Marriage of Erlandson v. Erlandson

*37AMDAHL, Chief Justice.

Appeal by Rose Helen Erlandson from an order for judgment and judgment and decree entered April 30, 1980, in which the marital status of Rose and Marlin Erland-son was dissolved pursuant to the petition of Marlin on the grounds of irretrievable breakdown. The issue on appeal is whether the trial court erred in the type and amount of maintenance awarded to Rose. Affirmed.

Rose and Marlin were married October 31,1959. A son and daughter were born of the marriage. At the time of dissolution, Rose was 49 and Marlin was 48 years of age and both children were living with petitioner. The daughter was an employed adult and the son, born on May 31, 1963, was still a minor.

The evidence at trial established that Marlin, a high school graduate who had taken some college courses, had been employed and was the provider of income for the family throughout the marriage. At the time of trial, he was employed in a managerial position at an annual salary of $30,500. Marlin testified that he was not aware of any career advancement prospects although he did expect yearly salary increases.

Rose, who had completed ninth grade, had vocational training in 1954 for compto-metry and for typing in 1951 and 1979. She was employed during the first 5 years of the marriage and then terminated employment to care for the children.

Physical injuries, caused by accidents, have limited Rose’s physical ability and have caused her severe pain. She has required surgical procedures to her neck and to her hands. She has pain upon continuous lifting or upon lifting heavy objects. She has a maximum typing ability of 30 words per minute but has difficulty typing as her hands get sore, tired, and swollen. She has no problems performing detail work but suffers pain when looking sideways. She cannot drive far and riding the bus causes jolting and pain to her neck. Rose returned to employment as a shipping inspector in August of 1973 and held that position until April of 1974 when she quit to undergo neck surgery. She returned to employment in June of 1977 and was employed at various jobs at pay rates of $2.50 to $3.40 per hour from that time to mid-December, 1979. Her usual reason for leaving a position was that the required activities caused her pain. In December of 1979 she began work as an inventory clerk at $3.40 per hour plus benefits of paid holidays and major medical, dental, and life insurance at no cost to her. She was employed at that job at the time of dissolution and although she knows of no opportunity for a salary raise, she intends to remain at the job because there is possibility of advancement and her supervisor had indicated that she was performing well.

In 1979, she received wages of $6,395 and her annual earnings at the time of the dissolution were approximately $7,072; her take home net pay was $461.58 per month.

A counseling supervisor for the Minnesota Department of Economic Security testified that in his expert opinion, Rose’s employment prospects would not improve with initial training, and the nature of her vocational disability was such that jobs requiring dexterity and coordination, such as factory jobs, or occupations involving heavy or continuous lifting, were inappropriate. He testified that she has demonstrated that she is an employable person who could work in a clerical job of a sedentary nature until normal retirement age and that her maximum annual earning capacity was probably $10,000 since retraining would most likely prove futile. The problems she experienced with her hands apd elbows would, in his view, prevent her from obtaining a job of supervisory capacity or as a skilled secretary.

The trial court determined the market value of the assets of the parties, after deducting encumbrances, to be $59,249.49. Debts, excluding encumbrances on real and personal property, were $1,971.38. The court then ordered that petitioner be *38awarded assets of the value of $28,336.961 and pay debts of $1,798.80. The petitioner was thus awarded a net amount of $26,-538.16.

The court awarded assets of the value of $30,912.53 to respondent and required that she pay a debt of $172.58. Respondent was thus awarded a net amount of $30,739.95.

Among the assets was the homestead which the court determined to have a market value of $53,000 and a present mortgage of $9,333.44 or a net value of $43,-666.56. Respondent was granted possession of the homestead and required to pay the monthly mortgage installments (principal, interest, taxes, and insurance) of $170.05 with the requirement that the property would be sold upon the happening of any of certain conditions2 and, in any event, not later than 3 years from the date of the filing of the judgment and decree. The court further directed that upon sale of the homestead the amount of principal paid by respondent between the date of the decree and the date of sale be deducted from the proceeds of sale and repaid to her before the division of one-third of the proceeds to the petitioner and two-thirds to respondent.

The court further determined that net proceeds of a personal injury suit were not marital assets and accepted a determination of another court that respondent was entitled to $18,838 and that petitioner was entitled to $1,900 of such proceeds.

At trial Rose submitted a monthly expense budget of $827.05 for herself and the minor child. This figure was not challenged by Marlin.

The court, after considering the assets, income, future income, and needs of the parties, directed petitioner to pay $250 per month support for the minor child of the parties until May 31, 1981, when the child would reach majority. The court also ordered petitioner to pay respondent $125 per month for spousal maintenance until her death, her remarriage, or further order of the court.

We assume that the homestead will be sold as required by the trial court and that the sale will be at or near the market value determined by the court. Respondent may anticipate receipt by her of two-thirds of the proceeds from the sale after deduction of sale expenses. Under normal circumstances, respondent should receive at least $26,000. She will have, barring expenditures from the personal injury settlement, about $45,000 for investment purposes. She will thus have income from that amount in addition to her earnings, plus fringe benefits of major medical and dental insurance provided by her employer and the permanent spousal maintenance of $125 per month required to be paid by petitioner.

The standard of review on appeal from a trial court’s determination of a maintenance award is whether the trial court abused the wide discretion accorded to it. In the absence of a finding by this court of such abuse, the trial court’s determination is final. Lillehei v. Lillehei, 298 N.W.2d 453 (Minn.1980); Cooper v. Cooper, 298 Minn. 247, 214 N.W.2d 682 (1974). That discretion must be examined in light of the controlling statutory guidelines contained in Minn.Stat. § 518.552 (1980), which contains a detailed enumeration of the several factors to be considered by the trial court.

Our determination of this appeal must be based on Minn.Stat. § 518.552 (1980) and *39our interpretation of that statute as expressed in Otis v. Otis, 299 N.W.2d 114 (Minn.1980) Minn.Stat. § 518.552 provides:

Subdivision 1. In a proceeding for dissolution of marriage or legal separation, or in a proceeding for maintenance following dissolution of the marriage by a court which lacked personal jurisdiction over the absent spouse and which has since acquired jurisdiction, the court may grant a maintenance order for either spouse if it finds that the spouse seeking maintenance:
(a) Lacks sufficient property, including marital property apportioned to him, to provide for his reasonable needs, especially during a period of training or education, and
(b) Is unable to adequately support himself after considering all relevant circumstances through appropriate employment or is the custodian of a child whose condition or circumstances make it appropriate that the custodian not be required to seek employment outside the home.
Subd. 2. The maintenance order shall be in amounts and for periods of time as the court deems just, without regard to marital misconduct, and after considering all relevant factors including:
(a) The financial resources of the party seeking maintenance, including marital property apportioned to him, and his ability to meet his needs independently, including the extent to which a provision for support of a child living with the party includes a sum for that party as custodian;
(b) The time necessary to acquire sufficient education or training to enable the party seeking maintenance to find appropriate employment;
(c) The standard of living established during the marriage;
(d) The duration of the marriage;
(e) The age, and the physical and emotional condition of the spouse seeking maintenance; and
(f) The ability of the spouse from whom maintenance is sought to meet his needs while meeting those of the spouse seeking maintenance; and
(g)The contribution of each party in the acquisition, preservation, depreciation, or appreciation in the amount or value of the marital property, as well as the contribution of a spouse as a homemaker.

Id.

This court in Otis recognized several contemporary principles that underlie the new legislation and have a bearing on this case, although they are not directly applicable here because the Otis decision involved rehabilitative or temporary maintenance. The Otis court reflected on the basic attitudinal change and stated that “[i]n recent years, courts have retreated from traditional attitudes toward spousal support because society no longer perceives the married woman as an economically unproductive creature * * Otis v. Otis, 299 N.W.2d 114, 116 (Minn.1980) (quoting Rehabilitative Spousal Support: In Need of a More Comprehensive Approach to Mitigating Dissolution Trauma, 12 U.S.F.L. Rev. 493, 494 (1978). Today, a spousal support award is based on the notion that the marital relationship involves an economic partnership in which the spouses equally share the burdens and responsibilities of both marriage and dissolution.

It is apparent that Rose meets the two basic conditions that establish a need for maintenance. First, the Erlandsons did not own substantial assets and Rose lacks sufficient property to provide for her needs. Second, her monthly expenses exceeded her net take-home salary, thereby establishing that she is unable to support herself through appropriate employment.

Because each case must be determined on its own facts, see Cooper v. Cooper, 298 Minn. 247, 214 N.W.2d 682 (1974), and no single statutory factor for determining the type or amount of maintenance is dispositive, see Minn.Stat. § 518.552, subd. 2 (1980), it is important to examine the current situation for Rose and Marlin, noting that although the statute lists seven factors, the issue is basically the financial needs of Rose and her ability to meet those *40needs balanced against the financial condition of Marlin.

Rose, despite her physical handicaps, is emotionally stable, in generally good health, and able to work to normal retirement age. She was awarded approximately 54% of the marital assets accumulated during the 20-year marriage. While the record is silent as to the marital standard of living, it appears that each of the parties contributed to that accumulation; Marlin contributed through employment outside of the home and Rose contributed through her wife, mother, and homemaker activities together with minimum outside employment.

Marlin’s income is adequate to provide him with the ability to meet his needs while providing the ordered spousal maintenance and child support.

Rose’s annual salary of $7,072, when augmented by the spousal maintenance and child support payment, is more than adequate to meet her budgeted expenses. She also has the ability to increase that salary to a probable maximum of $10,000 per year. Additionally, she has the income from any investment made of the proceeds of the personal injury action. While the child support income would terminate as of May 31, 1981, the legal duty to support the child would cease at that time for Rose as well as for Marlin. Furthermore, the record does not reflect the amount of the budgeted expenses attributable to the cost of providing for the minor.

Rose also has the discretion to put the homestead up for sale, if she desires to do so, before the 3-year period granted by the court expires. She will, upon sale, whenever made, receive reimbursement for the amount she has paid on the mortgage principal between the date of the dissolution and the date of sale, plus two-thirds of the net sale proceeds.

An examination of the trial court’s determination in light of the factors expressed here leads us to the conclusion that the award of permanent spousal maintenance, while certainly minimal, was not clearly erroneous in duration or amount.

Affirmed.

KELLEY, J., took no part in the consideration or decision of this case.

. The trial court valued these assets at $30,-637.96. However, it computed the value of a pickup and camper unit to be zero. In fact, an encumbrance on the unit exceeded the market value by $2,301. Thus the actual net value of the assets has been reduced by this amount.

. The judgment and decree provided:

The property shall be placed on the market for sale, at fair market value, within 30 days after the happening of any of these conditions:
a.Respondent’s remarriage;
b. Respondent’s voluntary sale of said premises;
c. Respondent’s ceasing to occupy said premises as a homestead;
d. Respondent’s death;
e. When payment on the mortgage principal or interest on said property are more than 60 days delinquent;
f. Three years from the date of filing of the Judgment and Decree herein;
whichever event occurs first.