On Rehearing
In their application for rehearing counsel for appellant have requested that we set forth the additional fact that Mrs. Delene B. Wyatt testified that she knew that this appellant was selling lumber to the county in his own name, and in the names of Robert Connell,' Dalton Connell, and Wilton Robinson. She further testified that she thought the county commissioners knew this. Her testimony along this line is contained in the following excerpt from the record:
“Q. Did Mr. D. C. Littlefield, or Cleve as he is sometimes known, sell lumber to the County during the war? A. Yes sir.
“Q. Will you state whether or not he sold lumber to the County during the war when it was scarce and the County couldn’t buy it at other places ? A. Well, I think he did.
“Q. That’s your recollection. A. That’s right.
“Q. Well, did Mr. Littlefield sell a good bit of lumber to the County? A. Yes sir. He sure did.
“Q. Over a long period of years, is that right ? A. That’s right.
“Q. Did he sell it in his own name ? A. Well-
“Q. I mean some of the times? A. Yes sir.
“Q. Did he sell it from Robert Connell’s name sometimes? A. Yes. I think he did.
“Q. Dalton Connell? A. Yes sir.
“Q. Wiltbn Robinson? Do you recall that? A. Yes sir. I think I remember.
“Q. Was that known by the Commissioners? A. Yes sir. I think it was.
“Q. Did you know that he was selling it and that he was doing that in those names of the other persons? A. Yes sir.
“Q. Do you know whether or not there was some criticism by other lumber dealers in the County that Mr. Littlefield was the only one that could sell lumber to the County?
“Mr. Huddleston: We don’t—
“Mr. Harrison: I beg your pardon ? I asked her if she knew.
“A. I have heard some say they felt like the Commissioners bought more lumber from Mr. Littlefield. I don’t know whether it was criticism or not. I have heard they say—
“Q. Had you heard that that was the reason that Mr. Littlefield sold in the names of these other persons? A. Yes sir. I heard that.”
Counsel for appellant argue that the above testimony establishes that the county, through its court, had knowledge that this appellant was selling lumber to the county under several assumed names, and therefore it could not be said that any fraud or deceit was present.
The fallacy of this argument is that the weight of all the evidence was for the jury. Mrs. Wyatt’s statement that it was known to the Commissioners that the appellant was selling lumber to the county under several assumed names was qualified by her statement “I think it was”. That a witness phrases his testimony in such terms as “I think,” “I believe,” etc., does not render such testimony inadmissible. See “Admissibility in Alabama of Witness’ Tes*514timony in Terms of T think/ T believe/ or the Like,” McElroy, 3 Ala. Lawyer 67.
However the probative value of such testimony is for the jury. At best it rep-represents only an imperfect recollection or impression. At worst, it may represent mere surmise or. speculation.
Further', the record shows that as to the particular transaction on which count 3 of the indictment is based Mrs. Wyatt testified that “Robert Connell” was the name read out in the Commissioners Court when the claim was passed, and that the name of this appellant was not read out, and that so far as the Commissioners were concerned the claim was read as for lumber sold by “Robert Connell.”
We adhere to our former conclusion that the evidence presented by the State was sufficient, if believed by'the jury under the required rule, to support the verdict rendered and judgment entered.
Counsel for appellant further argue that the Court of County Commissioners, being a court of limited jurisdiction, could not delegate authority to draw warrants, and therefore the warrant in this case, actually signed by Mrs. Wyatt in the name of “W. L. Parrish, President, County Commission of Chilton County” was void at the time of its issuance, and could not be validated by the later unqualified endorsement of the appellant, and.whether the warrant had value must be determined as of the time it was issued, and not at the time of its endorsement.
For the proposition that the 'Court of County Commissioners could not authorize Mrs. Wyatt, Clerk of the Commission, to sign warrants, counsel for appellant rely on Ellis v. Batson, 177 Ala. 313, 58 So. 193. This case, decided in 1912, holds that a County Treasurer could not lawfully delegate his duty, imposed under Sec. 211, Code of 1907, of receiving and disbursing county monies.
Section 76, Title 12, Code of Alabama 1940, specifically provides: “Who shall issue warrants. — No warrant shall be issued or check drawn on the county treasurer or county depository by any person except the judge of probate or chairman of the board of revenue, or like governing body, or such other •officer as may be 'designated, by such board unless otherwise provided by law.” (Italics ours.)
Section 209, Title 14, Code of Alabama 1940, provides: “Any person, who*, by false pretense or token, and with the intent to injure or defraud, obtains from another any money or other personal property, shall on conviction, be punished, as if he had stolen it.”
Personal property includes “things in action and evidence of debt”. Section 2, Title 1, Code of Alabama 1940. The warrant obtained in this case was a chose in action, an evidence of debt.
Further, Mr. Polk, Treasurer of Chilton County, testified that the value of the warrant was $83.72, and that it was marked paid.
Appellant’s requested written charges 14, 15, and 16 were refused without error as being incorrect statements of the legal principles applicable to this case.
Evidence was presented by the State tending to show that the appellant “did falsely pretend to the court of County Commissioners of Chilton County, Alabama, that Robert Connell had sold or furnished to Chilton County, Alabama, or that Chilton County, Alabama, was indebted to Robert Connell for, 2392 feet or board feet of lumber, in the amount or value of $83.72, and by means of such false pretenses obtained from Chilton County, Alabama, a check or warrant drawn on the Gasoline Fund of Chilton County, Alabama, dated ¡May 10, 1948, in the amount of $83.72, and of the value of $83.72, and payable to the order of Robert Connell,” as charged in the indictment.
This evidence in our opinion sufficiently made out a prima facie case against this appellant.
The theory on which counsel insists that charges 14, 15, and 16 should have been given is that the State should further have the burden of proving that no lumber was delivered by appellant, who had on previous occasions sold lumber to the county under assumed names, and that if lumber had been delivered to the county by appellant under an assumed name there could be no *515intent to defraud in that the county could not have .been injured.
Whether lumber of the value of the warrant had been delivered to the county by the appellant under any name was a fact peculiarly within the knowledge of this appellant. Certainly the undisputed evidence shows that Robert Connell had never sold or delivered any lumber to the county.
The State having presented evidence tending to establish a prima facie case under the terms of the indictment, the jury was .justified in inferring his guilt therefrom. The onus of showing that lumber had actually been delivered to the county by appellant under an assumed name, a fact peculiarly within appellant’s knowledge, was then cast upon the appellant. The appellant presented no evidence in the trial below.
Appellant’s requested charge 17 was also faulty and properly refused as being an incorrect statement of legal principles applicable. The fact that Mrs. Wyatt .may have had authority to sign warrants, and may have had knowledge that appellant was selling lumber in another’s name could not absolve appellant of his misconduct.
Charges 26 and 27 were properly refused as they too were incorrect statements of legal principles. Section 76, Title 12, Code of Alabama 1940.
Application overruled.