ON APPELLANT’S MOTION FOR REHEARING
DIAL, Justice.Appellant urges again that the trial court erred in refusing to grant his petition for mandamus requesting that the State furnish him with copies of its records regarding prospective jurors who have prior criminal jury service. He further contends that this Court erred in its prior opinion holding that the juror information cards in possession of the State were excepted from disclosure under § 3(a)(1) of the Texas Open Records Act.
The Texas Open Records Act, Tex.Rev. Civ.Stat.Ann. art. 6252-17a (Vernon Supp. 1982), states that all information collected by governmental bodies in connection with the transaction of official business is public information, available to the public during normal duty hours, with certain exceptions:
(1) information deemed confidential ... by judicial decision; ...
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(3)information relating to litigation of a criminal ... nature ... that ... the respective attorneys of the various political subdivision (have) determined should be withheld from public inspection; ...
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(8) records of law enforcement agencies ... which are maintained for internal use in matters relating to law enforcement; ....
If a governmental body receives a request for information which it considers to fall within one of the exceptions but there has not been a previous determination on that issue, the governmental body has ten (10) days from the request to ask for a decision from the attorney general. If no decision is requested, “the information shall be presumed to be public information.”
*449In the present case appellant filed his Request for State’s Records of Prior Jury Service of Prospective Jurors with the trial court, and certified that a copy was delivered to the criminal district attorney of Bexar County eleven (11) days prior to trial. The request averred that the district attorney had in its possession a complete record of the jury service of all persons who have served on criminal juries during the last several years, including- notations of verdicts rendered. Appellant contended that he was entitled to inspect this record to aid him in selecting the juyy in the present case. He requested an opportunity to inspect the records after he had received his jury list in the present case. The district attorney did not request an 'opinion on this matter from the attorney general. On the day of trial appellant’s attorney brought up ■ the request. The State took the position that the records were work product, and the defense had no right to them under any legal theory. The appellant then filed his Petition for Mandamus, which was denied by the trial judge.
According to the jury information forms made a part of the record, only four members of the panel had prior' criminal jury service. One of the four was excused because of illness. The prior service of a second juror was in El Paso County, and no verdict was reached. The questioning of the third juror revealed that his prior service had actually been in a civil suit, and he was challenged peremptorily by the State. The fourth juror, Mr. Perez, in response to State questions, stated he had served on a jury a year ago for a shooting, and the jury had reached a verdict. The defense asked no questions of Perez relating to the prior jury service. He was asked questions about the credibility of police officers, and a defense challenge for cause in this area was overruled. The defense struck Perez peremptorily.
The prior opinion of this Court stated that the information “having been deemed confidential by judicial decision,” came within one of the exceptions to the Act, article 6252-17a, § 3(a)(1), citing Martin v. State, 577 S.W.2d 490, 491 (Tex.Cr.App.1979) and Linebarger v. State, 469 S.W.2d 165 (Tex.Cr.App.1971). The appellant correctly points out in his brief that the cases cited do not have the specific holding of confidentiality. The cases do stand for the authority that the district attorney’s records is an inappropriate source of information in regard to prospective jurors. This draws attention to the fact that the appellant was not seeking public information per se (which is the purpose of the Open Records Act); he was seeking particular district attorney records, which may or may not have the desired information and may or may not have confidential information maintained for internal use relating to law enforcement. No one contends that a defense attorney should be prohibited from knowing the verdict a member of a current jury panel might have rendered in a previous trial. The verdict and the jurors who rendered it are of* record in the court where the verdict was returned and in the district clerk’s office. At all stages these records and the information contained therein have been available to appellant’s counsel.
The issue before this Court is not whether appellant should have had access to the information (we agree that he should) but whether the trial judge erred in denying mandamus. Mandamus is an extraordinary remedy and issues only where the party has a right to have something done and has no other way of compelling its performance. Dula v. Bush, 136 S.W.2d 898, 899 (Tex.Civ.App.—Dallas 1940, no writ). Ordinarily, a writ of mandamus must be the last resort and will be refused if there is another remedy which is effective and complete. Gonzales v. Stevens, 427 S.W.2d 694, 702 (Tex.Civ.App.—Corpus Christi 1968, writ ref’d n.r.e.). The other remedy must be as convenient, beneficial and effective as the remedy of mandamus. Simpson v. Williams Rural High School District, 153 S.W.2d 852, 856 (Tex.Civ.App.—Amarillo 1941, writ ref’d). An appellate court will not reverse a refusal of a trial court to grant a writ of mandamus unless it is made to appear that the trial court abused its discretion in denying the writ. Alice National Bank v. Ed*450ward, 408 S.W.2d 307, 311 (Tex.Civ.App.—Corpus Christi 1966, no writ). A trial court should not grant a writ of mandamus unless it is convinced that the issuance of such writ will effectively achieve the purpose sought by the petitioner. Economic Opportunities Development Corp. of San Antonio v. Bustamante, 562 S.W.2d 266, 267 (Tex.Civ.App.—San Antonio 1978, writ dism’d). Here appellant never showed that the district attorney had records containing the information on prior verdicts rendered by any member of the jury panel, just that the records had been generally kept over the years.
Here there was only one prospective juror whose prior verdict might have been of interest to the appellant. The simplest, most direct, and appropriate method of obtaining the information would have been to ask the juror what his verdict had been. There is no showing that there would have been an objection to such a question or that the trial judge would not have permitted the question. Trial judges have authority to limit questions on voir dire in the interest of time. Hughes v. State, 562 S.W.2d 857 (Tex.Cr.App.1978), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 903, 99 S.Ct. 268, 58 L.Ed.2d 250; Bodde v. State, 568 S.W.2d 344 (Tex.Cr.App.1978), cert. denied, 440 U.S. 968,99 S.Ct. 1520, 59 L.Ed.2d 784. The decision as to the propriety of a particular question is left to the trial judge’s discretion and only an abuse of such discretion will call for a reversal on appeal. Clark v. State, 608 S.W.2d 667 (Tex.Cr.App.1980); Milton v. State, 599 S.W.2d 824 (Tex.Cr. App.1980), cert. denied, 451 U.S. 1031, 101 S.Ct. 3022, 69 L.Ed.2d 400. Some judges have not permitted the question. Redd v. State, 578 S.W.2d 129 (Tex.Cr.App.1979). It is not reversible error to preclude the question, Wragg v. State, 65 Tex.Cr.R. 131, 145 S.W. 342 (1912), but no statute or case law prohibits the question from being asked. We fail to see how time is saved by permitting inquiries as to prior jury service, which court, what offense, and when, but not permitting the question as to the verdict.
If the question had not been permitted, the appellant still had the opportunity to obtain the information sought from the district clerk’s office and would have been allowed time to do so. This would have been an accurate and specific source of the information and would not have unnecessarily revealed other sensitive memoranda in the district attorney’s records.
Since there were other remedies more appropriate and equally effective, the denial of mandamus was correct. Simpson, supra; Gonzales, supra; Dula, supra.
Motion for rehearing is denied.