OPINION
DALLY, Judge.This is an appeal from a conviction for the offense of murder; the punishment is imprisonment for 50 years.
A written statement, which the appellant made while in custody and out of the presence of his retained counsel, was admitted in evidence. The appellant urges that the trial court committed reversible error in admitting that statement in evidence, because he did not waive his right to have counsel present when the statement was made, and therefore the statement was obtained in violation of constitutional re-' quirements of the Sixth Amendment to the Constitution of the United States as interpreted in Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 86 S.Ct. 1602, 16 L.Ed.2d 694 (1966).
On December 10,1974, the body of Celes-tine Williams, the appellant’s wife, was found in their home in Texas City. On December 11th, the appellant learned that he had been charged with the murder of his wife and he contacted Richard Thornton, an attorney. Thornton ascertained that a warrant for the arrest of the appellant had been issued; the appellant, accompanied by Thornton, surrendered himself in the Sheriff’s office in Galveston. Thornton told the Sheriff’s Chief Deputy, W. J. Whitburn, and other officers who were present that he represented the appellant and that he did not want the appellant, who he said was ill and on medication, interrogated unless he was present to represent him. There is no evidence that the officers agreed to Thornton’s demand. Thornton did not talk to any Texas City officers.
At 11:55 a. m. on December 11th, Texas City Police Sergeant Deril Oliver took cus*921tody of the appellant from the Galveston County Sheriff’s office. Oliver advised the appellant of his rights as required by Art. 38.22, V.A.C.C.P. and Miranda v. Arizona, supra. The appellant was taken by Oliver to Texas City, where they appeared before a magistrate at 12:50 p. m. The magistrate advised the appellant of his rights as provided by Art. 15.17, V.A.C.C.P. At 1:03 p. m. the appellant was again advised of his rights by Oliver and signed a form acknowledging the same. Oliver testified that after the appellant read and signed the form he was questioned until 1:45 p. m. Oliver stated that because the appellant was emotionally upset and crying he was placed in a cell. At 5:00 p. m. the appellant was taken to Oliver’s office and Oliver resumed questioning the appellant concerning the death of his wife. Oliver personally typed the appellant’s statement as appellant answered Oliver’s questions. When the typing was completed, Oliver read the appellant’s statement to him, including the advice concerning the constitutional rights printed at the top. Oliver also gave the appellant an opportunity to read the statement. The appellant then signed the statement at 7:05 p. m.
Appellant testified that after he was advised of his rights by the magistrate he was taken to a room at the Texas City police station and interrogated by two policemen. Appellant stated that he told the policemen that his attorney did not want him to make a statement unless the attorney was present. He said he asked to call his attorney but the policemen would not let him and told him that his attorney would not mind if he signed a statement. Appellant testified that one officer grabbed him by the shirt collar and pulled him up. He said he was frightened and crying and that he signed the statement after “they kept harassing me.” Appellant said the officer told him he would be there all night until he made a statement and that he could not have his medication. He stated that the officers did not hit him or promise him anything but that he signed the statement because he was being harassed.
Sgt. Oliver testified that he was informed by officers in the Sheriff’s office that the appellant was represented by Thornton. Oliver stated that at no time did the appellant request to see his attorney or ask to use the telephone, and that he never mentioned his medication. Oliver said the appellant discussed the case freely with him and appeared to be coherent and normal. Oliver testified that he did not strike or abuse the appellant in any manner, and that he did not threaten the appellant or promise him anything. Sgt. Stanley, who was identified by the appellant as the other officer present during the questioning, testified that he was not present when a statement was taken from the appellant. He stated that he never grabbed the appellant by the shirt collar or told him he had to make a statement.
The trial court made written findings of fact that the appellant had been advised of his constitutional rights prior to giving the police his statement. The court found that appellant’s confession was not obtained by threats, persuasion, compulsion, intimidation, violence, or promises, and that the statement was the appellant’s free and voluntary act. These findings are supported by the evidence. The appellant argues that his right to cut off questioning was not “scrupulously honored” by the police and that he did not waive his right to have his attorney present during questioning. Appellant cites and relies upon Michigan v. Mosley, 423 U.S. 96, 96 S.Ct. 321, 46 L.Ed.2d 313 (1975); Brewer v. Williams, 430 U.S. 387, 97 S.Ct. 1232, 51 L.Ed.2d 424 (1977); and Hearne v. State, 534 S.W.2d 703 (Tex.Cr.App.1976).
In Michigan v. Mosley, supra, Mosley was arrested in connection with several robberies and advised of his rights in accordance with Miranda v. Arizona, supra. Mosley acknowledged that he understood his rights, told the detective that he did not want to answer any questions about the robberies, and the interrogation was stopped. Over two hours later another detective again advised Mosley of his rights and questioned him about an unrelated murder. Mosley then made statements that were used *922against him in the murder trial. The Supreme Court discussed the portion of the Miranda opinion that states that “the interrogation must cease” when the person in custody indicates that “he wishes to remain silent.” The Supreme Court declined to interpret this passage either to require a blanket prohibition against further interrogation once an accused indicates he wishes to remain silent or to allow the continuation of custodial interrogation after a momentary cessation. The Court concluded that “the admissibility of statements obtained after the person in custody has decided to remain silent depends under Miranda on whether his ‘right to cut off questioning’ was ‘scrupulously honored.’ ” The Court held that the second detective’s questioning about an unrelated homicide was consistent with a reasonable interpretation of Mosley’s earlier refusal to answer any questions about the robberies, and that the statements were admissible.
The fact situation in the present case is quite different from that presented in Michigan v. Mosley, supra. Appellant’s testimony is the only evidence that appellant told Oliver he did not want to talk with him. Attorney Thornton testified that he told two Sheriff’s officers that he did not want the appellant questioned without him being present, but the record does not reflect that the Sheriff’s officers conveyed the information to Oliver, a Texas City policeman. Oliver, on cross-examination by Thornton, testified as follows:
“Q. And he (appellant) did not tell you he didn’t want to make a statement?
“A. At no time did he say he didn’t want to make a statement.
“Q. Just voluntarily came out with it?
“A. He was discussing the case freely, yes, sir.”
The appellant’s lengthy confession is two and a half pages long. Approximately one page directly concerns the events on the day of the shooting; the remainder of his statement tells about injuries the appellant suffered while working, his relationship with his wife, the deceased, and his attempts to commit suicide. This evidence strongly corroborates Oliver’s testimony that the appellant freely discussed the case.
It is clear that where the facts are in dispute on the voluntariness and admissibility of a confession, the trial judge, as the trier of the facts, can accept or reject all or any part of the testimony of any witness, including a defendant. McKittrick v. State, 541 S.W.2d 177 (Tex.Cr.App.1976), and cases cited therein. We hold that there was sufficient evidence for the trial court to conclude that the appellant waived his right to remain silent and to admit the statement in evidence.
In Hearne v. State, supra, the evidence was uncontradicted, and the officer freely admitted that he persuaded the defendant “bit by bit to change his mind” and talk with him after the defendant had told the officer he did not want to talk with him. The Hearne decision is not controlling under the facts of this case.
The Supreme Court recently discussed the issue of whether an accused waived his right to have his attorney present during questioning by police officers in Brewer v. Williams, supra. Williams was arrested in Davenport, Iowa for abducting a ten-year-old girl in Des Moines, Iowa. Two attorneys advised Williams not to make any statements until after he consulted with his attorney upon being returned to Des Moines. The police officers who were to transport Williams back to Des Moines by automobile agreed not to question him during the trip. Williams expressed no willingness to be interrogated without his attorney being present and told the officers several times that he would tell the whole story after seeing his Des Moines lawyer. One of the officers, who knew Williams was a former mental patient and deeply religious, obtained incriminating statements and evidence by stating to him during the trip that he felt they should stop and locate the girl’s body because her parents were entitled to a Christian burial for the girl, who was taken away from them on Christmas eve. The Supreme Court held that the policeman’s “Christian burial speech” was *923tantamount to interrogation and was designed to obtain incriminating statements after Williams had indicated that he did not want to make any statements until he had conferred with his lawyer in Des Moines.
In the case at bar the appellant conferred with his attorney prior to surrendering himself. Attorney Thornton told the Sheriff’s officers that he did not want appellant interrogated without him present. The record does not reflect whether the Sheriff’s officers relayed this information to Sgt. Oliver. Appellant testified that he told Oliver that he did not want to make any statements without his attorney present. He also testified that during the questioning he asked to call his attorney but was refused. Oliver disputed this testimony. He admitted that he knew the appellant had an attorney but stated that after the appellant was advised of his rights numerous times he never requested to see his lawyer or to use the telephone.
Brewer v. Williams does not hold that an accused cannot waive his right to have counsel present during questioning once he is represented by counsel. The Court specifically said that it did not hold that under the circumstances of the case Williams could not have waived his rights without notice to counsel; it only held that Williams did not waive his right to have counsel present during questioning. The fact that an attorney advises his client to remain silent or not make any statement without him present does not mean that the accused can never thereafter intelligently and knowingly waive those rights. Caraway v. State, 489 S.W.2d 106 (Tex.Cr.App.1971). See also Self v. State, 513 S.W.2d 832 (Tex.Cr.App.1974), and McKittrick v. State, supra.
There is no doubt that appellant knew he had the right to have his attorney present during questioning, having been so advised at least four times, including once by a magistrate. Indeed, he had conferred with his attorney prior to surrendering to the Sheriff. That there is no evidence the appellant explicitly waived his right to counsel does not preclude a finding that he knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily waived that right. Moreno v. State, 511 S.W.2d 273 (Tex.Cr.App.1974); Thomas v. State, 458 S.W.2d 817 (Tex.Cr.App.1970); Easley v. State, 448 S.W.2d 490 (Tex.Cr.App.1970). We conclude that under the totality of the circumstances the State has proven “an intentional relinquishment or abandonment of a known right” and that the appellant waived his right to remain silent and his right to have counsel present during questioning. The Court did not err in admitting appellant’s confession into evidence.
Appellant contends the court erred in failing to submit his timely requested charge on the law of circumstantial evidence. The deceased was found dead by several relatives in the bedroom of her home. The autopsy revealed that she died at approximately 5:00 p. m. on December 9, 1974. There were at least five separate bullet wounds in her body caused by .22 caliber bullets. The cause of death was a bullet wound to the heart. A .22 caliber revolver was found wrapped inside a blue jacket on the dresser in the bedroom. The revolver contained six empty cartridges.
The appellant not only gave a statement to Oliver but he also testified in his own behalf at the trial. Omitting parts not necessary to our discussion, appellant’s statement reads as follows:
“On Monday the 9th day of December 1974 I picked her (deceased) up from St. Mary’s where she works and she rode to the house with me. She was going to get some things for her daughter and while we were at the house we looked at some bills and was talking. I tried to talk her into coming back home and she got mad and told me to stop pressuring her about coming home. We were in the master bedroom when the phone rang and she got up to answer it. I saw her take her pistol out of the night stand drawer. I wasn’t sure what she was going to do until she pointed it at me and pulled the trigger. The gun snapped and did not fire and at this time I began struggling with her. I don’t remember exactly what *924happened after that but I do remember I layed the pistol down on a blue jacket which was on the dresser. I got my medicine and got into my car and drove to Houston. I left a note on the coffee table which I wrote on Saturday the 7th day of December. I put a lot of reasons in the note and I even mentioned about once having the crabs which we had a big fuss about. I wrote one other note but then I tore it up. I had been trying to get her to come back to me but she would always get mad when I mentioned it.
“When I arrived in Houston after the shooting I stayed for awhile and then my brother Wilbur brought me back to Galveston where I turned my self in to the Sheriffs Office. The note I wrote Saturday the 7th of December is the same one the police found at my home and the pistol used belonged to my wife and it was given her by her ex-husband who is a policeman in Galveston.
“The next morning (December 9) I picked her up and drove her to work and then I picked her up from work and took her to my house. A little while later is when the trouble happened. I think the trouble happened around 5:00 p. m. but I am really not sure.” (Emphasis added.)
Appellant testified in his own behalf at the guilt-innocence phase of the trial. On direct examination appellant testified that the deceased pointed the pistol at him and pulled the trigger but that the gun did not go off. He stated, “I remember getting to her and she and I started tussling with the gun and after that I don’t know what happened.” Appellant said that he did not recall shooting his wife. He said that if he did shoot her, he did so accidentally. During cross-examination the appellant testified concerning his jealousy towards the deceased. The prosecutor then asked the appellant, “Is that why you shot her?” Appellant replied, “No, that’s not why I shot her.”
A charge on circumstantial evidence need not be given where there is evidence of an admission of the accused that he killed the deceased. Knight v. State, 538 S.W.2d 101 (Tex.Cr.App.1975); Sloan v. State, 515 S.W.2d 913 (Tex.Cr.App.1974); Hogan v. State, 496 S.W.2d 594 (Tex.Cr.App.1973); Corbett v. State, 493 S.W.2d 940 (Tex.Cr.App.1973). Direct testimony from any source that the accused was an actor in bringing about the death of the deceased characterizes the case as one of direct and not circumstantial evidence. Smith v. State, 470 S.W.2d 696 (Tex.Cr.App.1971). Where the only element proved by circumstantial evidence is that of intent, no charge upon circumstantial evidence is required. Smith v. State, supra. While the appellant’s confession may not be a full admission of the offense of murder, when appellant’s written statement and his testimony at trial are considered together, we find that a charge on circumstantial evidence was not required. Steel v. State, 459 S.W.2d 649 (Tex.Cr.App.1970); Hogan v. State, supra.
This case may be distinguished from Gamboa v. State, 528 S.W.2d 247 (Tex.Cr.App.1975), and Ellis v. State, 551 S.W.2d 407 (Tex.Cr.App.1977). Gamboa did not involve a confession of the defendant’s participation in the offense. In Ellis, the defendant was charged as a party to the offense, under V.T.C.A. Penal Code, Sec. 7.02, and in his written statement did not admit doing any acts that would have made him criminally responsible for the conduct of the actual killer.
The court did not err in refusing to submit to the jury a charge on circumstantial evidence.
Appellant contends the trial court erred in sustaining the State’s objection to testimony concerning conversations related to Oliver by Galveston County Sheriff’s officers. Appellant complains of the following ruling by the trial court during his cross-examination of Oliver:
“Q. [By Mr. Thornton]: The Galveston County Sheriff’s Department had informed you that he had been surrendered by me with me as his counsel?
*925“THE STATE: Your Honor, at this point, we are going to object to what may have been told tó Sgt. Oliver as being hearsay.
“THE COURT: Sustain the objection.
“MR. THORNTON: Note our exception, Your Honor. I think I have already had—
“THE COURT: You may cross-examine him, Mr. Thornton.
“MR. THORNTON: All right.”
Questions by Mr. Thornton continued:
“Q. Anyway, on the 11th of December of 1974, at about eleven o’clock a. m., you knew that the defendant had been voluntarily surrendered to the Galveston County Sheriff’s Department?
“THE STATE: Your Honor, once again, we object to that as only calling for a hearsay answer which he has previously stated.
“THE COURT: Sustain the objection.
“MR. THORNTON: Note our exception, Your Honor.
“Hearsay to whom, Judge?
“THE COURT: Sir, I sustain the objection.”
Appellant admits in his brief that “Ultimately, on extended cross-examination, the witness finally admitted the truth of these matters.” Where evidence is excluded, but the same testimony is later admitted, this Court has consistently held such exclusion does not require reversal. Hays v. State, 480 S.W.2d 635 (Tex.Cr.App.1972); Preston v. State, 481 S.W.2d 408 (Tex.Cr.App.1972). Even if appellant’s argument and theory are correct, the error, if any, in sustaining the State’s objection was harmless.
Appellant contends the court erred in allowing the State to cross-examine the appellant’s father with “have you heard” questions during the punishment phase of the trial. Specifically, appellant is complaining of the following question by the State:
“Q. Let me ask you, sir, whether or not you have heard that on June the 14th, 1967, your son was arrested for the offense of assault with intent to murder?
“MR. THORNTON: Your Honor, we object to that question based upon the Hill’s case.
“THE COURT: Based upon what?
“MR. THORNTON: Hill v. State, your Honor. There has been no question related to this defendant about the reputation inviting any matter to be brought into evidence, your Honor, such as this to invite the final conviction of any felony.
“THE STATE: Your Honor, it’s the contention of the State that the defendant has opened and placed his character and reputation by having the father testify that he has been a good man; that he has given him no trouble. We should be able to cross-examine this particular witness by mentioning any prior arrests.
“THE COURT: Overrule the objection.
“MR. THORNTON: Note our exception, Your Honor.”
Thereafter, the appellant’s father was permitted to answer the question and he stated that he had heard of the incident.
During direct examination the appellant’s father testified that appellant had never been convicted of a felony offense and asked the jury to grant his son probation. Appellant’s counsel also brought out the following testimony on direct examination:
“Q. Mr. Williams, has Gerald been a good boy up to this time?
“A. Yes, he has never given me any trouble.
“Q. Never given you and your wife any trouble?
“A. Never has.
“Q. Has he obeyed you, generally?
“A. Yes.
“Q. Mr. Williams, you know quite a bit about Gerald Williams, don’t you?
“A. Ido.”
The testimony elicited on direct examination by appellant in the case is almost *926identical to the testimony in Childs v. State, 491 S.W.2d 907 (Tex.Cr.App.1973). In Childs the defendant’s father was asked, “Q. And has his conduct been good since he has been there while he has been there at home? A. Really has.” In analyzing this testimony the Court said:
“True, appellant’s counsel did not use the ‘magic words,’ does your son have a general reputation of being a peaceful and law abiding citizen in the community in which he resides, in questioning the witness. However, an examination of the record clearly indicates that the entire tenor of the elder Childs’ testimony was geared toward persuading the jury to grant appellant probation by showing them his good character and law abiding habits. Appellant may not have a witness testify about his good character traits but avoid ‘placing his reputation in evidence’ simply by not specifically asking whether appellant enjoyed a good reputation in the community.”
Cf. Els v. State, 525 S.W.2d 11 (Tex.Cr.App.1975). The Court did not err in permitting the cross-examination.
Appellant also argues under this ground of error that the State’s question was so framed as to imply that the appellant had committed the offense; however, no objection was voiced on this complaint in the trial court. In order to preserve error, if any, on appeal, appellant’s objection must be the same as that raised in the trial court. See Elizaldi v. State, 519 S.W.2d 881 (Tex.Cr.App.1975); Esquivel v. State, 506 S.W.2d 613 (Tex.Cr.App.1974). Moreover, the question was properly framed.
Appellant’s last contention is that “[t]he Trial Court erred in his actions against Defendant’s counsel with reference to the blackboard and the attempted use thereof by defense counsel in front of the jury.” Appellant does not point out where in the record this alleged error occurred. He makes no argument in support of the ground and cites no authority. This ground is not in compliance with Article 40.09, Sec. 9, Y.A.C.C.P.; nothing is presented for review.
The judgment is affirmed.