I respectfully dissent. The conduct of plaintiff may be classified as a high-handed business method and it may shock our sense of fair play and morality, but such alone does not serve to make it a fraudulent transaction.
The defendant-counterclaimant had been in the turkey business for years and was neither illiterate nor incompetent. He read the contract, was never precluded from so doing, and in fact asked several pointed questions about some material portions before signing. He should not now be heard to effectively cry fraud as to that which was well known to him before he affixed his signature to the agreement.
As was said in Short v. Martin, 255 Iowa 189, 193, 121 N.W.2d 154, where the parties are competent to contract and do so freely at arm’s, length, it is not for the court to act as a post transaction guardian for either party.
Going back to Indianapolis Terra-Cotta Co. v. Murphy, 99 Iowa 633, 68 N.W. 898, it was there made clear all preliminary verbal discussions merge in a written pact.
Then in Lillie v. Shriver, 190 Iowa 861, 864, 179 N.W. 632, this court said, if through a false representation of the contents of a paper one signs without reading it and nothing has been done working a prevention of the reading of the instrument, then, though it be assumed the contents were falsely represented, the party who signs without reading must accept the consequence of his own folly. By the same token he is bound if he reads and then signs. See also Crum v. McCollum, 211 Iowa 319, 233 N.W. 678.
We are here dealing with a written contract, clear and certain in its terms, and a claim of fraud-inducing execution. There was no actionable fraud in this. ease. Rather there were representations by one layman to. another as to. the meaning or legal *77effect, the intent or purpose of the terms of a written agreement. This was at best an opinion as to what might happen in the future. 17 C. J. S., Contracts, section 158, page 918.
The fact is defendant-appellant tried to act as his own counsel and as a result of false economy or lack of foresight entered into a written compact which went sour and he now complains.
The opinion is contrary to established principles in the field of contracts as disclosed by the relevant authorities set forth in Nutrena Mills v. Yoder, 187 F. Supp. 415, 423-429, affirmed 294 F.2d 505 (8 Cir.). In fact this case and Farmers Savings Bank of Slater v. Weeks, 209 Iowa 26, 227 N.W. 508, stand on comparable legal territory. In the cited case the testimony was to the effect the representatives of plaintiffs, who solicited a mortgage, assured the husband and wife they did not want the property, they would indefinitely extend time of payment, and would never take the personalty to be encumbered. We there said such inducing- statements were not representations of existing facts, but were only promises of future action. We there “went on to say, such representations were contradictory to the written provisions of the instrument and not admissible in evidence. Such is the stuff of which our parol-evidence rule is made.
I would follow this line of authority, and affirm.
Justice Stuart joins in this dissent.