(concurring specially).
In concurring with this reversal, I refer to my writing, concurring in part and dissenting in part, in State v. Short Horn, 427 N.W.2d 361, 364 (S.D.1988), which I conceptually believe supports this decision.
After a circuit court has lost jurisdiction, it is obvious the parole agent, not to mention the Board of Pardons and Paroles, needs authority to impose legal and reasonable conditions when a prisoner is released on the suspended portion of a split sentence. Under State v. Oban, 372 N.W.2d 125 (S.D.1985), the Board of Pardons and Paroles supervises persons serving the suspended portion of a split sentence.
This state needs a degree of uniformity in the administration of law and we cannot have a judge setting forth certain conditions and a parole board setting forth different conditions. What branch is the prisoner in? Oban laid this to rest in 1985. We held there that the suspended portion of Oban’s sentence could be revoked by the Board of Pardons and Paroles for a violation of a condition imposed by the prisoner’s parole officer. And we stated: “[H]e was still on parole by virtue of the suspended portion of the gubernatorial commutation. The circuit court had long lost jurisdiction.... Since appellant was still on parole, he was still bound by the terms and conditions of his parole agreement and the appropriate authority can revoke his parole for violation of its conditions.” Oban, 372 N.W.2d at 131. Also: “A penitentiary inmate is accordingly eligible for release either by the Board of Charities and Corrections [Board of Pardons and Paroles], SDCL 24-15-8, or a suspended sentence from the trial court. Via either route, the inmate becomes a parolee under the supervision of the Board of Charities and Corrections.” State v. Huftile, 367 N.W.2d 193, 196 (S.D.1985).
Appellant is raising an issue which is of recent stare decisis in South Dakota.
Let us touch upon policy, ever so briefly. The Board and parole agents are on top of the personal conduct of a prisoner; the sentencing judge is not. These trial judges cannot reach out from the grave, as I said in my writing in Short Horn (427 N.W.2d at 364), to adjudicate and hold on to these prisoners ad infinitum. See also Oban; Huftile. As I stated in my Short Horn writing, and point out again, a trial judge loses his jurisdiction after one year from imposition of a sentence to the State Penitentiary. SDCL §§ 23A-27-19, 23A-31-1. The circuit court loses jurisdiction after one year. Oban; Huftile. However, an illegal sentence can be modified or changed after the year expires under State v. Tibbetts, 333 N.W.2d 440 (S.D.1983). Not only does sound public policy favor allowing the parole board to impose legal and reasonable conditions on prisoners who are released on the suspended portion of a split sentence, but our state statutes and settled law of this state require it. See also the majority opinion of former Chief Justice Jon Fosh-eim in State v. Huftile, 367 N.W.2d at 195, wherein he stated: “All paroled prisoners are under the supervision of the Board of Charities and Corrections.” (Emphasis in original.) And our former Chief Justice also wrote: “This expressly includes persons on parole under a suspended sentence.” Id. (emphasis in original). Our former Chief Justice was concerned with overlapping-dual functions which could trigger uncertainties and confusion, for he wrote: “Uncertainty, if not chaos will result if a parolee is required to satisfy two supervisors; the sentencing court and the Board of Charities and Corrections, each with a different set of restrictions and conditions.” Id. at 196.
Lastly, this prisoner agreed to a “parole agreement,” which contained a reporting requirement. This reporting requirement was to report to a parole officer. She cannot be heard to complain about conditions that she has expressly agreed to. State v. Whalen, 367 N.W.2d 186 (S.D.1985); State v. Reinke, 298 N.W.2d 816 (S.D.1980); State v. Jackson, 272 N.W.2d 102, 104 (S.D.1978). It was error for the trial court to hold that the parole board could not impose conditions upon a person *848serving a suspended portion of a split sentence and that only the sentencing judge could enforce the conditions which he, himself, originally imposed.