(dissenting).
The trial court made a mistake, and our effort to affirm the decision only makes the error more evident.
1.Trial court error.
The trial court concluded that there could be no accident if the damaging event was “due to” a deteriorated valve gasket. But the Western National policy does not state a causation requirement of this kind.
It is true that the policy does not provide coverage for replacement of worn machinery or parts. But when a machine breakdown suddenly occurs, this is an accident. The policy covers losses resulting from accident, and it is fundamentally wrong to deny reimbursement for these losses on the theory that the accident had its roots in some nonacci-dent.
The trial court analysis depends on an addition of language to the policy. The court concluded that once wear and tear occurs (not an accident), resulting events can never constitute an accident. But there is no policy provision that supports this conclusion. The policy says that deterioration is not an accident. It says that sudden losses are accidents. The policy does not say that a sudden loss “due to” or “caused by” deterioration is no longer an accident.
The trial court’s policy construction is not justified by policy language. We should also reject the decision because it leads to an absurd result. If we consistently follow the trial court’s analysis, coverage under this kind of policy is almost completely precluded. Except in cases of manufactured defects, machinery defects almost always trace back to some deterioration of critical parts. Appellant did not purchase a manufacturing defects policy, but a boiler and machinery policy insuring it against accidental losses. Needless to say, respondent would be pleased to have the policy construed as one covering only manufacturing defects. Losses of this kind routinely involve prospects for subrogation claims against a manufacturer or supplier.
Incidentally, appellant did not go beyond the scope of this appeal when it called attention to its reasonable expectations. Appellant does not submit this concept as a new claim of coverage, a proposal that disregards policy language. Rather, appellant merely notes its expectations to support the argument that we should give effect to the most reasonable construction of policy language.
2. Appellate decision.
We propose to affirm the trial court because damage covered under the Western National policy must be “caused by” an accident. But this portion of the policy merely dictates that we correctly determine what constitutes an accident. When an accident is proven, the quoted language of the policy does not suggest that the accident be overlooked if it has roots in a nonaccident. It is evident that the trial court’s mistake can only be overlooked by misuse of an unrelated causation clause in the policy.
3. Other considerations.
a. The valve failure in this case wás no less sudden for the fact that causative circumstances stretched out over a period of time. The majority does not take issue with the fact that a sudden loss occurred in this case.1 It is well established that coverage for an accident is determined without reference to causation. Community Fed. S. & L. v. Hartford S. Boiler Insp. & Ins. Co., 580 F.Supp. 1170, 1173 (E.D.Mo.1984); Cyclops Corp. v. Home Ins. Co., 352 F.Supp. 931, 936 (W.D.Penn.1973). Significantly, the Minnesota Supreme Court has held that a drown*235ing is accidental in spite of the fact that the drowning was triggered by a disease of the decedent which was the subject of a life insurance policy exclusion. Orman v. Prudential Ins. Co. of America, 296 N.W.2d 380 (Minn.1980).
Other courts give a similar construction to wear and tear exceptions contained in a provision defining accidents. Lakeshore Marine, Inc. v. Hartford Acc. & Indem. Co., 164 Ga.App. 417, 296 S.E.2d 418 (1982) (accident notwithstanding history of corrosion); Riefflin v. Hartford Steam Boiler Insp. & Ins. Co., 164 Mont. 287, 521 P.2d 675 (1974) (contracting cleaning and replacement, not covered, with undisputed liability for boiler failures resulting from earlier corrosion).
b. It is evident that Western knows how to employ appropriate language when it chooses to introduce the concept of causation into its policy. The policy in this case excludes numerous hazards, including, for example, military hazards and nuclear hazards. In these instances, the policy provides an exclusion for accidents “caused by” those circumstances. In my opinion, it is critically important that this language was not employed in describing the wear and tear exceptions to the definition of accident.
c. Finally, the insurer has employed language in its policy which is at best ambiguous. The ambiguity in this case is one which is notorious, the subject of litigation in many courts over many years. Our courts are firmly committed to the notion that ambiguities in an insurance contract must be construed against the insurer. American Nat’l. Fire Ins. v. Fournelle Est, 472 N.W.2d 292, 294 (Minn.1991).
I respectfully dissent.
. Actually, the trial court employed a mixed rationale in its decision against appellant's claim. Before trial, the court stated its "due to” analysis. Later, when the court directed a verdict, the court repeated that the valve failure was caused by wear and tear, but the court concentrated on its analysis that there was no accident because there had been a "gradual" and not a "sudden" breakdown of the valve. As stated in the dissenting opinion, this analysis of suddenness is erroneous. Clearly, the court was preoccupied with its concern for the ultimate cause of appellant's accident. That concern was inappropriate in terms of the suddenness concept, and equally inappropriate in the sense of enlarging the wear and tear provision of the policy beyond its stated scope.