Hampton v. Arkansas State Game & Fish Commission

George Rose Smith, J.,

dissenting. By implication the majority recognize that the project in question is for a public purpose, and with that view I agree. It is no longer uncommon for states and municipalities to own recreational facilities, such as swimming pools, golf courses, and athletic stadiums. There would undoubtedly be a widespread use of these duck-shooting areas by the general public. To illustrate, last year the State issued 233,796 hunting licenses and 255,602 fishing licenses, the total revenue being $932,660.05. These figures show how numerous are our citizens who participate in hunting and fishing.

But, say the majority, Amendment 35 does not vest in the Commission the power to condemn land for a combined game refuge and hunting area. In the Wraps case, cited by the majority, we sustained the Commission’s power to condemn land for the creation of a lake where fish would be grown for the recreation of anglers. I cannot escape the feeling that by today’s decision the majority has discriminated against hunters as compared to fishermen.

It is hard to see how the people, in their effort to vest in the Commission complete control over the taking of fish and game, could have used broader language than that contained in Amendment 35. The amendment gives the Commission the general power to control, manage, and regulate our wildlife resources, as well as specific authority to declare bag limits, to fix open and closed seasons, to establish protected areas, etc. I am not convinced that these broad powers stop short of authorizing the proposal now condemned by the majority.

To begin with, one-fourth of the 40,000-acre area will be used as a game refuge, where hunting will be prohibited. For all that this records shows, the shooting area will be subordinate, or at least complementary, to the game refuge. The latter will unquestionably increase the wildlife population, by providing a sanctuary for the birds on their flight southward. The Commission could easily regulate the open seasons and bag limits in the public shooting area in such a manner that the end result of the entire project would be an increase in the State’s wildlife. Thus the facts do not support the majority’s view that this proposal is the antithesis of conservation.

Next, the amendment provides: “Said Commission shall have the power to acquire by purchase, gifts, eminent domain, or otherwise, all property necessary, useful or convenient for the use of the Commission in the exercise of any of its duties.” The power to condemn is patently as broad as the power to purchase; it could not logically be less unless the public will is to be thwarted by a landowner who refuses to sell. Granted that this purpose is a public one, I do not suppose anyone would seriously argue that the Commission lacks the power to purchase property to be used as a game refuge and shooting area. There is not a syllable in the amendment to indicate that a different rule is to prevail in condemnation proceedings.

Finally, I think the majority have confused the meaning of “conserve” with that of “preserve.” The latter means to protect entirely from danger, hut conservation “stresses the idea of maintenance of an existing condition.” Webster’s New International Dictionary, Second Edition. On the point of conservation the majority distinguish the Wrape case by saying that there the primary purpose was the propagation of fish. True, but propagation for what purpose? So that the fish could be caught by fishermen, of course. That is conservation as the term is used in Amendment 35- — a program whereby the wildlife population may be maintained at a level that will permit extensive hunting and fishing. That is the purpose of the project at bar, and I do not think the Constitution requires us to strike it down.

Holt and Millwee, JJ., join in this dissent.