(dissenting). Solely for future reference, I make specific note of these facts.
First: In Currie v. Fiting, 375 Mich 440, four Justices standing for affirmance ruled that the effect *356of sections 114 and 115, of chapter 2 of the probate code of 1939,* on the recovery and distribution of damages for “pecuniary injury,” was not before the Court. To repeat what the four attested in such regard (p 453 of report):
“But, it is argued, even if the wrongful death statute permits recovery, the probate code, PA 1939, No 288, ch 2, § 115 (CL 1948, § 702.115 [Stat Ann 1962 Rev § 27.3178(185)]), does not, and the probate code, it is contended, is controlling. We do not regard this action, brought under the wrongful death statute, as being governed by the probate code. In any event, that question is not before us in this case and we decline to pass upon it at this time.”
The floodgates of unlimited recovery and distribution of damages for loss of companionship, allegedly suffered by nondependents as well as dependents in statutory death cases, were opened in consequence only for administrators Currie and Reisig (Reisig v. Klusendorf, 375 Mich 519). The Court’s 5-3 vote for affirmance of Currie and Reisig is, in view of the express disavowal quoted above, no precedent as against others who may choose to raise, save, and present the question said by Justices Adams, Kavanagh, Souris, and Smith, as having been left undecided.
Second: No part of the trial judge’s reviewed charge on the subject of damages, for statutory pecuniary injury, appears in the present majority opinion. Here is the connected charge on that subject:
“In this particular case in this regard, the Supreme Court has recently given us somewhat of a measure *357as to what damages you are to consider. (If) You shall find that the plaintiff in this case is entitled to a verdict, I instruct you that it is your duty to give to the plaintiffs such damages in a sum which will reasonably compensate the mother and father of Jean Anne Wilson. In computing your damages, you shall consider evidence introduced as to the amount of funeral expenses which plaintiff sustained. In addition, you must consider the money value of the life of Jean Anne Wilson. Some of you might feel it is impossible to value the life of a 10-year-old girl. However, you cannot shirk this difficult problem of evaluation. A life has been taken, and if you find that plaintiff is entitled to a verdict, it is your duty as best you can to put a fair valuation on this life. The money, life — value of a human life is a compound of many elements. (Just) As with respect to a manufacturing plant, or industrial machine, value involves the cost of acquisition, emplacements, upkeep, maintenance, service, repair and renovation, so in our case, you must consider the expense of birth, of food, of clothing, of medicines, of instructions, or nurture, and shelter. And it is for that reason the court has permitted the plaintiff to testify as to the cost of bringing up the child from birth up to the age of 10 years old at the time of her death, and also as to the care that has been given to this child. Moreover, just as an item of machinery forming a part of a functioning industrial plant has a valuation over and above that of a similar item in a showroom awaiting purchase, so an individual member of a family has a value to others as part of a functioning social and economic unit. This is the value of mutual society and protection; in other words, companionship, love, and affection. The human companionship thus afforded has a definite substantial and ascertainable pecuniary value, and its loss forms a part of value of the life you seek to ascertain. So, in this case it is difficult to give you any exact rule, but I have given you the rule *358as laid down by the Supreme Court in order to determine a value, if you reach that point in your consideration of this case.”
Wycko v. Gnodtke, 361 Mich 331, strained to its headiest height of monetary intoxication, justifies no final jury argument, by a trial judge as above, in any — yes, any — wrongful death case. I think it only fair that the profession be advised, by direct quotation of the above, as to what (should the opinion proposed for affirmance receive majority support) will be expected of the circuit judge when — in a wrongful death case — he goes about preparation of damage instructions.
Third: I find in the trial judge’s charge no direction to ascertain the present value of damages for companionship lost and to be lost by these surviving parents. And isn’t the quotation below, of the judge’s charge, a wee bit offensive to what the Brethren standing for affirmance of Currie and Reisig wrote? Surely Wycko has sent some lawyers and judges rocketing into the wild yonder of carte blanche space. Now look at the following additional jury instruction, given in this case of Wilson after commencement of jury deliberation:
“(The jury returned to the courtroom.)
“Ladies and gentlemen of the jury, I have asked that you be brought back, because I don’t think you had more than turned the door handle when both attorneys and myself realized there were a couple of things I failed to give to you. One was a ruling that I made during the course of argument, and I think I should give you instructions on it. I instruct you, that if you find for the plaintiff, you may not award any damages under the death act. There can be no recovery to the plaintiff beyond the time that the deceased would have reached the age of 21 years. So, that damages, if you find for the plaintiff, would be limited only to that amount. It *359would also be, of course, pecuniary damages which the parents, Mr. and Mrs. Wilson, have suffered by reason of this loss.”
Justice Kelly was right when, in Reisig v. Klusendorf, 375 Mich 519, 524, he said Wycko should be reconsidered. Wycho has grown since it was handed down to bizarre if not monstrous proportions. Neither the legislature nor the profession were warned that instructions to juries — as above quoted — were going to be made on strength of Wycko’s determination that $14,000 awarded for pecuniary injury, distinguished from $7,500 for such injury, was not excessive.
When today’s majority, moving directly as it does from Currie and Reisig to this case of Wilson, is willing to declare: “We conclude from a reading of the charge that the trial court correctly instructed the jury as to the law of this jurisdiction concerning damages”, it is perfectly clear that nothing more need be said by way of dissent.
I would reverse for erroneous and prejudicial jury instruction.
See PA 1939, No 297 (CL 1948, § 691,582; current citation CLS 1961, § 600.2922 [Stat Ann 1962 Rev § 27 A.2922]); PA 1939, No 288 (CL 1948, §§ 702.114, 702.115 [Stat Ann 1962 Rev §§ 27.3178 (184), 27.3178(185)1). For relevant amendments made after submission of this case, see PA 1965, No 146, amending CLS 1961, § 600.2922 and PA 1965, No 181, amending CL 1948, § 702.115.