Martin v. Coffey

Danhof, C. J.

This appeal concerns a proceeding under the Uniform Reciprocal Enforcement of Support Act (URESA), MCL 780.151 et seq.; MSA 25.225(1) et seq. Plaintiff appeals from the trial court’s order quashing her petition for support under URESA.

Plaintiff, a Michigan resident, sought to utilize the URESA to enforce a purported obligation of support owed by defendant, a Texas resident, to the parties’ child, as established by a prior order of support entered as a result of an action under the Paternity Act, MCL 722.711 et seq; MSA 25.491 et seq. Because plaintiff relies on this order and because no marriage or divorce is involved, the divorce case law relied upon by the dissent, does not have application in the instant case. We note also that while URESA provides additional retnedies it does not independently create any duty of support.

Under URESA, once a petition has been presented to an initiating court setting out facts from which a duty of support may be found and the initiating court has certified this petition to the responding state court, the defendant should present any defenses in the responding state court which then determines the existence and extent of any support obligation. In the instant case plaintiff *116filed a URESA petition in the lower court. The petition stated that paternity hád been established in 1963. This petition was certified to the appropriate Texas court. Defendant then moved in the Michigan court to quash the petition.

URESA provides in part that:

"The petition shall be verified and shall state the name and, so far as known to the petitioner, the addresses and circumstances of the respondent, his dependents for whom support is sought and all other pertinent information.” (Emphasis added.) MCL 780.161; MSA 25.225(11).

We believe that the petition in this case was properly quashed because it failed to set out "other pertinent information”.

The Paternity Act reads in part:

"Sec. 3. (a) An agreement or compromise made by the mother or child or by some authorized person on their behalf with the father concerning the support and education of the child shall be binding upon the mother and the child only when the court having jurisdiction to compel support and education of the child shall have determined that adequate provision is reasonably secured by payment or otherwise and has approved the agreement or compromise.
"(b) The performance of the agreement or compromise, when so approved, shall bar other remedies of the mother or child for the support and education of the child.” (Emphasis added.) MCL 722.713; MSA 25.493.

In light of this Paternity Act provision, the 1969 agreement between the parties, approved by the circuit court, discharging defendant’s support obligation must be considered "other pertinent information”, however, no mention of this agreement was made in the URESA petition filed by plaintiff. *117Consequently, we affirm the quashing of plaintiffs original URESA petition but do so without prejudice to plaintiffs filing of another URESA petition fully setting out the pertinent information. We state no opinion as to whether or not MCL 722.7130b); MSA 25.4930b) necessarily precludes action under URESA on the facts of this case.

Affirmed. No costs.

Allen, J., concurred.