I agree with the majority that the challenged ordinance governing the Los Angeles International Airport (LAX) does not violate the California Constitution. But I would answer the question the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals posed, identify the legal standard applicable to that answer, and apply that standard to determine whether the ordinance is valid.
The Ninth Circuit requested this court to answer this question: “Is Los Angeles International Airport a public forum under the Liberty of Speech Clause of the California Constitution?” (See Cal. Const., art. I, § 2, subd. (a).) Consistent with the United States Supreme Court’s resolution of the same question under the First Amendment to the United States Constitution, I would answer that LAX is not a public forum for free speech purposes under the California Constitution. (See International Soc. for Krishna Consciousness, Inc. v. Lee (1992) 505 U.S. 672 [120 L.Ed.2d 541, 112 S.Ct. 2701] (Lee).) This answer does not mean free speech rights do not exist at LAX. It just means that speech at LAX receives a lower level of protection than speech receives at traditional free speech zones such as parks and public squares. LAX is not the same as a park and should not be treated the same as a park.
A. Whether Los Angeles International Airport Is a Public Forum Under the California Constitution
The United States Supreme Court developed the public forum doctrine to distinguish between public property subject to the highest free speech protection under the First Amendment and public property subject to a lower level of free speech protection. (See generally Clark v. Burleigh (1992) 4 Cal.4th 474, 482-483 [14 Cal.Rptr.2d 455, 841 P.2d 975].) The high court applied that law and concluded that airport terminals (in that case the three major airports in the greater New York City area) are not public forums. (Lee, supra, 505 U.S. at pp. 680-683.) I would reach the same conclusion for LAX under the California Constitution.
First, I agree with what is implied in the Ninth Circuit’s question and the majority opinion: Public forum analysis applies under the California Constitution as well as under the First Amendment even though the doctrine was developed in First Amendment cases. It is a useful doctrine for deciding what level of protection speech receives in a given context. (See Clark v. Burleigh, supra, 4 Cal.4th at pp. 482-483.)
Although this court sometimes interprets the California Constitution differently than the First Amendment, no reason appears to do so here, and good reason exists not to do so. The public, litigators, and government attorneys advising their clients need a clear, consistent “public forum” doctrine in cases *464arising on public property, not seemingly random fluctuations between state and federal constitutional law. This is especially true of airports. After the events of September 11, 2001, Congress enacted the Aviation and Transportation Security Act (Pub.L. No. 107-71, 115 Stat. 597), which created the Transportation Security Administration and gave it broad authority to “oversee the implementation, and ensure the adequacy, of security measures at airports” like LAX. (49 U.S.C. § 114(f)(ll).) Federal and other authorities overseeing security measures at international airports throughout the country should have one set of constitutional rules to contend with, not multiple sets. Because of the need for interstate and international security cooperation, it benefits no one to have different constitutional rules at California airports than at other airports.
Airports are not traditional free speech zones like parks. This is true of the prescreening areas open to the public as well as the postscreening areas. As the majority aptly observes, “Although portions of the airport are open to the general public, people usually come to the airport only to travel or to accompany a traveler. Travelers often are in a hurry, and the airport often is crowded.” (Maj. opn., ante, at p. 459; see also ibid, [quoting Lee, supra, 505 U.S. at pp. 683-684].) People do not go to airports to relax or to socialize, to be entertained or to spend time; they go to airports to get themselves or their friends and loved ones safely and efficiently to their destination. The parties’ stipulation of agreed facts (as well as common experience) tells us that “[t]he ‘basic purpose’ of LAX is to facilitate, process and serve the traveling public in getting to and from airline flights and moving into and out of the airport terminal areas in a safe, secure, convenient, and efficient fashion.” LAX is not, and should not be declared to be, a free speech public forum under either the United States or the California Constitution.
In concluding that California constitutional law should differ from First Amendment law regarding airports, Justice Kennard relies “primarily” on two cases: Fashion Valley Mall, LLC v. National Labor Relations Bd. (2007) 42 Cal.4th 850 [69 Cal.Rptr.3d 288, 172 P.3d 742] (Fashion Valley) and In re Hoffman (1967) 67 Cal.2d 845 [64 Cal.Rptr. 97, 434 P.2d 353] (Hoffman). (Cone. opn. of Kennard, J., ante, at p. 461.) Neither case addresses, much less answers, this question.
Hoffman, supra, 67 Cal.2d 845, held that “First Amendment activities [cannot] be prohibited [at train stations] solely because the property involved is not maintained primarily as a forum for such activities.” (Id. at p. 850.) For three reasons, that opinion has nothing to do with the issue here. First, Hoffman cited solely the First Amendment with no hint that the California Constitution should diverge from First Amendment law in this area. Second, *465Hoffman concerned train stations in the 1960’s, not airports in the 21st century. As the Lee court—in an opinion long predating September 11, 2001—noted, there are major differences between airports and other “ ‘transportation nodes.’ ” (Lee, supra, 505 U.S. at p. 681.) “To blithely equate airports with other transportation centers, therefore, would be a mistake.” (Id. at p. 682.) Finally, Hoffman simply did not address the question whether a train station is a public forum under the First Amendment, much less whether it is one under the California Constitution, which it never cites. Hoffman held only that free speech rights exist at train stations, which is also true of airports even under my conclusion that they are not public forums. (See pt. B., post.) But Hoffman conducted no public forum analysis, which is not surprising given that the First Amendment public forum doctrine largely developed after that opinion. It never considered what level of protection speech receives at train stations: the highest level reserved for true public forums or the lower level given nonpublic forums.1
Fashion Valley, supra, 42 Cal.4th 850, held that a shopping mall is a public forum under the California Constitution.2 A shopping mall is entirely different from an airport for free speech purposes. As Fashion Valley noted, “in many cities the public areas of the shopping mall are replacing the streets and sidewalks of the central business district, which ‘have immemorially been held in trust for the use of the public and, time out of mind, have been used for purposes of assembly, communicating thoughts between citizens, and discussing public questions.’ ” (42 Cal.4th at p. 858.) None of this is remotely true of airports. To equate an airport with a free speech zone is to ignore reality and, perhaps worse, trivialize free speech interests at true public forums.
B. The Standard Applicable to a Nonpublic Forum
Declaring an area a nonpublic forum does not mean free speech rights do not exist there. Free speech rights exist on public property open to the public whether or not the property is considered a public forum. This is true under the First Amendment and, I have no doubt, also true under the California Constitution. My conclusion that an airport is not a public forum just means that restrictions on speech at an airport are not subject to the same level of *466“highest scrutiny” that applies to the “regulation of speech on government property that has traditionally been available for public expression ....” (Lee, supra, 505 U.S. at p. 678.) As the high court explained, designating property as a public forum would mean that a restriction of speech on that property “could be sustained only if it was narrowly tailored to support a compelling state interest.” (Id. at p. 676.) A restriction on speech at a nonpublic forum such as an airport must still pass a constitutional test, albeit a less rigorous one. “The challenged regulation need only be reasonable, as long as the regulation is not an effort to suppress the speaker’s activity due to disagreement with the speaker’s view.” (Id. at p. 679.)
I would conclude that the ordinance at issue here passes this test for the reasons the majority gives for concluding it would pass even the more rigorous test reserved for public forums. Accordingly, I concur with the majority opinion.
Baxter, J., and Corrigan, J., concurred.
The Hoffman opinion does say that in one “respect, a railway station is like a public street or park.” (Hoffman, supra, 67 Cal.2d at p. 851.) But saying that a railway station is like a public street in one respect does not mean the court found it to be a public forum under a later-developed doctrine that it never mentioned.
1 dissented in Fashion Valley, supra, 42 Cal.4th 850, but only because the shopping mall at issue there was private property. (Id. at pp. 870-882.) If the shopping mall had been public property, I would have agreed that it was a public forum. But LAX is public property. Accordingly, the disagreement between the majority and dissent in Fashion Valley is irrelevant here.