The question presented is whether the exclusive remedy provision of the Workers’ Disability Compensation Act1 precludes the Adams estate from maintaining causes of action against the National Bank of Detroit arising out of the arrest of Michael Bret Adams.
Adams, an employee of the National Bank of Detroit, was erroneously arrested on a charge of making fraudulent withdrawals from nbd. The withdrawals had actually been made by another nbd employee, Michael Ansara Adams.
*333Adams was arrested after Mary Miller Mach, an nbd employee, had erroneously given the police his address and phone number. The error was discovered and the charges were dropped. Adams, nevertheless, suffered serious trauma and, approximately eight months after he was arrested, committed suicide.
The jury awarded the Adams estate $1,529,154.41 for false arrest, negligence, gross negligence, wilful and wanton misconduct, and intentional infliction of emotional distress. The jury further found that there was no cause of action for malicious prosecution. The Court of Appeals affirmed.2
I would hold that the Adams estate may maintain an action for false imprisonment (false arrest), and join in remand to the trial court. There is, however, no separate cause of action for negligence, gross negligence, or wilful and wanton misconduct in causing Adams’ false arrest.3 I would also hold that the Adams estate may not maintain an action for intentional infliction of emotional distress.4
i
The workers’ compensation act provides benefits for diminution or loss of earning power caused by *334"physical and mental injuries suffered on account of employment.”5
The exclusive remedy provision of the workers’ compensation act bars recovery for physical or mental injury resulting from accident,6 and does not bar claims for invasion of a worker’s interest in being free from interference with other inter*335ests, such as injuries to reputation resulting from defamation.7
The exclusive remedy provision does not bar a claim for defamation because "the gist of an action for defamation is injury to reputation, irrespective of any physical or mental harm.” Foley v Polaroid Corp (Foley I), 381 Mass 545, 551-552; 413 NE2d 711 (1980);8 Braman v Walthall, 215 Ark 582; 225 SW2d 342 (1949); Howland v Balma, 143 Cal App 3d 899; 192 Cal Rptr 286 (1983); Mounteer v Utah Power & Light Co, 823 P2d 1055 (Utah, 1991).9 Similarly, the exclusive remedy provision does not bar a claim for malicious prosecution because the "essence of the tort is not physical of mental injury, but interference with the right to be free from unjustifiable litigation.”10_
*336As with the torts of defamation and malicious prosecution, the gist of false imprisonment is not physical or mental injury. The gist of an action for false imprisonment is interference with the liberty interest. No showing of physical or mental injury is required. An intent to confine any person is sufficient, and thus an innocent or reasonable mistake of identity will not relieve the actor of liability.11
In Prosser and Keeton’s words, the cause of action for false imprisonment "protects the personal interest in freedom from restraint of movement.”12 Because "there is no relation between the kind of injuries envisioned by the Workers’] Compensation law and the injury” to the liberty interest that is caused by false imprisonment, the exclusive remedy provision does not bar this cause of action.13
In Moore v Federal Dep’t Stores, 33 Mich App 556, 559; 190 NW2d 262 (1971), the Court of Appeals concluded that the exclusive remedy provision did not bar a claim for false imprisonment. The Court said that "the gist of an action for false imprisonment is unlawful detention irrespective of any physical or mental harm.” The Court agreed with Moore "that her humiliation, embarrassment, and deprivation of personal liberty are not the type of 'personal injury’ ” covered by the workers’ compensation statute.14
*337Nor does the exclusive remedy provision bar recovery for physical and mental injury arising out of false imprisonment. Foley v Polaroid Corp (Foley ID, 400 Mass 82; 58 NE2d 72 (1987). In Foley II, Polaroid did not argue that the exclusive remedy provision barred a cause of action for false imprisonment, but rather contended that the plaintiff could not seek damages for physical or mental injury arising out of false imprisonment. The court rejected the argument, stating that the inquiry should be "structured in terms of what claims an employee could assert against his employer in an action at law — not in terms of the injuries for which the employee could seek recompense.” Id. at 93. (Emphasis in original.)15_
*338The workers’ compensation act provides benefits for disability arising out of physical or mental injury resulting from employer failures to provide a safe workplace. Recovery of workers’ compensation benefits is the exclusive remedy unless a failure to provide a safe workplace constitutes an intentional tort as defined in Beauchamp v Dow Chemical Co, 427 Mich 1; 398 NW2d 882 (1986), and the 1987 amendment of § 131 of the act.
A claim for false imprisonment does not implicate the safety of the workplace. As with claims seeking recovery for physical, mental, or emotional injury resulting from employer discrimination in violation of civil rights acts — which are not barred by the exclusive remedy provision, Boscaglia v Michigan Bell Telephone Co, 420 Mich 308, 315; 362 NW2d 642 (1984) — the "evil” at which the action for false imprisonment is aimed is different from failures to maintain workplace safety, for which workers’ compensation benefits are provided.
ii
Collective corporate knowledge and intent are not real issues in the estate’s claim for false imprisonment because an nbd employee, Mary Miller Mach, possessed the requisite state of mind to cause false imprisonment. An actor can commit an *339intentional tort if the actor intends to act and knows that another person will be harmed thereby.16
More specifically, a hostile intent to invade the interests of another is not an essential element of false imprisonment. "Although intent is necessary, malice, in the sense of ill will or a desire to injure, is not. There may be liability although the defendant believed in good faith that the arrest was justified, or that the defendant was acting for the plaintiff’s own good.” Prosser & Keeton, Torts (5th ed), § 11, p 53.17
Even more specifically, a defendant cannot escape liability for false imprisonment on the basis of a mistake concerning the plaintiff’s identity. In Prosser and Keeton’s words:
Even if intent to confine the individual is necessary, it need not be with knowledge of who the plaintiff is; and, as in the case of other intentional interferences with the person or property, an innocent, and quite reasonable mistake of identity will not avoid liability. [7d]
The California Court of Appeals observed concerning intent in false imprisonment:
We do point out, however, that, contrary to the view expressed by defendants, plaintiff was not *340required to allege that defendants knew plaintiff and specifically acted with the intent to have him arrested. . . . The doctrine of transferred intent has long been recognized to apply to the tort of false imprisonment. . . . Under this doctrine the intention to confine any person is a sufficient intent to render one liable to the person actually confined. It is immaterial that the actor did not know the identity of the person he intended to confine; nor does it matter that the actor intended to affect some person other than the one actually confined. . . . Thus an allegation that the defendant intended to induce an arrest of someone would have been sufficient.[18] [Du Lac v Perma Trans Products, Inc, 103 Cal App 3d 937, 944; 163 Cal Rptr 335 (1980). Emphasis in original.]
In the instant case, the jury could reasonably conclude that nbd — through its employee Mary Miller Mach — intended to cause the false arrest of Michael Adams. Mach gave Adams’ name to the West Bloomfield Police Department when Officer Mero called seeking information "[i]n order to arrest the suspect . . . .” In the context in which Mary Miller Mach named Adams as the suspect, it being substantially certain that an arrest would follow from her disclosure, it is not a defense that nbd meant to cause the arrest of another Michael Adams or that nbd had no desire to confine the Michael Adams whose estate brings this action.19
*341Ill
The Adams estate presented sufficient evidence of all the elements of false imprisonment. The elements are: an act committed with the intention of confining another,20 the act directly or indirectly results in such confinement, and the person confined is conscious of his confinement.21
Nbd claims that the trial court erred in submitting the false imprisonment claim to the jury because its actions were not sufficient to meet the standard for instigation of, or participation in, a false arrest, and because the confinement was incident to a valid arrest pursuant to a facially valid warrant.
A person is not subject to liability for false arrest where the person merely gives information to the police and the police use their own judgment in deciding whether to make an arrest, Lewis v Farmer Jack Div, Inc, 415 Mich 212, 219, n 3; 327 NW2d 893 (1982). The trier of fact could properly find that this case is not within that rule.
It appears that nbd did more than simply provide information to the police, and the trier of fact could find that the police did not use their independent judgment in making the decision to arrest. Nbd’s internal security department conducted the investigation leading to the arrest. The West Bloomfield officer in charge of the case testified *342that he treats information received from the security departments of large corporations differently than information received from ordinary citizens. He indicated that he is more apt to rely on the security department’s identification of the suspect. When an officer "act[s] on [the] judgment” of the defendant, "it may well be said that [the] defendant directed the arrest,”22 and the trier of fact here could properly so find.
Nor is nbd relieved of liability merely because the arrest was made pursuant to a facially valid arrest warrant.23 While the general rule would shield an arresting officer from liability who acts in good faith pursuant to a facially valid warrant, it does not protect a person who instigates the issuance of the warrant where the officer acted on that person’s judgment.24
iv
The estate seeks to recover for loss resulting from Adams’ suicide. The chain of causation test, stated in Hammons v Highland Park Police, 421 Mich 1; 364 NW2d 575 (1984), is, in my opinion, preferable to the rule stated in the concurring opinion25 for determining whether there is the requisite causation._
*343I join in remand to the circuit court for a new trial on the claim for false imprisonment.
MCL 418.131; MSA 17.237(131).
Unpublished per curiam opinion, decided December 12, 1991 (Docket No. 112711).
See n 11.
The mistake in identifying Adams as the culprit was neither "outrageous” nor done with bad purpose or intent, and, therefore, the Adams estate may not maintain an action for intentional infliction of emotional distress.
See also Mounteer v Utah Power & Light Co, 823 P2d 1055, 1057 (Utah, 1991), and Foley v Polaroid Corp (Foley I), 381 Mass 545, 551; 413 NE2d 711 (1980), discussed in notes 8 and 9.
Sewell v Bathey Mfg Co, 103 Mich App 732, 736; 303 NW2d 876 (1981). Similarly see Mounteer v Utah Power & Light Co, n 4 supra, stating that Utah’s worker’s compensation act provides compensation for "diminution or loss of earning power caused by a physical or mental injury or by death sustained in the work place”; Foley 1, n 4 supra, stating that the Massachusetts’ workers’ compensation act covers "physical and mental injuries arising out of employment.”
The workers’ compensation act does not define a chapter 3 personal injury, and thus does not identify specific injuries. A 1980 amendment provides that certain disabilities and conditions shall be compensable if caused by the employment in a "significant manner.” MCL 418.301(2); MSA 17.237(301)(2). The act does, however, define a chapter 4 personal injury concerning diseases or disabilities due to causes and conditions characteristic of and peculiar to the business of the employer. MCL 418.401(l)(b); MSA 17.237(401)(l)(b).
See Beauchamp v Dow Chemical Co, 427 Mich 1; 398 NW2d 882 (1986), in which this Court held that the exclusive remedy provision bars recovery by an employee for accidental injury and not for an intentional tort, and declared that where the employer knew that the injury was substantially certain to occur from the employer’s intentional act, the employer may be found to have committed an intentional tort. In Beauchamp, the plaintiff sought recovery for physical and mental injury resulting from exposure to "Agent Orange” during employment with Dow Chemical.
The Legislature amended the exclusive remedy provision in response to Beauchamp to provide that the worker’s exclusive remedy against the employer "for a personal injury or occupational disease” is recovery of benefits provided by the workers’ compensation act, and that the only exception is an intentional tort, and to provide that an intentional tort occurs when the worker is injured "as a result of a deliberate act of the employer and the employer specifically intended an injury.” 1987 PA 28, amending MCL 418.131(1); MSA 17.237(131X1).
I see no need to decide whether the amendment is retroactive because the amendment concerns the standard for determining the line between an accidental and intentional tort where the interest of the worker is freedom from physical and mental injury. The amendment does not bar or concern intentional torts where physical or mental injury is only incidental to the primary interest protected, such as the interests protected by the actions for defamation (reputation), malicious prosecution (unwarranted litigation), and false imprisonment (unlawful arrest or confinement). See n 14.
Other jurisdictions have recognized that not all harms occasioned by the employment relationship qualify as compensable injuries under the Act. Such harm includes: injuries to reputation resulting from libel, malicious prosecution and false imprisonment, invasion of privacy, and false arrest. [Battista v Chrysler Corp, 454 A2d 286, 289 (Del Super, 1982).]
In Foley I, the court "recognized the conceptual problem inherent in the employee’s including physical and mental injury as elements of damage in the defamation claim.” Foley, supra at 552. The "conceptual problem” was that the plaintiff was seeking recovery for physical and mental injuries, for which compensation is provided under the act, in addition to seeking damages for harm to his reputation. The court concluded that "to block the main thrust of this action because of peripheral items of damages, when a compensation claim could not purport to give relief for the main wrong of injury to reputation, would be incongruous, and outside the obvious intent of the exclusiveness clause.” Id.
In Mounteer, the court said that courts have developed a test to determine whether a cause of action arising out of a work-related injury is barred by the exclusive remedy provision. The test asks whether physical or mental injury is an indispensable element of the tort. If physical or mental injury is not an indispensable element, a cause of action based on that tort is not barred. Thus, a cause of action for intentional infliction of emotional distress is barred because emotional harm is an indispensable element of that tort. Foley I and Mounteer, supra. A cause of action for false imprisonment is not barred because neither physical nor mental injury is an essential element of that tort.
Foley I, supra at 552. See also Battista, n 7 supra at 289.
See part n and accompanying text.
Because an action for false imprisonment can be maintained without regard to the degree of fault of the actor, a separate cause of action for negligence, gross negligence, and wilful and wanton misconduct in causing Adams’ false arrest cannot be maintained.
Prosser & Keeton, Torts (5th ed), § 11, p 47.
Battista, n 7 supra at 289; Foley v Polaroid Corp (Foley II), 400 Mass 82; 508 NE2d 72 (1987); Redican v Kmart Corp, 734 SW2d 864 (Mo App, 1987).
The holding in Moore cannot properly be questioned on the basis *337that it was decided before Beauchamp or the 1987 amendment of § 131 of the act.
The question whether harm to the liberty interest is the kind of harm covered by the workers’ compensation act is antecedent to the issue in Beauchamp.
Suppose that during the course of employment, an employer broke the eyeglasses of a worker or bashed in the windshield of his automobile, and that the worker filed a claim for trespass to chattels against his employer, and that the employer claimed that the exclusive remedy provision barred the claim. The court would first consider whether broken eyeglasses or windshields are the kind of harm for which recovery is provided under the workers’ compensation act. That was the inquiry in Behl v General Motors, 25 Mich App 490; 181 NW2d 660 (1970), in which the Court set aside an award of workers’ compensation because it concluded that damage to a hearing aid is not a "personal injury” within the meaning of the workers’ compensation act.
Although the act of an employer in breaking eyeglasses or a windshield or a hearing aid may have been intentional within the meaning of Beauchamp or § 131 as amended, it is not the kind of harm for which workers’ compensation benefits are payable. See n 6.
In Dockins v Ingles Markets, Inc, 306 SC 287; 411 SE2d 437 (1991), the South Carolina Supreme Court followed Foley I as clarified in Foley II and held that a worker’s cause of action for slander was not barred by the exclusive remedy provision because the gist of the action is injury to reputation, and that the worker could recover for emotional injuries that resulted from the slander.
In Mounteer, supra, the worker developed posttraumatic stress disorder after a mine fire broke out while he was on duty. After the worker returned to work, the employer’s fire investigator accused him *338of "being on drugs” and broadcast this accusation over the loudspeaker at the worksite. The worker then brought an action for slander and sought damages for emotional distress. The Utah Supreme Court rejected the employer’s argument that the worker’s action should be barred because he sought damages "for personal injuries which have a medical identity, physical and mental impact, and are medically treated.” Id. at 1057. The court said that "it would be an erroneous oversimplification for us to lump together all of plaintiff’s claimed damages, both to his person and to his reputation, and hold that since all of his damages stemmed directly or indirectly from the accidentally caused mine fire, workers’ compensation should be his sole remedy.” Id.
Prosser & Keeton, n 12 supra, pp 34-37; 1 Restatement Torts, 2d, § 8A, p 15; Bradley v American Smelting & Refining Co, 104 Wash 2d 677, 683; 709 P2d 782 (1985).
See also Murphy v Nassau Co, 154 Misc 2d 605, 607; 585 NYS2d 951 (1992) ("The best of intentions will not legalize a false arrest and it matters not whether the arresting party has good or bad motives, good or bad faith, malice or lack thereof. These elements are immaterial in an action for false arrest”); Zayre of Virginia, Inc v Gowdy, 207 Va 47, 51; 147 SE2d 710 (1966) ("To maintain an action for false imprisonment it is not necessary to show malice, ill will or the slightest wrongful intention, and neither the good faith of a defendant nor that of his employee will defeat a plaintiff’s right to recover”).
See also 1 Harper, James & Gray, Torts (2d ed), § 3.7, p 291 ("Nor will a mistake in the identity of the plaintiff constitute a defense. The intention to confine another person will make the defendant liable to the person actually confined although there is no desire or intent on the part of the defendant to harm the plaintiff”); 1 Restatement Torts, 2d, § 43, comment a, p 66 ("To make the actor liable for false imprisonment under the rule stated in § 35, it is not necessary that his act be done with the intention of imposing a confinement upon the other. It is enough if he intends to confine a third person and the other is in fact confined”).
See Wilson v Bonner, 166 Ga App 9, 15; 303 SE2d 134 (1983). The court said that "[i]f there has been a mistake made as to the name in *341the warrant, and the prosecutor is responsible for such mistake, the prosecutor might be liable [for false imprisonment], but the officer [who made the arrest] would be blameless.” The clear implication of this statement is that the prosecutor could be liable for false arrest although he did not know or intend that the wrong suspect would be arrested as a result of his actions. The basis of nbd’s liability— through Mary Miller Mach’s actions — is similar to the liability of the prosecutor in the passage from Bonner.
The Restatement, n 18 supra, equates intent with knowledge that a harm will result from one’s actions.
Id., §35, p 52.
Maliniemi v Gronlund, 92 Mich 222, 227; 52 NW 627 (1892).
See Lewis, supra at 218, n 2, stating the general rule that liability for false arrest cannot flow from a lawful arrest.
The Michigan Court of Appeals said:
While a complaining witness is immune from liability for false arrest where a valid complaint was issued, this immunity does not extend to instances where the complaining witness does not act reasonably: for example, when he knew, or should have known, that, were it not for his mistake, the arrest warrant would not have been issued. [Raudabaugh v Baley, 133 Mich App 242, 248; 350 NW2d 242 (1983). See also Wilson v Bonner, n 19 supra.]
The view stated in the concurring opinion finds some support in 2 *343Restatement Torts, 2d, § 455, p 493. The view there stated is that of the reporter, Professor Prosser (Prosser & Keeton, Torts [5th ed], § 44, p 310). Professors Harper, James and Gray acknowledge that there is support in the cases for the view expressed in the Restatement, but state that the chain of causation test is sounder (4 Harper, James & Gray, Torts [2d ed], § 20.5, n 41, p 159), and I agree.