ON MOTION FOR REHEARING
In his motion for rehearing, Warded continues to advance the contention that, as independent co-executor, he has the unfettered discretion to decide when the property in this estate will be distributed and who will receive it. Our conclusion that his perception of his power is in conflict with, among other things, § 149B of the Probate Code is characterized as “the demise of independent administrations in the State of Texas.” To the contrary, this estate illustrates the reason for the enactment of § 149B. The estate has been in administration since 1971 and, to date, the persons entitled to the estate have not received any significant portion of it. Instead, for twelve years the co-executors have fought with each other while Warded has, with minimal success, searched for allegedly missing estate property. As a result, the estate has potential liability for substantial executor’s expenses and fees.
Obviously, if the persons entitled to an estate do not have a remedy under such circumstances, an independent administration is unworkable. Section 149B provides the necessary remedy and, under this record, the trial court granted the appropriate relief.
Wardell’s reiterated argument that § 149B cannot be used to justify the trial *510court’s judgment because the section was not pled erroneously characterizes the live pleadings that were before the trial court. The pleadings do not refer to any specific provisions of the Probate Code; instead, the Shirleys and Robinson allege in general language the need for, and they request, the accounting and distribution ordered by the trial court. The pleadings fully inform Wardell of the relief being sought and, for the reasons previously stated, the trial court’s reference to § 373 in the findings and conclusions was not reversible error.
Pointing to § 145(h), appellant also argues that the trial court could not act under § 149B because there was no evidence that an inventory, appraisement and list of claims has been filed or approved by the probate court. As with his argument under § 151, that contention may lead Wardell down a road he does not want to travel. Because no party has contended that the estate is not under an independent administration, we have not ruled on the effect of failing to prove that an inventory, appraisement and list of claims has been filed and approved. We observe, however, that by the specific language of § 145(h), the filing and approval of the document is the final prerequisite to the freeing of the estate from “further action of any nature” in court. If it has not been filed and approved, § 145(h) has not been activated and the estate remains a dependent administration subject to the general supervisory control of the appropriate court.4
In reurging his eighth point of error, Wardell contends a bill of exceptions was unnecessary to preserve error on excluded evidence because he made an offer of proof. We find nothing in the record, however, that summarizes “the facts which the witness would have related had he been allowed to do so”, Matter of Marriage of Goodwin, 562 S.W.2d 532, 534 (Tex.Civ.App.—Texarkana 1978, writ ref’d n.r.e.), or otherwise properly informs this court or the trial court of the identity of the witnesses and the substance of the excluded evidence.
Neither the foregoing arguments nor others advanced by Wardell in his motion for rehearing demonstrate error in our decision. Wardell has, however, questioned our assessment of costs, pointing out that our judgment appears to assess them against him individually. Because he was sued as executor, and because no one urges a different assessment, we conclude that the costs should be assessed against him in his official capacity. Therefore, an appropriate amended judgment will be rendered. In all other respects, the motion for rehearing is overruled.
. Section 145(h) states:
When an independent administration has been created, and the order appointing an independent executor has been entered by the county court, and the inventory, appraisement, and list of aforesaid has been Hied by the executor and approved by the county court, as long as the estate is represented by an independent executor, further action of any nature shall not be had in the county court except where this Code specifically and explicitly provides for some action in the county court.