ON MOTION FOR REHEARING
Able counsel for the District, true to the traditions of effective advocacy, takes us to task in the motion for rehearing because of some of the language used in the original opinion. District contends, inter alia, that we erred factually in at least two respects, our statement under subsection (e) with reference to the allegations as to the hearing of evidence before the Board of Equalization, and the increase of the assessment over the rendition. As to the latter, we confirm that our recitation of the amounts was correct but that we overlooked noting that the rendition was not upon a basis of one hundred percent of the actual valuation but upon a percentage thereof, while the asses'ment purported to be at an actual one hundred percent valuation. The correction noted does not alter the result but is recognized because of the District’s insistence.
We find difficulty following District’s challenge to the first statement noted, so we reproduce the complaint in full:
“(a) Under (e) on page 2 of the opinion, the Court says that the Plaintiff taxpayer alleged the Board of Equalization did not hear any other evidence under oath or otherwise. The allegations in Paragraph No. 7 of Plaintiffs Original Petition alleged that in violation of *484the Constitution of the United States and the State of Texas, the Board of Equalization purportedly held a further additional hearing of which Plaintiff was given no notice or opportunity to attend. The evidence showed no other hearing was held.”
We have again combed the record and, as best we understand the actual sequence of events, the taxpayer had witnesses present who were sworn and gave testimony before the Board of Equalization. The tax assessor was also sworn but the minutes do not reflect that he testified. Under these circumstances, it is difficult to understand District’s insistence that this correction be made. See in this connection, Wells Ind. Sch. Dist. v. St. Louis Southwestern Ry. Co., 324 S.W.2d 442 (Tex.Civ.App., Texarkana, 1959, error ref. n. r. e.).
District challenges our “timetable” with reference to the sequence of events in the levy arid collection of taxes by independent school districts, and especially our reliance upon the statutes applicable to the collection of county taxes. It insists that we erred in the instant case, as well as in our prior decision in Atlantic Richfield Co. v. Warren Ind. Sch. Dist., 453 S.W.2d 190, 201, fn. 5 (Tex.Civ.App., Beaumont, 1970, error ref. n. r. e.).
Appropriately enough, counsel calls to our attention the provisions of §§ 23.91-23.98, Texas Education Code, V.T.C.A., and the reference in § 23.91 to the powers and duties of the assessor-collector of independent school districts — those “that are conferred by law upon the assessor and collector of taxes in and for any incorporated city, town, or village.” We note also that § 23.93, subdivision (c), requires the officer so appointed to “assess the taxable property . . . within the time and in the manner provided by existing law.” Unfortunately, the Education Code does not otherwise specify what “existing law” is to be followed; and, we are familiar with the rule that in the assessment of city taxes, the provisions of the city charter control insofar as not inconsistent with state law.. Houston Crane Rentals, Inc. v. City of Houston, 454 S.W.2d 216, 218 (Tex.Civ.App., Houston—1st, 1970, error ref. n. r. e.).
Art. 7345d-l, V.A.C.S., provides that incorporated cities and towns and independent school districts having their own assessor-collector of taxes and Boards of Equalization, etc., “shall have the right by ordinance, order or resolution properly enacted, passed, and entered to avail themselves of this law.” The only reference to any statute in our record is to be found in the rendition sheet of the taxpayer which was sworn to before District’s assessor-collector.
It is headed “School District Inventory of Property” and recites that the property was “Rendered for Assessment of Taxes for the year 1971” by an agent of the taxpayer to the individual who was assessor-collector of taxes for the district. Immediately before the description of the property we find these words: “(Assessed, if un-rendered, under Articles 7205 and 7218, Revised Statutes 1925.)”
Art. 7205 is a part of Title 122 and not a part of the Education Code, nor is it a part of Chapter 5, Title 28, relating to taxation by cities and towns. The reference in the very sheet accepted by the tax assessor-collector in this instance would indicate that he was proceeding under the law governing the assessment of taxes by county officials.' Art. 7205 makes it the duty of the county assessor-collector of taxes to list unrendered property, while Art. 7218 requires him to “submit all the lists of property rendered to him prior to the first Monday in June to the board of equalization.”
Counsel for the District, pointing to Art. 7345d-l, authorizing independent school districts to avail themselves of the provisions of Title 122, says: “There is nothing in the record showing that Little Cypress-Mauriceville has ever availed itself of this *485law.” Such is true, but, we say with equal validity, the only reference to any statute anywhere in our record indicates that it is actually “availing” itself of at least two of the provisions of Title 122.
Remaining convinced that the order sustaining District’s plea in abatement was erroneously entered, we adhere to the conclusions expressed in our original opinion. District’s motion for rehearing is overruled.