Plaintiffs seek to have this Court declare unconstitutional certain Washington State statutes which impose upon them a one-year durational residency requirement to qualify as residents for tuition purposes at the University of Washington. It is stipulated that each plaintiff is a registered full-time student at the University, and, with two exceptions, each plaintiff has established a *39bona fide domicile in the State of Washington within the meaning of RCW 28B.15.012.1
That statute defines a resident student as one who has: (a) established a bona fide domicile in the State of Washington for other than educational purposes, and (b) established and maintained that domiciliary status for more than one year immediately preceding the commencement of the first day of the school term for which he registered at the State’s institution of higher learning.
It is contended that the challenged statutes2 require the plaintiffs to be treated differently for tuition purposes than other residents of the State, and thus, for no compelling state reason, they are deprived of their rights under the Equal Protection Clause of the United States Constitution. They further contend that the statutes in question violate their constitutional rights to travel and to the due process of law.
The action is instituted under 42 U.S. C. § 1983 (Civil Rights Act). Jurisdiction is vested in the Court under 28 U. S.C. §§ 1331 and 1343, and the Three-Judge Court was convened pursuant to the provisions of 28 U.S.C. §§ 2281 and 2284.
We find there to be no constitutional infirmity in the challenged statutes.
Plaintiffs argue that the discrimination created by the statutes in question *40infringe upon their basic constitutional rights and thus cannot be sustained in absence of a compelling state interest for the differentiation. They rest their arguments primarily on Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618, 89 S.Ct. 1322, 22 L.Ed.2d 600 (1969), and Dunn v. Blumstein, 405 U.S. 330, 92 S.Ct. 995, 31 L.Ed.2d 274 (1972). In Shapiro, the court declared unconstitutional certain State of Connecticut and District of Columbia statutory provisions which denied welfare assistance to persons who had not resided within the geographical boundaries of those jurisdictions for at least one year immediately preceding the application for the assistance. The Court reasoned that the classification served to limit the constitutionally protected right of the plaintiffs to travel, and that defendants had failed to prove that there was a compelling Governmental need for the discrimination. In Dunn, a Tennessee law creating a durational residency requirement of one year for purposes of qualifying residents to vote was held to be in violation of the Equal Protection Clause of the United States Constitution. The Court held that it had the effect of creating a classification which resulted in the denial to some citizens of the fundamental constitutional right to vote and that it directly impinged on the exercise of a second fundamental right, the right to travel.
Dispositive of the arguments raised by plaintiffs here is the reasoning of the Court in Starns v. Malkerson, 326 F. Supp. 234 (D.C.Minn.1970), affirmed without opinion, 401 U.S. 985, 91 S.Ct. 1231, 28 L.Ed.2d 527 (1971), which we adopt, and where the facts were almost identical to those at hand. In Starns, the University of Minnesota Board of Regents adopted a regulation which provided in part that:
“No student is eligible for residence classification in the University unless he has been a bona fide domiciliary of the state for at least a year immediately prior thereto.”
In determining that the compelling state interest test was not the appropriate standard to apply in evaluating the classification, the Starns Court distinguished Shapiro in two respects, first, that:
“The Supreme Court found, based on weighty evidence, that the one-year waiting period for welfare assistance had as a specific objective the exclusion from the jurisdiction of the poor who needed or may need relief. Shapiro v. Thompson, supra at 628-629, 89 S.Ct. 1322. The Court stated that such a purpose could not serve as a ‘justification for the classification created by the one-year waiting period, since that purpose is constitutionally impermissible.’ Id. at 629, 89 S. Ct. at 1329.” 326 F.Supp. at 237.
By contrast, the court in Starns, noted that there was no set of facts by which it could find that the tuition residency requirement was in any way designed to exclude or even deter an appreciable number of out-of-state students from attending the University of Minnesota and, for that reason, the compelling state interest test was held to be not applicable. As indicated by the record in that case,
“Of the approximately 50,000 students enrolled in the University (of Minnesota) . . . over 6,000 were nonresidents.”
Similarly, the total enrollment at the University of Washington for the Autumn Quarter of the 1972-1973 school year was 34,125 students, of whom 5,913 were classified as non-residents.
The record before us is devoid of evidence, or even a suggestion, that this tuition residency requirement was intended for any reason other than to cover the bare costs of providing for the students’ costs of education. In fact, the only evidence before this Court which relates to the actual cost of higher education in the State of Washington shows that the fees for a non-resident student *41are directly related to the cost of educating that student. Thus, the non-resident student merely pays his way and no penalty can correctly be said to have attached to the non-resident status.
The second distinguishing feature found 'by the Court in Starns was said to be that:
“In Shapiro, the one-year waiting period for welfare assistance had the effect of denying the basic necessities of life to needy residents. Thus, the deterring effect on interstate movement by the use of the residency requirement was readily apparent.” 326 F.Supp. at 238.
But that was not true in Starns, nor is it true here, because a person is not entitled to a higher education as a matter of right. See San Antonio Independent School District v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 93 S.Ct. 1278, 36 L.Ed.2d 16 (March 21, 1973). Also, see the Washington State Constitution3 which makes provision only for the education of children. And, obviously, it cannot rightfully be said that a person without a higher education is a person without the basic necessities of life.
While plaintiffs claim that the Court is bound by Shapiro and Dunn to subject the challenged statutes to “close judicial scrutiny”, it is observed that the residential classifications in those cases involved not only the right to travel, but also the right to the basic necessities of life and the right to vote. As already noted, the right to a higher education which is involved here is not a fundamental right. San Antonio Independent School District v. Rodriguez, supra. Accordingly, we conclude that this is not a case of infringement of a fundamental right and therefore hold that the exacting standards of the compelling state interest test are not here applicable.
Instead, the constitutionality of the contested statutes must be viewed in the light of the traditional equal protection standard, i. e., is there a rational, reasonable, relevant distinction between the differentiated classes? If there is not, then the mandate of the Equal Protection Clause has been violated.
Plaintiffs contend that they are foreclosed by the durational residency requirement from successfully controverting for a period of one year the presumption of non-residency, and that such a presumption is arbitrary, unreasonable and an invidious discrimination against them in violation of their Fourteenth Amendment rights. We find there to be a rational basis for the classification and thus hold otherwise.
The evidence before this Court shows that the purpose of the differentiation is to afford residents of this State who have resided here for more than one year immediately preceding the commencement of the school term an opportunity to attend the University at a cost subsidized by the taxpayers of the State, while charging those who have not theretofore contributed tax dollars to the State the actual cost to the State of their education. The one-year waiting period thus serves to provide the state with a time period during which it may charge a realistic tuition rate in order to achieve a partial cost equalization. As the Court said in Starns:
“We believe that the State . has the right to say that those new residents of the State shall make some contribution, tangible or intangible, towards the State’s welfare for a period of twelve months before becoming entitled to enjoy the same privileges as long-term residents possess to attend the University at a reduced resident’s fee.”
It appears to us that for the foregoing reasons, the distinctions drawn by the challenged statutes bear a rational, reasonable and relevant relationship to a legitimate state purpose and thus constitute permissible legislation. See McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U.S. 420, 81 S. Ct. 1101, 6 L.Ed.2d 393 (1961), and McDonald v. Board of Election Commis*42sioners, 394 U.S. 802, 89 S.Ct. 1404, 22 L.Ed.2d 739 (1969).
It is the judgment of this Court that the statutes of the State of Washington which require a State University student to establish a one-year residency within the State in order for that person to qualify as a resident student for tuition purposes are constitutionally valid. Judgment will accordingly be entered for the defendants.4
. “28B.15.012 — Definitions
Whenever used in chapter 28B.15 RCW:
(1) The term ‘institution’ shall mean a public university, college, or community college within the state of Washington.
(2) The term ‘resident student’ shall mean a student who has had a domicile in the state of AVashington for the period of one year immediately prior to the time of commencement of the first day of the semester or quarter for which he has registered at any institution and has in fact established a bona fide domicile in this state for other than educational purposes: Provided, That a nonresident student enrolled for more than six hours per semester or quarter shall be considered as attending for educational purposes only, and for tuition and fee paying purposes only such period of enrollment shall not be counted toward the establishment of a bona fide domicile of one year in this state unless such student proves that he has in fact established a bona fide domicile in this state for other than educational purposes.
(3) The term ‘nonresident student’ shall mean any student who does not qualify as a ‘resident student’ under the provisions of ROW 28B.15.011 through 28B.15.014 as now or hereafter amended.
(4) The term ‘domicile’ shall denote a person’s true, fixed and' permanent home and place of habitation. It is the place where he intends to remain, and to which he expects to return when he leaves without intending to establish a new domicile elsewhere.
(5) The term ‘minor’ shall mean a male or female person who is not deemed and taken to be of full age and majority for all purposes under ROW 26.28.-010, as now law or hereafter amended ; the term ‘emancipated minor’ shall mean a minor whose parents have entirely surrendered the right to the care, custody, and earnings of such minor and whose parents no longer in any way support or maintain such minor.
(6) The term ‘qualified person’ shall mean a person qualified to determine his own domicile. A person of full age and majority for all purposes under RCW 26.28.010, as now law or hereafter amended, or an emancipated minor is so qualified.
(7) The term ‘parent-qualified student’ shall mean a student having a parent who has a domicile in the state of Washington but who does not have legal custody of the student because of divorce or legal separation.
(8) The terms ‘he’ or ‘his’ shall apply to the female as well as the male sex unless the context clearly requires otherwise. [Added by Laws 1st Ex Sess 1971 ch 273 § 2, effective May 21, 1971; Amended by Laws 1st Ex Sess 1972 ch 149 § 1, effective February 25, 1972.]”
. RCW 28B.15.005, 28B.15.010, 28B.15.012, 28B.15.013, 28B.15.014, 28B.15.100 and 28B.15.200.
. See Washington State Constitution, Article IX, §§ 1-5.
. We note that after oral argument in this case, the Supreme Court ruled on a collateral issue in Vlandis v. Kline, 412 U.S. 441, 93 S.Ct. 2230, 37 L.Ed.2d 63 (June 11, 1973). There, the Court held that a permanent irrebuttable presumption of non-residence for tuition purposes violates the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. In reference to the Starns case, supra, on which we rely, the Supreme Court stated 93 S.Ct. at 2236:
“Nor should our decision [in Vlandis v. Kline] be construed to deny a State the right to impose on a student, as one element in demonstrating bona fide residence, a reasonable durational residency requirement, which can be met while in student status. We fully recognize that a State has a legitimate interest in protecting and preserving the quality of its colleges and universities and the right of its own bona fide residents to attend such institutions on a preferential tuition basis.”
Thus, the Supreme Court clearly distinguished between statutory schemes that impose irrebuttable presumptions of non-residence and those states that use residency requirements as one element in determining bona fide residence. Washington’s statutory framework falls within the latter category and is therefore consistent with the ruling in Vlandis v. Kline, supra.