(concurring specially).
While I concur with the majority’s conclusion that EnviroGas is entitled to recover damages from Bluestem, I concur specially because I am convinced the competitive bidding requirements of Division VI applied to this -project. Specifically, I believe, at a minimum, $101,000 of public funds were used to drill the wells necessary for the construction of the methane/leachate collection system. Because there was substantial evidence to conclude public funds and equipment were used in the construction of this joint project, I would affirm the trial court’s determination of this issue.
We cannot permit entities engaged in the construction of public improvements to evade the public bidding requirements *788simply by forming a 28E corporation. The district court correctly found strong policy reasons exist at the heart of competitive bidding statutes that impose the exact type of obligation on a city or county which cannot be avoided by the “expedient of creating a separate legal entity pursuant to a chapter 28E agreement.” The legislature did not intend the only public improvements subject to competitive bidding, where the project contracted with an entity established pursuant to chapter 28E, are those public improvements defined by Division IV of chapter 384. Iowa Code § 384.37(19).
The majority says it refuses to expand the scope of Division VI by finding 28E entities are subject to the competitive bidding requirement in Division VI. I would say this differently — we refuse to limit the scope of Division VI of chapter 384; that the public bidding laws apply to projects where funding from public sources exceed the statutory mínimums, even if a 28E entity is developing the project. We must apply the statute as written. It would be unreasonable to conclude a city or county may circumvent the more general competitive bidding requirements of Division VI by forming a 28E entity. Therefore where, as here, public funds are used to finance a public improvements project, the competitive bidding requirements in Division VI are triggered if-the city and county contribute minimum funds. The focus then is on whether public funds were used in this project.
I disagree with the majority’s depiction of the money used to construct the joint system. The majority is content to conclude that when public money — here, $500,000 of public money — is transferred to a 28E entity, the money somehow loses its public character. This is the essence of their holding. The mere fact that a 28E entity is using public money to construct a public improvement does not mean the money ceases to be public funds.
The majority finds the $500,000 of public funds somehow vanished or became less public when it was placed into the hands of this 28E entity. In so concluding, the majority opinion hinges much on Hogan’s testimony that the city and county funds were “probably used up.” By vesting such significance in this one phrase, the majority ignores substantial other evidence. The same witness who testified the public funds were “probably used up” also testified how these funds were used.
Hogan’s testimony explained what he meant by saying the public funds were “used up.” The city and county “contributed all plant and capital, in other words all the equipment and the two landfills ...” including the real estate for both landfills.1 He further explained the city and county funds were used to purchase “all of the heavy equipment that is used on both sites, ... virtually everything in the equipment, parts and inventory.” Two years after the investment of public funds of $500,000, this infrastructure of land and equipment was used to build the methane/leachate system.2
Hogan also stated the user fees and the city and county funds all go into the same Bluestem account. As to the operating expenses, Hogan testified the money comes out of “day-to-day operations, funds.” This money includes “a contribution from both the city and the county, and *789then in addition to that there are funds deposited to our account based on fees that we charge the public.”
Most importantly, Bluestem put part of the $500,000 into a closure account shortly after the city and county made their respective contributions in 1994. The closure account was to be used to close the landfill when it was full. These funds are also to be used to monitor the landfill for thirty years following closure. Hogan stated a portion of these public funds “was used also for the drilling of the wells.” As an initial step in the construction of the system, it was necessary to drill wells at the site of the landfill. When asked about the financing for the well-drilling portion of the methane/leaehate project, Hogan stated “it was paid for with public funds.... ” The entire expense for construction and labor of the well-drilling, all from the closure account, was over $101,000. This contribution of public funds alone is well over the statutory minimums necessary to trigger the competitive bidding requirement in Division VI.
Finally, Hogan was asked if the city and county made any additional contributions, to which he responded:
They each have a liability to the agency that relates to the amount of fill that had already been placed until we took over, but that’s a liability that they will satisfy when we actually close. So there are other contributions, but it’s now existing in the form of a liability on their books.
Though the majority relies on Hogan’s statement that Bluestem “used that money up,” (referring to the public funds) it misconstrues Hogan’s statement to conclude he meant the money was not used in the construction of the joint system. To the contrary, the money was integrally involved and is still there. It is in the land upon which Bluestem constructed the landfill and the methane/leachate collection system. It is in the equipment Bluestem used to construct the landfill and the joint system, and continues to use at the site. It is in the wells at the site. And finally, the money is in the closure account. The money has not gone anywhere.
The majority says its conclusion the “seed” money was used up by 1996 is supported by the fact that Bluestem had' an annual budget in 1996 of $6 million, which grew to almost $8 million by 1999. Given this fact, the majority concludes no public money could have been used in the construction of the joint system. However, the mere size of the operating budget does not change the fact that the county and city are only required to contribute $50,000 and $25,000 respectively to the construction of the project in order for competitive bidding to apply. Furthermore, the fact that some of the public funds were used before 1996 does not mean those funds were not used in furtherance of the construction of the joint system. The evidence shows at least $101,000 of public funds were used in constructing the joint system. Given the totality of the facts, the inescapable conclusion is that sufficient public funds were used in the creation of the methane/leach-ate collection system to trigger the competitive bidding requirement.
On appeal, we must determine whether there is substantial evidence in the record to uphold the trial court’s conclusions. “Evidence is substantial when a reasonable mind would accept it as adequate to reach a conclusion.” Hasselman v. Hasselman, 596 N.W.2d 541, 545 (Iowa 1999). Furthermore, if the findings are ambiguous, they will be construed to uphold, not defeat, the judgment. Byers v. Contemporary Indus. Midwest, Inc., 419 N.W.2d 396, 397 (Iowa 1988). While there may be some evidence to the contrary, the sub*790stantial evidence in the record supports the trial court’s ruling. Our duty is not to choose between evidence supporting the trial court’s ruling and that contrary to it. We are only to decide whether substantial evidence existed upon which the court could conclude public funds were involved. If such substantial evidence exists, we are bound by the trial court’s ruling. For the ' reasons stated above, I would uphold the judgment of the trial court on this issue.
In conclusion, if it walks like a duck, quacks like a duck, and tastes good with plum sauce, that’s substantial evidence it’s a duck. We have public money used to buy public property, developed with public equipment, and public funds to provide for the landfill clean-up and monitoring for the years to come. At a minimum, substantial evidence supports the conclusion that over $101,000 of public funds were used to finance the well-drilling portion of the methane/leachate project. Given the extensive entanglements3 of public funds in this case, it is impossible to find the public character of this project has been in any way compromised or destroyed simply because a portion of expenses were paid for with user fees. There is substantial evidence to support the conclusion public funds were used to construct the joint system. Given this determination, I would affirm the trial court’s determination on this issue.
LARSON, J., joins this special concurrence.
. Hogan’s testimony at trial implied the equipment purchased by funds from the city and county is presently being used at the Bluestem landfills and was used to construct tire joint methane/leachate collection system.
. Three years later, at trial, the land and equipment had a value between one and one and a half million dollars.
. The agreement creating Bluestem describes the nature of Bluestem operations and the character of the funds in the Bluestem account. This agreement provided all funds will be managed by Bluestem. The Bluestem funds are to be treated as public funds for the purposes of regulation, use, and investment. Moreover, Bluestem shall be governed by a Board of Directors to be appointed by both the Cedar Rapids City Council and the Linn County Board of Supervisors. Those appointed to Bluestem’s Board of Directors were to be elected or appointed officials of the City of Cedar Rapids, Linn County, or any associate member. The agreement also provided in the event Bluestem did not have sufficient funds to support operating expenses, the City of Cedar Rapids and Linn County would supply the necessary money.