concurring.
I respectfully concur because I agree that the decision of the trial court should be affirmed. I write separately because the majority opinion never decides whether the trial court was correct or not when it found the search was valid because it was *476conducted incident to a lawful arrest. Rather, the majority ends its analysis when it finds that a reasonable articulable suspicion existed and continues on to create a new doctrine regarding the offense of obstruction of a peace officer and a pat-down search.
The majority correctly frames the issue raised by Brooks when it states that “Brooks claims that the trial court erred in overruling his motion to suppress and in admitting the evidence of the crack cocaine at trial.”
The majority also accurately comments regarding our standard of review when it says that a reviewing court should take care both to review findings of historical fact only for clear error and to give due weight to inferences drawn from those facts by resident judges and local law enforcement officers.
The historical facts of this case are that at midnight, Brooks was urinating in a stall of a carwash which was open at each end and one of those open ends faced the street, near the intersection of 30th and Pratt Streets in Omaha. From the street, Officers Paul and Orsi saw Brooks urinating and could see his penis.
In ruling on the motion to suppress, the trial judge found in his written findings and order that these facts were a violation of Omaha’s indecent exposure ordinance. He stated further that this violation gave the officers probable cause to arrest Brooks. He further found that the search was therefore incident to a lawful arrest.
The Omaha city ordinance regarding indecent exposure reads: “It shall be unlawful for any person purposely or knowingly to expose his genitals under circumstances likely to cause affront or alarm.” This ordinance defines a general intent crime. See, generally, State v. Hoffman, 227 Neb. 131, 416 N.W.2d 231 (1987). Under this ordinance, it is inconsequential whether Brooks possessed specific intent to affront or alarm. I am unable to find that the trial judge was in error in concluding that an actual violation of the indecent exposure ordinance had occurred and that, therefore, the officers had authority to search Brooks as incident to a lawful arrest. The majority, however, in its review, does not reach the question of whether probable cause existed.
The majority concludes that
*477the totality of the facts of this case gave rise to a reasonable articulable suspicion that some offense, i.e., indecent exposure under the Omaha city ordinance, was being committed sufficient for a Terry stop without regard to whether or not there then existed probable cause to arrest, an issue we need not decide. See State v. Van Ackeren, 242 Neb. 479, 495 N.W.2d 630 (1993).
(Emphasis supplied.)
I agree with that part of the above quote which finds there was a reasonable articulable suspicion. I say this because I agree with the trial court that there was probable cause, and, therefore, it is axiomatic that a reasonable articulable suspicion existed. However, I do not agree that State v. Van Ackeren, 242 Neb. 479, 495 N.W.2d 630 (1993), dictates or stands for the proposition of law that in a case such as that before us, because a reasonable articulable suspicion exists, we need not decide whether the trial court was in error in concluding that probable cause existed. In fact, in Van Ackeren, the state conceded that probable cause did not exist at the time of the defendant’s confrontation with the police but contended that the confrontation was an investigatory stop.
The majority has concluded that the proper path of analysis is to begin with a determination regarding the existence of a reasonable articulable suspicion and finding such to exist, not to continue on in an analysis with regard to the trial court’s ruling that probable cause existed. This results in the unnecessary creation of a doctrine regarding the offense of obstruction of a police officer and pat-down searches. I express no view regarding this doctrine at this time.
Probable cause for a warrantless arrest exists where the facts and circumstances within an officer’s knowledge and of which he or she has reasonably trustworthy information are sufficient to warrant one of reasonable caution to believe that there was a fair probability that an offense has been or is being committed. See, Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 103 S. Ct. 2317, 76 L. Ed. 2d 527 (1983); State v. Roach, 234 Neb. 620, 452 N.W.2d 262 (1990). At the time of arrest, the police need not be certain that the person could actually be convicted of the crime.
*478Based upon the record before us, the officers would have been reasonable in concluding that there was a fair probability Brooks was committing the crime of indecent exposure under the city ordinance.
In summary, I would conclude that the trial court did not err when it concluded that the police had probable cause to arrest Brooks for public indecency, that the subsequent search was proper as a search incident to arrest, and that drugs found pursuant to the search were admissible at trial. I would affirm Brooks’ conviction and sentence on this basis.