OPINION
KENNEDY, Justice.This is an appeal from a judgment rendered in a consumer suit brought under the Texas Deceptive Trade Practices Act, the Texas Consumer Credit Code and the Federal Truth in Lending Act. Trial plaintiff Juan Molina (Molina), appellee in this action, brought suit against Wayne Strand Pontiac-GMC, Inc. (Wayne Strand), General Motors Corporation (GMC) and General Motors Acceptance Corporation (GMAC) in connection with the purchase of a 1977 GMC three-quarter ton pick-up truck. Judgment was rendered that Molina (appel-lee in this Court) take nothing in his suit against GMC and GMAC, but that he recover against Wayne Strand the sum of Three Thousand Seven Hundred Eighty-three Dollars and Ten Cents, $3,783.10, i.e., twice the amount of the finance charge of One Thousand Eight Hundred Ninety-one Dollars and Fifty-five Cents, $1,891.55.1 Wayne Strand has timely perfected an appeal from that judgment. Molina has presented two cross-points.
For the reasons hereinafter stated, we reverse and render a take nothing judgment.
In twelve points of error, Wayne Strand contends that the trial court erred in granting judgment for Molina asserting that Molina’s claim under the Federal Truth in Lending Act was untimely filed. It further asserts that special issues were improperly submitted to the jury, that jury answers to special issues submitted conflicted with the final judgment, that there existed either no, or, alternatively, insufficient evidence to support vital jury findings, and that the trial court improperly applied the Texas Consumer Credit Code. Additionally, it contends that the “de minimis” nature of the actual irregularity in the contract does not warrant this Court’s affirmation of the judgment.
Concurrently, Molina, by a cross-point, contends that, consistent with favorable jury findings, this Court should render judgment for him for reasonable attorneys’ fees (as found by the jury). We will address first, the statute of limitations question.
In Wayne Strand’s points of error 1, 10, and essentially 9, the contention is made that Molina should be denied recovery under the Federal Truth in Lending Act on the proposition that his suit was untimely filed. As the retail installment contract, made the basis of this suit, was executed on May 31, 1977, and Molina’s original petition was filed on May 30,1978, we find no merit in Wayne Strand’s assertion that the suit was barred by 15 U.S.C. § 1640(e) which provides for a one (1) year statute of limitations for claims arising under the Federal Truth in Lending Act.
Moreover, this Court notes that the Texas Consumer Credit Code is more liberal than the Federal Act and provides for a four-year statute of limitations, or in the case of a retail installment transaction, two years from the date of the final entry made thereon, whichever is later. Accordingly, we find that Molina’s cause of action was not barred by any applicable statutes of limitation. Wayne Strand’s points of error 1 and 10 are overruled.
Wayne Strand next contends that the $5.53 overcharge is “de minimis non curat lex ” as a matter of law. We agree.
*47The doctrine stands for the proposition that “[t]he law does not care for, or take notice of, very small or trifling matters.” Thornhill v. Sharpstown Dodge Sales, Inc., 546 S.W.2d 151 (Tex.Civ.App. — Beaumont 1976, no writ). In the present suit, the $5.53 error arises out of the computation of the license plate charge assessed on the contract of sale. Through an error made by an employee of Wayne Strand, Molina was charged a license fee of $33.47 instead of a fee of $27.94 which Wayne Strand actually later paid the State of Texas for the plates.
Under varied circumstances, overcharges have been held to be “de minimis.” See Thornhill, supra, at 153; Ford Motor Co. v. Zapata, 605 S.W.2d 362 (Tex.Civ.App.— Beaumont 1980), reversed on other grounds at 615 S.W.2d 198 (Tex.1981); Ford Motor Credit Co. v. Long, 608 S.W.2d 293 (Tex.Civ. App. — Beaumont 1980, writ ref’d n.r.e.).
In Thornhill, a miscomputation of the proper interest rate resulted in an overcharge of $.01 cent a month over the 42 month life of the contract. The court pointed out that the difference was so slight that competent mathematicians might have disagreed upon just exactly what the proper amount should have been. Thornhill at 152.
Zapata addressed an overcharge very similar to the $5.53 overcharge we find before us today. In that case, plaintiff contended that he was entitled to recover under the code because of a $7.11 overcharge in the license or registration fee. Zapata at 366. The court held the charge was “de minimis ” but resolved the issue on another basis.
Finally, in Long, the Beaumont Court held a $25.00 acquisition fee “de minimis finding that while it was not provided for as a valid charge under the code, neither was it prohibited. Long, at 296. While Long does not state how the acquisition fee, was provided for on the face of the contract, a reading of Tex.Civ.Stat.Ann., art. 5069-7.04 (Vernon’s Supp.1981) indicates that an acquisition charge is not a direct charge made at the time a contract is initiated, but rather is a charge made at the time a contract is prepaid and, made out of any applicable refund credit.
The $5.53 overcharge before us in the instant case is quite similar to the charges mentioned in the above cases. While the charge was properly labeled, it was simply miscalculated. We hold that the $5.53 overcharge is “de minimis." Wayne Strand’s points of error 2, 7 and 8 are sustained.
For the reasons just stated, we also hold that the charging of Molina by Wayne Strand the sum of $2.50, called “official fees” in the contract, is governed by the doctrine of “de minimis.”
We are aware of the argument made in the dissent hereto that a distinction should be made, in applying the doctrine, between overcharges which result from miscalculations of proper charges and charges which were never authorized in the first place, and, therefore, constituted misrepresentations. We do not believe that this distinction should control, however. The very nature of the “de minimis ” doctrine, even the very words used to entitle the doctrine, relate solely to the fact that it is a doctrine of convenience — one that has as its purpose the relief of the courts from trivial matters. This being so, we see no logic in restricting its use to a limited class of transaction.
As further reasons for holding as we do, we note that, as previously stated, in Long, supra, a $25.00 acquisition fee was found to be “de minimis" by the Beaumont court. This Court (Corpus Christi) has found the failure to include the sales tax as part of the “cash sale price” to be “de minimis.” Grant v. Friendly Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc., 612 S.W.2d 667 (Tex.Civ.App. — Corpus Christi 1981, writ ref’d n.r.e.). The Austin court applied the doctrine in Hight v. Jim Bass Ford, Inc., 552 S.W.2d 490 (Tex.Civ. App. — Austin 1977, writ ref’d n.r.e.) in holding that the use of ten-point type in a sales contract did not violate Tex.Rev.Civ.Stat. Ann., art. 5069-7.02(2) (Vernon 1968) which required ten-point bold type.
Wayne Strand’s point of error 3 is sustained.
*48Our holding m sustaining Wayne Strand’s points of error 2, 3, 7 and 8 make it unnecessary that we rule upon Wayne Strand’s remaining points of error. Likewise, Molina’s two cross-points are disposed of thereby-
The judgment of the trial court is reversed, and judgment is here rendered that appellee (plaintiff) take nothing with all costs charged to appellee (plaintiff).
. On May 31, 1977, Juan Molina executed a contract with Wayne Strand Pontiac, GMC, Inc., for the purchase of a new 1977 GMC three-quarter ton pick-up truck. The contract called for a down payment of one thousand dollars, $1,000.00, and the financing of seven thousand two hundred five dollars and twenty-three cents, $7,205.23, for a period of forty-two months, at an annual percentage rate of 13.61%, resulting in a finance charge of $1,891.55.