(concurring in part, dissenting in part).
There is no doubt in my mind that appellant’s appeal has no merit insofar as he claims the court abused its discretion in revoking his probation. A “reasonably satisfied” platform of proof has been met by the State in several regards.
I am troubled by this appeal from an entirely different aspect, namely, jurisdiction. Jurisdiction, although not raised by either party on appeal or at the trial level, may be addressed by this Court, sua sponte. State v. Waldner, 381 N.W.2d 273, 275 (S.D.1986) (citing State v. Oban, 372 N.W.2d 125 (S.D.1985); State v. Huftile, 367 N.W.2d 193 (S.D.1985)). Huftile, 367 N.W.2d at 195, cited State v. Huth, 334 N.W.2d 485 (S.D.1983). It is the philosophy, of at least some trial judges in this state, that their jurisdiction is never-ending. Here, this trial judge first imposed probation. This probation resulted from withholding an entry of judgment of guilt and suspending imposition of sentence. Before us, we later find a judgment of guilt being imposed and a simultaneous sentence of fifteen years to the State Penitentiary. This sentence then contains one of these “I shall reach out from the grave to adjudicate” powers. For, you see, after ten years, and mind you, the Executive Branch will have control of the prisoner for ten years, the trial judge placed this appellant upon a “suspended sentence” establishing eleven separate conditions. In other words, this appellant will be answerable to this trial judge (Judicial Branch) some ten years down the road via a suspended sentence of five years, which was an overlay on an executed sentence of ten years. The trial judge in this case seems to direct a determination of complying with the rules and regulations of the South Dakota Board of Charities and Corrections and expressly does so by virtue of condition No. 8. The trial judge directs the appellant to obey the parole officers. Are parole officers, working for the Executive Branch of government, under a trial judge who is in the Judicial Branch of government? I think not.
However, the division of powers has been written upon extensively on the sentencing issue in this Court. Not one citation to any of these cases is alluded to in appellant’s brief. A few examples: Roden v. Solem, 411 N.W.2d 421 (S.D.1987) (Wuest, C.J., concurring specially); State v. Waldner, 381 N.W.2d 273 (S.D.1986); *365State v. Oban, 372 N.W.2d 125 (S.D.1985); State v. Huftile, 367 N.W.2d 193 (S.D.1985). These are but a few of the writings on sentencing.
“All paroled prisoners are under the supervision of the Board of Charities and Corrections.” See language in Huftile, 367 N.W.2d at 195 (emphasis in original) (citing SDCL 24-15-14). “This expressly includes persons on parole under a suspended sentence.” Id. (emphasis in original). “Uncertainty, if not chaos will result if a parolee is required to satisfy two supervisors; the sentencing court and the Board of Charities and Corrections, each with a different set of restrictions and conditions.” Id. at 196. This sentence is inherently flawed per the settled law of this state.
Acting Justice Wuest, now Chief Justice Wuest, in concurring in result in Huftile, at 197, noted that the State Legislature had amended SDCL 23A-27-19 in 1985. Specifically, the Legislature clarified that the Board of Charities and Corrections retain jurisdiction to revoke a suspended sentence imposed under SDCL 23A-27-18. In 1986, the statute, SDCL 23A-27-19, was amended (1986 S.D.Sess.L. ch. 195) (House Bill 1163), again but did not substantively eradicate the power of the Board to retain jurisdiction to revoke a suspended sentence (with exception of the existing one-year jurisdiction which a trial judge has to alter a sentence). In 1987, this pertinent statute was not amended. However, in 1988, via 1988 S.D.Sess.L. chs. 192 (House Bill 1159) and 193 (House Bill 1088), effective July 1, 1988, the Legislature again changed the statute by substituting “pardons and paroles” for “charities and corrections,” substituting “retains” for “shall have and retain,” and adding a notice provision, irrelevant to this appeal. Therefore, the Legislature continues to manifest its intent that a trial judge has jurisdiction for a period of one year from the effective date of the conviction, and continues to affirm its declaration that the Board of Pardons and Paroles retains jurisdiction to revoke a suspended sentence. A court services officer can only get into the picture when a defendant has been sentenced to the county jail as a condition of suspended imposition of sentence, suspended sentence, or suspended execution of sentence. SDCL 23A-27-18.2. Visualize the prisoner, who becomes a parolee; he cannot be in both branches at the same time, under dual supervision, and so says our State Legislature, again and again and again. Judge Konenkamp’s sentence, i.e., the last five years, is in excess of his jurisdiction and should be struck down even though not one case was cited in the briefs to substantiate that position. As former Chief Justice Fosheim noted in Huftile, 367 N.W.2d at 195, “[i]t is the rule in this state that jurisdiction must affirmatively appear from the record and this court is required sua sponte to take note of jurisdictional deficiencies, whether presented by the parties or not.”