OPINION
ONION, Presiding Judge.The appeal here involved springs out of a conviction for possession of marihuana where the punishment was assessed at five years, probated.
At his trial, the appellant waived trial by jury and entered a plea of not guilty before the court. The State’s evidence was stipulated and the appellant testified as to his eligibility for probation.
The initial contention advanced on appeal is that the court erred in admitting into evidence the marihuana which appellant contends was obtained as a result of an illegal search and seizure. He notes that the stipulation was entered subject to his objection, as to the introduction of testi*566mony relating to the marihuana found. The objection was overruled.
The stipulation reflects that on May 16, 1970, about 12:30 p. m., Dallas City Police Officers Merten and Etley observed the appellant operating a 1970 Volkswagen pulling a homemade trailer bearing an expired 1969 license tag. They stopped the appellant and, while standing beside appellant’s vehicle conversing with him about said license tag, Officer Etley observed through the rear window of the vehicle cigarette wrapping paper, a leafy green substance which appeared to be marihuana, and seeds which appeared to be marihuana seeds. After observing this material “in plain view,” the officers searched the car, finding three cigarette butts in the rear ash tray and a small quantity of leafy green substance behind the rear seat. The stipulation also showed that a chain of custody of the material was established and that the chemist’s testimony would be that the material submitted to him was marihuana.
The appellant does not question the right of the officers to stop and arrest the appellant for the use of an expired license tag. Thus, under the circumstances, Officer Etley was in a position where he had a right to be. It is well established that an officer may seize contraband which he sees in plain sight or open view if he is lawfully where he is. Ker v. California, 374 U.S. 23, 83 S.Ct. 1623, 10 L.Ed.2d 726; United States v. Lee, 274 U.S. 559, 47 S.Ct. 746, 71 L.Ed. 1202; Abel v. United States, 362 U.S. 217, 80 S.Ct. 683, 4 L.Ed.2d 668; Marron v. United States, 275 U.S. 192, 48 S.Ct. 74, 72 L.Ed. 231; Lewis v. State, 439 S.W.2d 351 (Tex.Cr.App.1969); Jackson v. State, 449 S.W.2d 279 (Tex.Cr.App.1970).
Further,
“[o]nce a bona fide stop or arrest has been made for a traffic offense, the police can make an additional arrest for any other offense unexpectedly discovered during the course of the investigation. If, while questioning a motorist regarding the operation of his vehicle, an officer sees evidence of a criminal violation in open view, or in some other manner acquires probable cause on a more serious charge, he may arrest for that offense and incident thereto conduct an additional search for physical evidence. . This is true even if no specific statement of fact of the second arrest is made. . ” Taylor v. State, 421 S.W.2d 403 at 407 (Tex.Cr.App.1967). (Emphasis supplied.)
We conclude that under the circumstances the court did not err in admitting testimony concerning the marihuana. See Legall v. State, 463 S.W.2d 731 (Tex.Cr.App.1971). See also Article 14.03, Vernon’s Ann.C.C.P.
Next, appellant, in two grounds of error, challenges the sufficiency of the evidence. From the stipulation already set forth, it is clear that such grounds of error are without merit.
The judgment is affirmed.