(concurring specially)-
Because I agree that relator satisfied the statutory test under Minn.Stat. § 299A.465 (2004 & Supp.2005) when he suffered his disabling injury, I would reverse the eligibility panel, but I disagree with the reasoning of the majority and, therefore, I specially concur.
This is a statutory construction case. Statutory construction is a question of law subject to de novo review. Anderson-Johanningmeier v. Mid-Minnesota Women’s Ctr., Inc., 637 N.W.2d 270, 273 (Minn. 2002). “The object of all interpretation and construction of laws is to ascertain and effectuate the intention of the legislature.” Minn.Stat. § 645.16 (2006). When the language of a statute is plain and unambiguous, that plain language must be followed. Amaral v. Saint Cloud Hosp., 598 N.W.2d 379, 384 (Minn.1999). A statute is only ambiguous when its language is subject to more than one reasonable interpretation. Turna v. Comm’r of Econ. Sec., 386 N.W.2d 702, 706 (Minn.1986).
Under Minn.Stat. § 299A.465, the legislature has set forth the qualifications for *632the continuation of health care coverage when a police officer or firefighter suffers a disabling injury. Relator must show that his disabling injury “oecur[ed] while the officer or firefighter [wa]s acting in the course and scope of duties as a peace officer,” and that those duties put him “at risk for the type of injury actually sustained.” Minn.Stat. § 299A.465, subds. 1(2), 6(a).
The majority adopts a new test that extends the meaning of the statute to include reasonable “exercises of professional judgment” which are legitimately calculated to protect the public. I disagree for two reasons.
First, absent a determination that the statutory language is ambiguous, it is not the province of this court to supply an additional test. “We will not supply words that the legislature either purposely omitted or inadvertently left out.” Vlahos v. R & I Const. of Bloomington, Inc., 676 N.W.2d 672, 681 (Minn.2004). Instead, we must apply the plain meaning of the statute. Amaral, 598 N.W.2d at 384.
Second, the new “test” adopted by the majority is vague, susceptible of differing interpretations, and difficult to apply. The test is vague as to what objective factors should be considered to determine whether conduct is “legitimately calculated” to protect the public. Further, such a test appears to be overinclusive, i.e., it goes beyond the language of the statute which limits coverage to the “course and scope of duties” that put the officer “at risk for the type of injury actually sustained.”