Two issues are presented in this review of the plaintiff’s award of damages for violators of the Civil Rights Act, MCL 37.2101 et seq.; MSA 3.548(101) et seq. First, we must consider whether a derivative cause of action for loss of consortium is precluded by the Civil Rights Act. In our view, there is nothing in the statute which suggests a legislative purpose to preclude this derivative cause of action, and, indeed, to conclude otherwise would undermine the legislative purpose underlying the act. Thus, we believe, contrary to the partial dissent of Justice Griffin, that a derivative claim for loss of consortium should be recognized under the Civil Rights Act.
Second, we must consider whether exemplary damages, apart from actual damages, may be awarded for violations of the Civil Rights Act. In this respect, we are in agreement with Justice Griffin and conclude that exemplary damages *29may not be awarded apart from actual damages. However, we would emphasize that, under longstanding Michigan law, the award of exemplary damages was duplicative of certain aspects of actual damages.
Michigan has long recognized a cause of action for loss of consortium in favor of spouses, Montgomery v Stephan, 359 Mich 33, 38; 101 NW2d 227 (1960). But see Sizemore v Smock, 430 Mich 283, 299; 422 NW2d 666 (1988) (concurring opinion of Justice Griffin suggesting that Berger v Weber, 411 Mich 1; 303 NW2d 424 [1981], is no longer to be regarded as precedent). A claim for loss of consortium is simply one for loss of society and companionship. As Justice Griffin explains, a claim for loss of consortium is usually considered to be derivative, but only in the sense that it does not arise at all unless the other, impaired spouse has sustained some legally cognizable harm or injury. Thus, courts have consistently treated loss of consortium not as an item of damages, but as a separate cause of action. Montgomery, supra. See also Prosser & Keeton, Torts (5th ed), § 125, pp 931-934. This fact is often obscured by the use of the term "derivative” and also by the common procedural requirement that the claim be joined with that of the impaired spouse. As one commentator has explained:
So far as damages are based on intangible losses of society and affection, there is some risk that a jury hearing the husband’s claim will consciously or not, include something in the verdict for the wife’s loss as well, and vice versa. To minimize this risk, some courts have required that the main claim and the consortium claim be tried together, at least in the ordinary situation. [Prosser & Keeton, supra, p 933. See also Rusinek v Schultz, Snyder & Steele Lumber Co, 411 Mich 502, 508; 309 NW2d 163 (1981).] .
*30In our view, the partial dissent of Justice Griffin obscures the fact that loss of consortium is a separate cause of action and thus misstates the issue presented in this case. The question is not whether a cause of action is available under the Civil Rights Act, but whether there is anything in the act which would preclude this independent cause of action. We believe that this question must be answered in the negative.
In Boscaglia v Michigan Bell Telephone Co, 420 Mich 308; 362 NW2d 642 (1984), we considered a distinctly different question — whether Michigan’s Fair Employment Practices Act, 1955 PA 251, authorized a claim for loss of consortium. In doing so, we principally relied upon the remedial language of the fepa and its focus on equitable relief. Boscaglia, supra at 322. That language specified:
If, upon the preponderance of the evidence on the record considered as a whole, the [fair employment practices] commission shall determine that the respondent has engaged in or is engaging in any unfair employment practice, the commission shall state its findings of fact and shall issue and cause to be served on such respondent an order requiring such respondent to cease and desist from such unfair employment practice and to take such further affirmative or other action as will effectuate the purposes of this act, including, but not limited to, hiring, reinstatement or upgrading of employees with or without back pay, or admission or restoration to union membership, including a requirement for reports of the manner of compliance. [1955 PA 251, § 7(h).]
In addition, the Boscaglia Court noted that title vn of the federal Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 USC 2000e-5(g), was similarly limited to equitable remedies and had been construed to preclude a cause of *31action for loss of consortium. Boscaglia, supra at 323.
The Civil Rights Act, 1976 PA 453, which supplanted the fepa, is not limited to remedying discrimination in employment, but extends to public accommodations, services, and educational institutions. In language befitting this comprehensive scheme, art 8 of the Civil Rights Act includes its own civil action enforcement provision:
A person alleging a violation of this act may bring a civil action for appropriate injunctive relief or damages, or both. [MCL 37.2801(1); MSA 3.548(801)(1).]
Nothing in the language of this provision suggests a legislative intent to preclude a cause of action for loss of consortium. Indeed, elsewhere in art 8 of the act it is emphasized:
This act shall not be construed to diminish the right of a person to direct or immediate legal or equitable remedies in the courts of this state. [MCL 37.2803; MSA 3.548(803X1).]
The interpretive provision of § 803 of the Civil Rights Act mirrors the interpretive provision of Const 1963, art 5, § 29:
Nothing contained in this section shall be construed to diminish the right of any party to direct and immediate legal or equitable remedies in the courts of this state.[1]
*32It is therefore apparent that the legislative purpose underlying the civil enforcement provision of the Civil Rights Act was intended to provide all rights embraced in Const 1963, art 5, § 29.* 2 More*33over, it is apparent that Const 1963, art 5, § 29 itself cannot be construed to limit the legal and equitable remedies of the Michigan citizen. A right of action for loss of consortium is not only an existing legal remedy, but one which was in existence long before the adoption of Const 1963. Montgomery, supra.
Nothing in the language of the statute itself warrants such a restrictive interpretation. The partial dissent has fixed upon the opening clause of §801(1), which provides: "A person alleging a violation of this act . . . .” The partial dissent asserts that a spouse in an action for loss of consortium is not such a person. This is obviously incorrect. However, it is undisputed that loss of consortium is a derivative cause of action and the complaining spouse must allege a violation of the act to substantiate the claim. Thus, the clear language of the statute would support recognition of a cause of action for loss of consortium. Hiltz v Phil’s Quality Market, 417 Mich 335, 343; 337 NW2d 237 (1983). Moreover, the fact that the act itself does not confer civil rights upon the spouse is entirely irrelevant to whether an independent cause of action exists for loss of consortium.* *3 Properly perceived, Craig Eide’s claim for loss of con*34sortium is not a claim under the Civil Rights Act, but a claim at common law. Prosser & Keeton, supra.
Assuming that any construction of §801(1) of the act is necessary, it must first be compared with the correlative language of its statutory predecessor, the fepa. The opening clause of the fepa, § 7(b) was: "Any individual claiming to be aggrieved by an alleged unlawful employment practice . . . .” As we emphasized in Boscaglia, the complainant in a derivative cause of action, such as loss of consortium, does not claim to be aggrieved by an alleged unlawful employment practice, but by the subsequent injury to the impaired spouse. Boscaglia, supra at 322. In contrast, the opening clause of the civil enforcement provision of the Civil Rights Act is: "A person alleging a violation of this act . . . .” It is presumed that a change of language in a statute is intended to change the result of the statute. 2A Sands, Sutherland Statutory Construction (4th ed), § 45.12, pp 54-55. We would, therefore, construe this broadening of the statutory language to imply a broadening of the remedy to which it is addressed. Such a construction is also consistent with the well-established rule that remedial statutes are to be liberally construed to suppress the evil and advance the remedy. 3 Sands, Sutherland Statutory Construction (4th ed), § 60.01, p 55. Therefore, in our view, neither the clear language of the act nor conventional rules of statutory construction support the partial dissent’s view that § 801(1) precludes a claim for loss of consortium.4
*35We have addressed the intrinsic analysis of the partial dissent because we believe that it is ultimately flawed. However, we cannot embrace the partial dissent’s implicit assumption that resolution of this question may be found in the letter of the statute. As this Court has previously explained:
The Civil Rights Act did not merely codify preexisting statutes and procedural remedies. It worked an extensive expansion of the preexisting substantive provisions of civil rights legislation. [Matras v Amoco Oil Co, 424 Mich 675, 696-697; 385 NW2d 586 (1986).][5]
In our view, the comprehensive nature of the Civil Rights Act makes it qualitatively different from any predecessor statute, such as the fepa, and far greater than the sum of these "parts.” The fepa remedies provision was modeled after the federal Fair Employment Practices Act, Boscaglia, supra at 323, which was in turn modeled after the Labor-Management Relations Act, 29 USC 160. Albemarle Paper Co v Moody, 422 US 405, 417-419; 95 S Ct 2362; 45 L Ed 2d 280 (1975). All are essentially administrative schemes that focus upon the employment relationship, and the equitable remedies provided therein were designed to address *36problems in that relationship. See 1955 PA 251, § 7(h). The Civil Rights Act is much broader in scope.6 To focus upon any particular language of the statute, much less a flawed reading of that language, is to ignore the manifest breadth and comprehensive nature of this remedial statute.
This Court was acutely aware of the limitations of the fepa when it fashioned a judicially created, private remedy for racial discrimination in employment. Pompey v General Motors Corp, 385 Mich 537; 189 NW2d 243 (1971). Our restraint in further extending this judicially created remedy under Boscaglia was heavily influenced, if not solely dependent upon, the limitations of the fepa remedy.7 No such limitation is presented under the Civil Rights Act. Indeed, the Court of Appeals and federal courts have consistently extended the remedies provided under the Civil Rights Act to damages for humiliation, embarrassment, and outrage. See, e.g., Schafke v Chrysler Corp, 147 Mich App 751, 754; 383 NW2d 141 (1985), lv den 424 Mich 892 (1986); Slayton v Michigan Host, Inc, 122 Mich App 411, 416-417; 332 NW2d 498 (1983); Freeman v Kelvinator, Inc, 469 F Supp 999, 1004 (ED Mich, 1979).
Finally, we believe that the partial dissent is flawed in its continuing reliance upon federal precedent under title vn of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 USC 2000e-5(g). While we have previously noted the refusal of federal courts to recognize claims for loss of consortium under title vii, Boscaglia, supra, we have not based our interpretation *37of Michigan law upon them. Again, it must be emphasized that a claim for loss of consortium is an independent cause of action and not merely an item of damages. That claims for loss of consortium are not properly brought under title vii is apparent from the language of its remedies provision:
If the court finds that the respondent has intentionally engaged in or is intentionally engaging in an unlawful employment practice charged in the complaint, the court may enjoin the respondent from engaging in such unlawful employment practice, and order such affirmative action as may be appropriate, which may include, but is not limited to, reinstatement or hiring of employees, with or without back pay (payable by the employer, employment agency, or labor organization, as the case may be, responsible for the unlawful employment practice), or any other equitable relief as the court deems appropriate. [42 USC 2000e-5(g).]
The title vii remedies provision does not merely omit loss of consortium, but actually limits the claimant to equitable relief.8 In contrast, loss of consortium is a legal remedy and therefore unavailable under title vii. Hooten v Pennsylvania College of Optometry, 601 F Supp 1151, 1155, n 2 (ED Pa, 1984); Pryor v United States Gypsum, 585 F Supp 311, 317 (WD Mo, 1984). Furthermore, although title vii does not preclude an independent action under state law or other federal statutes, Johnson v Railway Express Agency, 421 US 454, 459; 95 S Ct 1716; 44 L Ed 2d 295 (1975), the extremely limited scope of federal common law following Erie R Co v Tomkins, 304 US 64, 78; 58 S Ct 817; 82 L Ed 1188 (1937), does not extend to *38title vii. Northwest Airlines, Inc v Transport Workers Union, AFL-CIO, 451 US 77; 101 S Ct 1571; 67 L Ed 2d 750 (1981).9 See, generally, 19 Wright, Miller & Cooper, Federal Practice and Procedure, §4514 et seq., pp 217 if. Indeed, it is doubtful that even a pendent state claim for loss of consortium could be maintained in a title vii action because of stringent jurisdictional limitations over pendent parties. Fritts v Niehouse, 604 F Supp 823 (WD Mo, 1984).
Michigan law is not bound by these statutory and jurisdictional restraints. The Michigan Civil Rights Act now contains its own civil enforcement provision, allowing both legal and equitable remedies without qualification. Michigan common law is not limited by the Erie doctrine and has in fact long recognized the right of each spouse to an independent action for loss of consortium. Boscaglia simply provides no authority in this case. As explained by Justice Smith in Montgomery, supra at 38, "Our oath is to do justice, not to perpetuate error.” Finding no other principled basis either within or without the opinion of the partial dissent for this restriction of the civil rights of Michigan citizens, we conclude that Craig Eide has properly stated a claim for loss of consortium under Michigan law.
As we have previously noted, we agree with the conclusion of the partial dissent that the award of exemplary damage to Mrs. Eide was in error. The judgment of the circuit court is, therefore, affirmed in part and reversed in part. This matter is remanded to the circuit court for entry of judgment in accordance with this opinion._
*39Brickley, Cavanagh, and Archer, JJ., concurred with Boyle, J.Const 1963, art 5, § 29 provides in full:
There is hereby established a civil rights commission which shall consist of eight persons, not more than four of whom shall be members of the same political party, who shall be appointed by the governor, by and with the advice and consent of the senate, for four-year terms not more than two of which shall *32expire in the same year. It shall be the duty of the commission in a manner which may be prescribed by law to investigate alleged discrimination against any person because of religion, race, color or national origin in the enjoyment of the civil rights guaranteed by law and by this constitution, and to secure the equal protection of such civil rights without such discrimination. The legislature shall provide an annual appropriation for the effective operation of the commission.
The commission shall have power, in accordance with the provisions of this constitution and of general laws governing administrative agencies, to promulgate rules and regulations for its own procedures, to hold hearings, administer oaths, through court authorization to require the attendance of witnesses and the submission of records, to take testimony, and to issue appropriate orders. The commission shall have other powers provided by law to carry out its purposes. Nothing contained in this section shall be construed to diminish the right of any party to direct and immediate legal or equitable remedies in the courts of this state.
Appeals from final orders of the commission, including cease and desist orders and refusals to issue complaints, shall be tried de novo before the circuit court having jurisdiction provided by law.
Further indication that the interpretive language of Const 1963, art 5, § 29 was intended to preclude this article from restricting any known legal or equitable remedies can be gleaned from the debate on the Garvin Amendment which would have given the Civil Rights Commission exclusive jurisdiction during the processing of complaints before the commission. The Garvin Amendment ultimately failed, but in support of it, Delegate William Ford remarked:
What is happening here, when we look at it in the first instance, is that we are creating an administrative body which we hope will have the general characteristics of an administrative body and that when the legislature defines its powers, the legislature is going to be directed to do certain things, but is not going to be restricted any more than necessary. It is possible to construe this language to be a restriction on the legislature never to ever give to this administrative body original jurisdiction over any matter involving civil rights in the first instance.
There isn’t anyone, I am sure, including Mr. Garvin, who would advocate an administrative remedy to the exclusion of your rights in the court, but the whole principle of administrative law is that you have a specialized tribunal that deals with *33special subject matter and has people especially trained to deal with that subject matter, and because they are dealing only with a certain limited area, have day to day actual knowledge of the conditions that exist. [2 Official Record, Constitutional Convention 1961, p 2192.]
Contrary to the assertion of the partial dissent, the Civil Rights Act does not confer civil rights only upon employees and applicants for employment. The act also creates a cause of action for discrimination in public accommodations, MCL 37.2301 et seq.; MSA 3.548(301) et seq., education, MCL 37.2401 et seq.; MSA 3.548(401) et seq., and in housing, MCL 37.2501 et seq.; MSA 3.548(501) et seq. Furthermore, it is misleading to suggest that civil rights of employees and job applicants are "created” by the Civil Rights Act since, in my view, these rights are created in the United States or Michigan Constitutions, and the act merely creates certain remedies for their violation.
Although the partial dissent quotes the House Legislative Analysis, Second Analysis, HB 4055, December 30,1976 (as enrolled), it does so selectively. The full text of the analysis of the civil action provision explains:
*35The bill would allow a person alleging a violation of this Act to bring a civil action in the circuit court for injunctive relief, damages, or both. The Act could not be construed to diminish the right of a person to legal or equitable remedies in Michigan courts. [Emphasis added.]
We are not persuaded by the partial dissent’s suggestion, contrary to Matras, that the Civil Rights Act merely codified existing rights. Read in its full context, Department of Labor Analysis, HB 4055, April 5, 1976, provides scant support for the general statement that the purpose of the bill was merely to codify remedies. In any case, the Department of Labor’s unique vantage suggests a rather limited analysis of the act, consistent with the scope of that department’s interests. See opinion of Justice Griffin, post, p 46, n 10.
See n 3.
The New York decision cited in Boscaglia, Hart v Sullivan, 84 AD2d 865, 866; 445 NYS2d 40 (1981), aff'd 55 NY2d 1011; 449 NYS2d 481; 434 NE2d 717 (1982), was based upon New York statutes which, like the fepa, have very limited remedy provisions. See NY, Civil Rights Law, § 40-c, 40-d (McKinney). See also NY, Executive Law, § 297(9) (McKinney).
As one federal court has explained, the back pay authorized under title vii is properly understood as restitution and not damages. Torres v Claytor, 25 FEP Cases 998, 1000 (SD Cal, 1978).
It is interesting to note that when federal common law is available, the United States Supreme Court has recognized a cause of action for loss of consortium. See American Export Lines, Inc v Alvez, 446 US 274; 100 S Ct 1673; 64 L Ed 2d 284 (1980) (recognizing a cause of action for loss of consortium under general federal maritime law).