(dissenting). This case was not fully tried. For that reason, we should exercise the discretionary authority under sec. 752.35, Stats., to order a new trial. The new trial should be limited to the farmers' damages and contributory negligence, if any, from February 17,1981 through the date their stray voltage problem was cured and their milk production returned to normal.
The facts on which I base my dissent are these. The company was negligent in the manner in which it provided electricity to the dairy farm, and that negligence was a cause of the farmers' damages. Those jury findings are not disputed on appeal. The farmers knew or should have known before February 17, 1981 that the company's electrical system was a cause of those damages. *502The company insists on the accuracy of the jury's finding to that effect, and the farmers do not seriously dispute it. The company's electrical distribution system continued to cause damages to the farmers after February 17,1981 until early 1985. Their cows suffered shocks from stray voltage during that period, and the farmers' milk production continued to suffer. During that same period the farmers attempted to cure their problem and finally did so through the installation of an anti-stray voltage grounding system. Finally, the jury found the farmers were contributorily negligent, and a basis exists for that finding.
I agree with the majority that the farmers cannot recover for their damages which accrued before February 17, 1981. The reason is that the Kolpins knew, or in the exercise of reasonable care should have known, before that date that the company's electrical distribution system was a cause of their damage and they commenced this action on February 17, 1987. The applicable limitations period is six years under sec. 893.52, Stats. In a negligence action, the cause of action accrues after an injury has occurred and has been or should have been discovered. Hanson v. A.H. Robins, Inc., 113 Wis. 2d 550, 560, 335 N.W.2d 578, 583 (1983).
But the record contains ample evidence from which the jury could conclude that because it could be removed or its effects avoided, the cause of the farmers' damages was temporary. After the company added grounding rods to its distribution lines to the Kolpin farm, the stray voltage level in the milking parlor decreased. This curative measure did not, however, completely eliminate the stray voltage problem, and the farmers' records show that they continued to suffer low milk production. They therefore attempted other measures, such as reducing the use of other electrical equipment while they were *503milking and changing their schedule to milk at times other than the company’s peak horns. These measures were partially successful since they reduced the stray voltage level and the behavior of their herd improved somewhat.
During 1983 the Kolpins learned from their electrical contractor that an experimental electronic grounding system developed by ITT Corporation was being installed on a nearby farm. In May 1984 the Kolpins installed such a system at a cost of $1,500.
Following that installation, the farmers' stray voltage level was reduced to .005 volts. The behavior of their herd improved, milk production began to increase and the amount of time they had to devote to milking was reduced. The change was gradual, but on January 16, 1985 the farmers wrote to ITT Corporation,
We are very pleased with the results of our electronic grounding system in reducing the stray voltage caused by our power company's inability to effectively ground their primary neutral system. Some of the results are as follows: Milk time has been reduced by 30 minutes per milking; cattle are easier to work with; milking is much less stressful for the milkers now because cattle entering the milking parlor enter more willingly; they no longer kick the units off or kick the milkers. We have noticed a better milk letdown which has in turn increased our production by approximately 10 percent or 300 pounds per day and reduced voltage related mastitis considerably. Texture of the cows' udders are soft and there is very little teat end erection. Cows are not as nervous during milking.
If a tort results in a temporary cause of damages, then the injured party may bring successive actions to recover damages. The principle is illustrated in Peterson *504v. Wisconsin River Power Co., 264 Wis. 84, 58 N.W.2d 287 (1953). In Peterson, the plaintiffs brought an action against a power company for damage to their land during the year 1951 caused by seepage of water from the company's dam. The company counterclaimed, alleging that plaintiffs had suffered a permanent taking and should be awarded the value of the premises taken. The plaintiffs replied that the company had constructed ditches, the purpose of which was to carry off the water from their lands, and that it would therefore be improper to assess damages on a permanent rather than a yearly basis. The company demurred to the reply on grounds that it failed to state a defense. On appeal, the Peterson court held that if it were determined upon the trial that the plaintiffs' injuries were of a temporary nature, they were entitled to the relief prayed for in their complaint. The court relied on the proposition that if the cause of a plaintiffs damages is temporary, a right exists to successive actions. Id. at 88, 58 N.W.3d at 289.1
In my view, the reasons for the rule applied in Peterson are these: If the defendant causes damages and the cause is permanent, then the plaintiffs future damages can be determined and are therefore recoverable in a single action. If the cause can be cured, removed, or avoided, then future damages are speculative and not recoverable but may occur. If the plaintiff in the latter case cannot bring successive suits to recover those damages, the defendant acquires a license to continue to *505harm the plaintiff after paying only for past hárm.2 Nor should a defendant acquire a license to inflict more harm merely because a statute of limitations has barred recovery for damages which occurred more than six years before the present action was brought. Accordingly, the farmers in the case before us should be able to recover their continuing damages during the period February 17, 1981 to the date of trial.
The jury found that the farmers were contributorily negligent and attributed 30% of the total negligence to the farmers. That percentage, however, was not limited to the period from February 17,1981 to the date that the farmers had solved their problem. For that reason, the contributory negligence of the farmers during that *506period, if any, should be resubmitted to the jury in the partial new trial.
This case was not tried on the theory that because the cause of the farmers' damages was temporary, they may recover their damages for the six years preceding the date they commenced their action. The result was that the jury was never asked questions in the verdict appropriate to the theory I have outlined. That should not deter us from exercising our discretionary power to order a new trial under sec. 752.35, Stats.
We may order a new trial under that statute "if it appears from the record that the real controversy has not been fully tried,. . . regardless of whether the proper motion or objection appears in the record." We may reverse under sec. 752.35, Stats., whether or not the appropriate requests were made for jury instructions or special verdict questions. State v. Schumacher, 144 Wis. 2d 388, 408, 424 N.W.2d 672, 679-80 (1988).
This would not be the first time that an appellate court has reversed a judgment and ordered a second trial on grounds that the first trial had not proceeded on the right theory. The Wisconsin Supreme Court has ordered new trials under such circumstances by exercising their discretionary authority in sec. 751.06, Stats., which is identical to that of the court of appeals in sec. 752.35, Stats. See, e.g., Merrill Lynch, Pierce, etc. v. Boeck, 127 Wis. 2d 127, 141-42, 377 N.W.2d 605, 611-12 (1985) (parties' reliance on court's erroneous decision to submit instruction on fiduciary theory meant party did not pursue claim under proper theory of case); First Nat. Bank & Trust Co. v. Notte, 97 Wis. 2d 207, 225-26, 293 N.W.2d 530, 539 (1980) (proper theory of case not advanced at trial); Wagner v. Wagner, 80 Wis. 2d 299, 304, 259 N.W.2d 60, 62 (1977) (trial court and parties failed to determine right of plaintiff to other applicable *507remedies in action to obtain rescission of deed); In Matter of Estate of Alexander, 75 Wis. 2d 168, 189, 248 N.W.2d 475, 486 (1977) (parties and trial court failed to consider issue of liability on an agreement); Banks v. State, 51 Wis. 2d 145, 158-60, 186 N.W.2d 250, 257 (1971) (trial court had not fully considered self-defense provision); Simonz v. Brockman, 249 Wis. 2d 50, 54-55, 23 N.W.2d 464, 466 (1946) (issues existed which were insufficiently pleaded and proved as to amount recoverable by seller in contract case); Rowell v. Rhadans, 171 Wis. 86, 89-90, 175 N.W. 937, 938 (1920) (real question neither presented by the pleadings nor tried by the court); Knudson v. George, 157 Wis. 520, 523-24, 147 N.W. 1003, 1004-05 (1914) (negligence issue overlooked by trial court and parties).
We have good reasons to order a partial new trial on the theory I have described. Stray voltage cases are no longer novel in Wisconsin, a dairy state. All theories applicable to recovery in such cases should be explored. The farmers in the case before us assiduously attempted to remedy their problem. Their fault lay in their emphasis on self-help, since a jury could find that they failed to notify the company that its effort to cure the stray voltage problem through additional grounding had been unsuccessful. That they were able to cure their problem by use of an experimental anti-stray voltage device is not only a happy circumstance, but shows that power companies and farmers may solve a serious but curable problem which has plagued both groups. Farmers who strive toward such solutions should recover their damages which continue to accrue while they attempt in good faith to cure the problem.
Peterson is consistent with Carl v. The Sheboygan and Fond du Lac Railroad Company, 46 Wis. 625, 629, 1 N.W. 295, 297 (1879) (in action for continuing trespass or nuisance resulting from railroad's installation of tracks on plaintiffs land, plaintiff could recover only damages sustained before commencing action and could bring future action for similar damages).
The Restatement recognizes the distinction in nuisance law between damages from a permanent cause and from a temporary cause. Restatement (Second) of Torts sec. 899 comment d (1977). The distinction was recognized and a rationale provided in a Tennessee case in which landowners sought damages for the negligent construction of a sewer. The court said,
It seems to us that the true rule deducible from the authorities is that the law will not presume the continuance of a wrong, nor allow a license to continue a wrong, where the caus[e of] the injury is of such a nature as to be abatable either by the expenditure of labor or money; and that, where the cause of the injury is one not presumed to continue, the damages recoverable from the wrong-doer are only such as have accrued before [an] action [is] brought, and that successive actions may be brought for the subsequent continuance of the wrong or nuisance.
City of Nashville v. Comer, 12 S.W. 1027, 1030 (Tenn. 1890). Tennessee has approved the same rationale as late as 1962 in Henegar v. International Minerals & Chemical Corp., 354 S.W.2d 69, 70 (Tenn. 1962). I see no reason why it should not be applied to negligence cases as well, at least where, as here, the plaintiffs suffer continuing harm from a temporary cause..