¶ 53. (concurring). This tragic case raises important questions about liability for harm caused by drunk drivers. I agree with the majority's conclusion that § 324A of the Restatement applies to the analysis of "designated driver" liability. I also agree with the majority's conclusion that public policy considerations operate to preclude designated driver liability *203here. The case for statutory immunity is weaker, however, because the designated driver's alleged liability in this case does not stem from his "procurement" of alcohol for the drunk driver — immunized under Wis. Stat. § 125.035(2) — but from his failure to drive the drunk home.
¶ 54. Kathy Stephenson's husband does not appear to be arguing that John Kreuser's agreement to drive Michael Devine home from the company holiday party contributed to Devine's drunkenness in such a way as to be a cause in fact of her death. I suspect it would be difficult to determine the causal effect of the extra drinks the bartender served Devine after Kreuser agreed to drive him home.
¶ 55. The statute immunizes against "civil liability arising out of the act of procuring alcohol...." Wis. Stat. § 125.035(2). I agree that Kreuser's assumption of responsibility for driving Devine home could be viewed as a form of "procurement" under the statute, in the sense that it kept the drinks coming when they otherwise would have been cut off. Kreuser's liability, however, is not premised on his role as a "procurer" of alcohol for Devine; it is premised on his failure to perform a voluntary undertaking under § 324A.
¶ 56. As the majority notes, § 324A provides that one who "undertakes, gratuitously or for consideration, to render services to another which he should recognize as necessary for the protection of a third person" is liable for the negligent performance of that undertak-ingif:
(a) his failure to exercise reasonable care increases the risk of harm, or
(b) he has undertaken to perform a duty owed by the other to the third person, or
*204(c) the harm is suffered because of reliance of the other or the third person upon the undertaking.
Restatement (Second) of Torts § 324A (1967).
¶ 57. This case falls within the first of these possible theories of liability, in that the designated driver's failure to fulfill that role increased the risk that the drunk he had agreed to drive home would get behind the wheel himself and hurt someone. It is conceivable that another "designated driver" scenario— where the drinking is done entirely in reliance on the ride home — might fall within the third theory of liability under § 324A. In such a case, it might be possible to prove a causal link between the ultimate harm and the drunk driver's reliance on the designated driver's undertaking. But I do not understand the plaintiff to be making that argument here, and to do so risks coming up against the statute's immunity. So, while I agree with the majority's analysis of the term "procurement" for purposes of statutory immunity under Wis. Stat. § 125.035(2), I do not think it is applicable to the type of liability asserted in this case.
¶ 58. Considerations of public policy, however, operate to preclude liability under § 324A, for the reasons thoroughly articulated by the majority opinion. Wisconsin has statutorily immunized those who provide, procure or sell alcohol from liability for harm caused by people who drink too much. Where those who provide the means of intoxication are statutorily immune, it seems entirely disproportionate and unduly burdensome to hold designated drivers liable at common law, considering their relative culpability. An injured person's recourse is against the drunk driver, not those who provide the drinks or fail to drive him home. Accordingly, I respectfully concur.