(dissenting). On May 11, 1973, plaintiff decedent, DeAndrea Rosario, was found drowned in an open sewer drain in the Bethlehem Evangelical Lutheran Church parking lot in the City of Lansing.1 The drain was part of a sewer system owned and maintained by the City of Lansing. Plaintiffs brought suit against both the church and the City of Lansing, alleging negligence.2 Later *145plaintiffs amended the complaint to include an additional count in negligence based on "attractive nuisance”.3
The City of Lansing moved for summary judgment, asserting that any recovery based upon claim of negligence or nuisance predicated upon negligence is precluded by § 7, 1964 PA 170 as amended, MCLA 691.1407; MSA 3.996(107).4 The trial court granted the City of Lansing’s motion and dismissed the plaintiffs’ cause of action as failing to state a claim on which relief can be granted. GCR 1963, 117.2(1). The Court of Appeals affirmed. 66 Mich App 597; 239 NW2d 428 (1976).
As was observed in Thomas v Department of State Highways, 398 Mich 1, 10; 247 NW2d 530 (1976):
"The historical context in which the governmental immunity statute was enacted suggests that the Legislature, alarmed at the prospects of liability for govern*146mental activities previously protected, sought to restore the immunity enjoyed by municipalities prior to Williams v Detroit; 364 Mich 231; 111 NW2d 1 (1961), and to codify the state’s existing immunity to insulate governmental entities from tort liability.” (Emphasis added.)
Consequently, in order to determine the scope of the now codified immunity, we must determine the scope of its antecedent "existing immunity”. Since the common-law or "existing immunity” doctrine included certain judicially created exceptions which defined its limits, the legislatively codified immunity is limited and defined by the same exceptions. One of these exceptions is here in issue: the doctrine of "nuisance”.
In Gerzeski v Department of State Highways; 403 Mich 149; 268 NW2d 525 (1978), we were asked to define the perimeters of the judicially created "nuisance” exception as it related to judicially created sovereign immunity. After reviewing prior case law, I concluded that the "nuisance exception”, as it is commonly known, is limited to two subclasses of nuisance, "nuisances per se” and "intruding nuisances” and observed:
"The first exception entails those situations where the state creates or maintains a 'nuisance per se’. Royston v Charlotte, 278 Mich 255, 260; 270 NW 288 (1936). See, for example of 'nuisance per se’, Trowbridge v Lansing, 237 Mich 402; 212 NW 73 (1927), decaying garbage in 'piggery’; Attorney General ex rel Wyoming Twp v Grand Rapids, 175 Mich 503; 141 NW 890 (1913), disposing of raw sewage in river.
"Such activities or conditions are properly characterized as a 'nuisance per se’ because they are nuisances without regard to the care with which they are conducted or the circumstances under which they exist. Bluemer v Saginaw Central Oil & Gas Service, Inc, 356 Mich 399, 411; 97 NW2d 90 (1959); People v Detroit *147White Lead Works, 82 Mich 471, 476; 46 NW 735 (1890).” Gerzeski at 149.
"The second judicial exception to governmental immunity consists of those situations wherein damage is caused by the direct trespass of an instrumentality from government-owned land onto private property. Buckeye Union Ins Co v Michigan, 383 Mich 630; 178 NW2d 476 (1960), fire spreading from state maintained hazard; Herro v Chippewa County Road Commissioners, 368 Mich 263; 118 NW2d 271 (1962), flooding waters escaping from artificial reservoir; Ferris v Board of Education of Detroit, 122 Mich 315; 81 NW 98 (1899), slippery condition created by ice and snow falling from roof of government-owned building onto neighboring land.” Gerzeski at 149.
For the reasons stated infra, those same conclusions are equally applicable to this legislatively created immunity case.
In this case, plaintiffs’ complaint against the City of Lansing alleged that the open sewer drain constituted an unreasonably dangerous condition. The liability of the city in connection therewith was essentially predicated upon the city’s negligent conduct in failing to replace the top on the drain, provide barricades around the drain, or provide any warning of this dangerous condition after its representatives knew or should have known of the dangerous condition.
It is readily apparent that plaintiffs’ complaint does not allege a factual basis sufficient to establish either a "nuisance per se” or an "intruding nuisance”. Rather, the claim is one for damages predicated upon the city’s carelessness in failing to remedy a dangerous condition. This Court has previously refused to except from the defense of governmental immunity, negligence claims brought under the guise and label of "nuisance”. McDowell v State Highway Commissioner, 365 *148Mich 268; 112 NW2d 491 (1961); Royston v Charlotte, supra; Daniels v Board of Education of Grand Rapids, 191 Mich 339; 158 NW 23 (1916).
I reemphasize that the narrow judicial exceptions to governmental immunity extend only to "per se” and "intruding” nuisances.
Accordingly, I would affirm the finding of the Court of Appeals. No costs, a public question.
Coleman, J., concurred with Ryan, J.In their amended complaint, plaintiffs alleged that "the covering on the drain in question was frequently removed by children and other persons * * * ”.
Plaintiffs’ "negligence” averments against the City of Lansing were:
V.
"That the City of Lansing, its agents, servants, or employees, knew or should have known that there was no top on said drain and that said open drain constituted an inherently dangerous condition, but that the City of Lansing neglected, failed and refused to place any top on said drain, failed to provide any barricades around said open drain, or to provide any warning or take any steps whatsoever to remove, repair, or eliminate this inherently dangerous condition;
VI.
"That the City of Lansing had been advised of this condition, had *145been requested to correct this inherently dangerous condition, and neglected and failed to do so, which was a proximate cause of the death of DeAndrea Rosario.”
Plaintiffs’ allegation of "attractive nuisance” was as follows:
"That the defendant, City of Lansing, was notified by both church officials and congregation members that the covering on the drain in question was frequently removed by children and other persons, and knew or should have known that children played in this area, and that said open drain was an attractive nuisance and created an extremely dangerous and hazardous condition for the children playing in this area, but that said defendant negligently failed and refused to take any steps whatsoever to secure the covering of said drain or to provide a heavier drain covering, or provide a covering that could not be removed without the appropriate tools, which was a proximate cause of the death of DeAndrea Rosario.”
"Except as in this act otherwise provided, all governmental agencies shall be immune from tort liability in all cases wherein the government agency is engaged in the exercise or discharge of a governmental function. Except as otherwise provided herein, this act shall not be construed as modifying or restricting the immunity of the state from tort liability as it existed heretofore, which immunity is hereby affirmed.”