgated by this panel and the Illinois Supreme Court. If such drastic relief had been thought possible, surely the parties would have insisted upon a new assignment which would have been their right under our local rule. (See local rule 10, General Rules Northern District of Illinois). Furthermore, by adopting a wholly new plan the majority also departs from the procedures which we have adopted in the prior related cases of sitting down in pretrial conference with all parties of interest in the hope of establishing an acceptable agreement.
I do not intend to infer that politics have no place in judicial reapportionment. Reapportionment is intrinsically political. But it is one thing to weigh political factors in arranging some districts in an effort to do justice to all and quite another to discard the rights of some in an effort to achieve partisan gerrymandering. I have expressed these views in prior cases; and the same are reported at length by Professor Dixon, “Democratic Representation-Reapportionment In Law and Polities” (Oxford University Press, 1968). In that book Professor Dixon writes:
Chief Judge Campbell’s central premise, building out really from Justice Felix Frankfurter’s dissenting opinion in Baker v. Carr, seems to be this: Reapportionment is generically a political matter; but having made the crucial decision to enter the political thicket, judges must act as statesmen-politicians, within the safeguards of bipartisan pre-trial conference, in order to do an honest job of reapportionment. At the press conference a reporter noted there had been some comments that Judge Campbell had considered political factors in arranging some districts. The Judge’s response was forthright and clear:
I certainly did; it’s a necessary part of tiying to work out a fair and balanced set of districts from the standpoint of the interests of each political party. But there is crucial difference between considering political factors in an attempt to do justice to each party in regard to provision of safe and swing districts, and a one-sided partisan political gerrymander for the advantage of one party alone.
I conclude that the plan submitted by the equally bi-partisan Illinois Congressional Delegation should be adopted by this court as a fair, just, equitable and mathematically accurate up-dating of our provisional plan to conform to the 1970 census and the one man one vote constitutional principle.
To the extent that the foregoing Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and Memorandum disagree with those to be filed by my brethren of this panel, I dissent.
ORDER
DECKER, District Judge.This Court having considered the motions of Plaintiff, Sherman H. Skolnick and Intervenor W. Robert Blair which seek injunctive relief in this matter against the Supreme Court of Illinois and the motion of Defendant, State Electoral Board of Illinois, which seeks injunctive relief against the various parties to an action now pending before the Illinois Supreme Court, each of said motions having invoked Title 28 U.S.C. §§ 2283 and 1651, and the Court having conducted a hearing and heard the argument of counsel for parties;
This Court finds, that on September 21, 1971 the three-judge panel of Judges Castle, Campbell and Decker entered its final order in the matter of Skolnick v. State Electoral Board of Illinois, 69 C 755, adopting a Congressional redistricting plan and ordering the defendant, the State Electoral Board of Illinois to comply with the apportionment plan so adopted, said order having been entered after a full hearing during which evidence was heard and all interested persons or parties were given the opportunity to be *861heard or testify, and from which order no appeal has been taken;
On or about October 5, 1971 a “Motion for Leave to File Petition for Supplementary Relief in the Matter of Apportionment of Illinois Congressional Districts and for the Substitution and Addition of Parties or, in the Alternative, Original Petition for Writ of Mandamus” was filed with the Clerk of the Illinois Supreme Court by Petitioners Joseph Germano, John Alesia, Joseph Cesario, Sam E. Perish and Buddy W. Davis against Respondent members of the State Electoral Board of Illinois: Richard B. Ogilvie, Governor; William J. Scott, Attorney General; Alan J. Dixon, Treasurer; Michael J. Hewlett, Auditor; James A. Ronan, Chairman, Democratic State Central Committee and Victor L. Smith, Chairman, Republican State Central Committee, which Petition or Motions seek to modify, supersede, set aside or nullify the September 21, 1971 order of this Court and to order Defendant State Electoral Board not to comply with said order of this Court.
On or about October 14, 1971, the Supreme Court of Illinois allowed the above-named Petitioners leave to file an original petition for mandamus under No. 44728, but did not grant Petitioners leave to file a petition for supplementary relief in case No. 39201 (reported as Scott v. Kemer, 32 Ill.2d 539, 208 N.E.2d 561 (1965). Said order of the Illinois Supreme Court directed the Respondents to file their answer to the Petition on or before October 26, 1971, whereupon Petitioners could file their reply on or before November 5, 1971, with oral argument to be heard in Springfield on November 9, 1971.
On or about October 14, 1971, Edward V. Hanrahan, State’s Attorney of Cook County on behalf of himself and Edward J. Barrett, County Clerk filed a “Motion for Leave to File an Original Petition for Writ of Mandamus and Supporting Suggestions” with the Clerk of the Supreme Court of Illinois, which Petition asked that the Illinois Supreme Court direct the Defendant Electoral Board not to conduct an election pursuant to this Court’s order entered September 21, 1971 and that the Secretary of State be directed to advise any interested persons that, among other things, the districts established by this Court are unconstitutional.
On October 26, 1971, pursuant to the order of the Illinois Supreme Court, the members of the State Electoral Board filed their “Answer and Suggestions” with the Illinois Supreme Court, setting out, among other things, that a Petition for Original Mandamus was without authority in that the Petition sought a declaratory judgment as to this Court’s order and that declaratory judgment was not a method of relief subject to the original jurisdiction of the Supreme Court of Illinois. The “Answer” further pointed out that the Petition was filed after the entry of our order and would be determined only one month from when candidates nominating petitions were to be filed. Said “Answer” also makes the observation that the new Constitution of Illinois is totally silent as to Congressional districts or redistricting, contrary to the allegations of Petitioners that new Illinois standards governing Congressional districting had been established by said Constitution of 1970.
On October 27, 1971, the Clerk of the Supreme Court of Illinois issued a letter to the Honorable Edward V. Hanrahan informing him that the Supreme Court of Illinois had denied his petition for an original writ of mandamus; however, leave was given for Mr. Hanrahan to appear as amicus curiae in Case No. 44728 filed by Petitioner Joseph Germano, et al.
In addition to the parties and movants herein or their attorneys, Edward V. Hanrahan and Joseph Germano, et al., were represented by their counsel and heard by this Court and John E. Cassidy, though not a party or intervenor to this matter, was allowed to argue to this court with regard to the three motions heard by this court.
This Court finds that the matter of Congressional redistricting is one *862of general public importance and that the motions filed herein raise issues of vital importance to the People of Illinois and to the many persons who may desire to seek election to the House of Representatives of the United States Congress from Illinois and the supporters of such candidates. Some, though not all, of the issues considered by this Court were:
1. Whether this Court should further stay its consideration of what districts should govern the Illinois seats for United States Representatives and await action by the Illinois General Assembly in the hope it would act in timely fashion to coincide with the December 13 to 20 filing dates for nominating petitions;
2. What the power of the Illinois Supreme Court would be to override, directly or indirectly, the order of this United States District Court after this Court had afforded virtually every opportunity possible to the Illinois General Assembly to create new and Constitutional Congressional districts by awaiting such remedial action from the entry of our order December 21, 1969 declaring the 1965 districts unconstitutional through today;
3. What weight should be given to the contentions of some that there is still time for the legislature to act or for the Supreme Court of Illinois to create a different map from the one we approved or whether we should take notice of the legislature’s long history of inaction on this subject and the in-court admission by a member of the Illinois House of Representatives that redistricting by our legislature in the near future was unlikely.
4. Whether, absent any indication of belated legislative efforts, the Supreme Court of Illinois should seek to interfere with the carrying out of the United States District Court order entered two weeks before the filing of Germano v. Lewis, No. 44728.
5. When injunctive relief pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 2283 and 1651 is permitted and whether under the present circumstances injunctive relief is essential to prevent grave and irreparable damage to the electorate of Illinois and the candidates and their supporters.
6. Whether injunctive relief pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 2283 and 1651 would be timely and wise in the interest of comity, to avoid unseemly conflict and to uphold the dignity of the United States District Court or whether any other useful remedy than injunction would serve the purpose.
This Court further finds that the parties, petitioners, respondents and amicus curiae in the matter of Germano et al. v. Lewis et al., No. 44728, in the Supreme Court of Illinois, are entitled to a full hearing before any final resolution of these important and difficult issues, but it is equally important that the status quo be maintained pending such final resolution.
It is hereby ordered, therefore, that all parties and the amicus curiae in the matter entitled People ex rel. Joseph Germano v. John W. Lewis, No. 44728 in the Supreme Court of Illinois, specifically Joseph Germano, John Alesia, Joseph Cesario, Sam E. Perish and Buddy W. Davis, petitioners, Edward V. Hanrahan, amicus curiae, John W. Lewis, Secretary of State, Richard B. Ogilvie, Governor, William J. Scott, Attorney General, Alan J. Dixon, Treasurer, Michael J. Howlett, Auditor, James A. Ronan, Chairman, Democratic State Central Committee and Victor L. Smith, Chairman, Republican State Central Committee, respondents and members of the State Electoral Board of Illinois, and all other persons having knowledge of this Court’s order herein be and are hereby temporarily restrained from further proceeding in the above-entitled action now before the Illinois Supreme Court or from filing any new actions affecting the matters herein in issue pending the further hearing and final disposition of this motion.
It is further ordered that Petitioners Joseph Germano, John Alesia, Joseph Cesario, Sam E. Perish and Buddy W. Davis and Edward V. Hanrahan, amicus curiae in the Illinois Supreme Court mat*863ter, be and are hereby given leave to file with this court, their responses to the motion of the State Electoral Board of Illinois on or before November 9, 1971 and that the application of said Defendant State Electoral Board of Illinois for preliminary and permanent injunctive relief are hereby consolidated for hearing by this Court and the matter of any such injunctive relief is set for argument before this Court on November 11, 1971 at 2:00 p. m.
With respect to the motions of Plaintiff Sherman H. Skolnick and W. Robert Blair, et al., this Court finds that in view of the foregoing action of this Court and the present posture of the matter now before the Illinois Supreme Court, there is no necessity at this time for this Court to consider these other requests for injunctive relief and it is therefore ordered that said two motions be and are hereby continued until taken up by this Court upon proper notice to all interested parties.
CAMPBELL, Senior District Judge, objects to the entry of this Order and will file his suggestions in support of his objections within five (5) days from the date of this Order.. This plan was submitted by W. Robert Blair, Speaker of the House, Henry J. Hyde, Majority Leader of the House, and Edward R. Madigan, Chairman of the House Reapportionment Committee.
. Mr. Chapman stated that he could not speak for the Chicago Bar Association because of the impossibility due to limitations of time to seek approval of his position by the Association’s Board of Managers.