OPINION
BROWN, Bankruptcy Judge.Appellant B-Line, LLC appeals an order of the bankruptcy court disallowing its claim against Patricia M. Kirkland (“Debt- or”). The bankruptcy court sustained the Objection of Michael J. Caplari (“Trustee”), whose only objection to the claim was that it failed to meet the requirements of the Federal Rules of Bankruptcy Procedure because the claimant had not attached any supporting documentation.1 Holding that 11 U.S.C. § 502(b) provides the exclusive grounds for disallowance of a claim and that the Rules may not modify substantive rights, we reverse.2
I. BACKGROUND
Debtor filed a voluntary Chapter 18 petition on August 22, 2001. In her schedule of unsecured creditors, Debtor listed a debt for credit card purchases to “Nex-tcard” in the amount of $5,004. On September 25, 2001, “NextBank, NA/B-Line, LLC” filed a proof of claim (the “Claim”) on Official Form 10 in the amount of $5,328.19 as an unsecured claim. There was no supporting documentation attached to the Claim.
The attempt at debt restructuring failed, and the case was converted to a case under Chapter 7 on May 20, 2005. Trustee was appointed to serve as the Chapter 7 trustee. On June 22, 2006, Trustee filed an objection to the Claim (the “Objection”). Thereafter, the Appellant filed a Notice of Transfer of Claim (the “Notice of Transfer”), indicating the Claim had been transferred to it by “Next Card.” No supporting documentation was attached to the Notice of Transfer.
The bankruptcy court held a hearing on the Objection on November 15, 2006. Neither the Appellant nor the Trustee offered any additional evidence regarding the Claim. The Appellant asked the bank*343ruptcy court to take judicial notice of the schedules filed by Debtor, and the court did so. The Trustee raised an additional argument regarding the Appellant’s ownership of the Claim, because it had also failed to attach supporting documentation to the Notice of Transfer. The bankruptcy court did not consider this argument because the transferor had not objected to the Notice of Transfer pursuant to Federal Rule of Bankruptcy Procedure 3001(e)(2).3 But the bankruptcy court sustained Trustee’s objection and disallowed the Claim on the ground that, “[Appellant] was required to present some evidence that it has a valid claim. Failing that, the Claim must be disallowed.”4 Appellant now brings this timely appeal.
II.APPELLATE JURISDICTION
This Court has jurisdiction to hear timely-filed appeals from “final judgments, orders, and decrees” of bankruptcy courts within the Tenth Circuit, unless one of the parties elects to have the district court hear the appeal.5 Neither party elected to have this appeal heard by the United States District Court for the District of New Mexico. The parties have therefore consented to appellate review by this Court.
A decision is considered final “if it ‘ends the litigation on the merits and leaves nothing for the court to do but execute the judgment.’ ”6 In this case, the order of the bankruptcy court disallowed Appellant’s Claim. Nothing remains for the bankruptcy court’s consideration. Thus, the decision of the bankruptcy court is final for purposes of review.7
III. STANDARD OF REVIEW
To resolve the issue on appeal we must interpret and apply § 502 and Federal Rule of Bankruptcy Procedure 3001. The interpretation of federal statutes and rules involves legal questions. On appeal, we review legal conclusions under a de novo standard.8 De novo review requires an independent determination of the issues, giving no special weight to the bankruptcy court’s decision.9
IV. ANALYSIS
Section 502(a) of the Bankruptcy Code provides that, once a proof of claim is filed, it is “deemed allowed,” unless a party in interest objects to it. Section 502(b) states that, once an objection is lodged, the court “after notice and a hearing, shall determine the ... claim[.]” It further mandates that the court “shall allow” the claim, except to the extent it falls within one of nine enumerated categories of prohibited claims. The statute does not list among the grounds for disallowance the *344proof of claim’s failure to adhere to the requirements of the Federal Rules of Bankruptcy Procedure, namely Rule 3001. Rule 3001(a) requires the proof of claim filed to “conform substantially to the appropriate Official Form,” which form imposes a requirement to attach supporting documents. Rule 3001(c) directs creditors filing a proof of claim “based on a writing” to attach either the original or a duplicate of the writing. Rule 3001(f) provides that a claim “filed in accordance with these rules shall constitute prima facie evidence of the validity and amount of the claim.” But neither the statute nor the Rule expressly addresses the consequence of filing a proof of claim that fails to meet all of the Rule’s requirements.
Courts disagree on whether an objection based solely on a claim’s nonconformity, in this case failing to attach supporting documents, constitutes a ground for disallowance of the claim. As discussed further below, some courts addressing this issue have held that § 502(b) provides the exclusive basis for disallowance of claims (the “Exclusive View”).10 Other courts find the failure to attach documents to be a valid ground for a claim objection (the “Nonexclusive View”). Once an objection is lodged, according to the Nonexclusive View, if the creditor fails to remedy the defect or to otherwise prove its claim at hearing, then the claim must be disallowed.11
In the present case, at the hearing, the Appellant offered only the Claim and the Debtor’s schedules, which also reflected an undisputed claim in substantially the same amount. The Appellant’s evidence was meager, but it was nevertheless some evidence.12 The Trustee offered no evidence to disprove the Claim, nor any legal argument that the Claim was unenforceable under non-bankruptcy law. The bankruptcy court disallowed the Claim, based solely on the lack of supporting documentation, thereby adopting the Nonexclusive View.
We adopt the Exclusive View and reverse the bankruptcy court. The Exclusive View adheres to the plain language of § 502(b). It recognizes an objection based on lack of supporting documentation, but only when the absence of documentation would render a claim unenforceable under non-bankruptcy law. Moreover, the Exclusive View supports the overall purpose of the Rules. We reject the Nonexclusive View as unnecessary to curb against false claims or to enable a trustee to fulfill his duty to review claims. And, the Nonexclusive View would invite additional technical objections regarding “substantial conformity” with the Rule.
*345A. The Exclusive View Adheres to the Plain Language of the Statute.
The Exclusive View gives effect to the plain language of the statute. Section 502 uses mandatory language, by providing that the court “shall” allow a claim “except to the extent that” one of nine exceptions apply. None of these exceptions recognize the failure to adhere to the requirements of the Rules. The list of exceptions is not preceded by the word “including,” which would have established a non-exclusive list.13 Thus, the statute speaks in absolute terms: the court “shall allow” a claim “except to the extent that” the claim falls into one or more of the enumerated categories of claims.
The Rules governing claims cannot vary the terms of the statute by providing additional bases for an objection.
The Bankruptcy Rules do not effect [sic] substantive rights, “for when Congress accorded the Supreme Court authority to promulgate the Bankruptcy Rules, it stated ‘[s]uch rules shall not abridge, enlarge, or modify any substantive right.’ ” The alteration or elimination of a creditor’s proof of claim effects a substantive right. Bankruptcy Rule 3001 does not enlarge the Debtors’ statutory reasons to disallow a claim; it merely “defines the process by which [the claims] may be effected.” Therefore, even if an objecting party files an objection asserting facts in a form sufficient to rebut the presumption of Bankruptcy Rule 3001(f), the objection alone does not “implicate any of the statutory reasons which Congress has determined warrant denial of a claim.”14
To date, only three appellate courts have considered this issue. In In re Stoecker;15 the Chapter 7 trustee objected to a secured creditor’s proof of claim on the grounds that its judgment liens were preferential and it did not attach the necessary documentation. The creditor defended in part based on its assertion that its prior settlement with the trustee precluded this subsequent attack on its claim. The bankruptcy court disallowed the claim due to the failure to attach documentation. The district court reversed and remanded to allow the creditor to submit the required documentation.
In Stoecker, the Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit affirmed the district court in part, ruling that a creditor should be allowed to amend its claim “provided that other creditors are not harmed by the belated completion of the filing.” 16 It held that a creditor should not be barred from establishing its claim, as nothing in the statute or the Rules “justifies so disproportionate a sanction for a harmless error.” 17 The Seventh Circuit disagreed with the notion that compliance with the Rule was mandatory. “All that the rule says, so far as bears on this case, is that the filing of a proof of claim with the required documentation is prima facie evidence that the claim is valid.”18 The case was then remanded to consider extrinsic evidence as to the intent of the parties in entering into the settlement agreement. In this context, the Seventh Circuit did not *346have to reach the ultimate question of whether the failure to amend would be grounds for disallowance under the statute.
In In re Heath,19 Chapter 7 debtors filed objections to several proofs of claim filed by credit card companies. The debtors had originally listed these debts in lesser amounts in their schedules, without any designation that they disputed the debts. The bankruptcy court refused to disallow the claims in their entirety and instead reduced them to the amounts listed in the schedules. In doing so, the bankruptcy court based its ruling in large part on the “admissions” in the debtors’ schedules and its perception that the debtors were attempting to obtain a windfall at the creditors’ expense.20
On appeal, the Heath court adopted the Exclusive View. It refused to base its decision on arguments of estoppel or any evi-dentiary admissions in the schedules, noting that “amendments to bankruptcy schedules are permitted as a matter of course any time before a case is closed.”21 Instead, it held that § 502(b) sets forth the exclusive grounds for claims objections. It acknowledged the split of authority and in particular the reasoning adopted by some courts that a trustee would be unfairly hampered in his duty to review claims without the necessary documentation. But it rejected this possible justification for disallowance on the basis of the mandatory language employed in the statute.
In In re Dove-Nation,22 the Bankruptcy Appellate Panel of the Eighth Circuit affirmed the bankruptcy court’s decision to overrule the Chapter 13 debtor’s claims objections based solely on the failure to attach necessary documentation. In Dove-Nation as well, the debtor had originally scheduled the debts, without any indication of a dispute. The court found that the proofs of claims substantially complied with the rules, having attached summaries that invited requests for further documentation. In what is admittedly dictum, it held that “even if the claims had not substantially complied with Rule 3001, the claims are still allowed claims under Section 502 of the Bankruptcy Code unless the Debtor establishes an exception under Section 502(b).”23
Many bankruptcy courts have struggled with this issue, with differing results. Most of the reported decisions arise in the context of an objection lodged by the debt- or, rather than a trustee, and most involve claims for credit card debt. In some cases, while espousing the Exclusive View, they have expressly stated, in dictum, that their conclusions might differ if the objecting party was a trustee.24 In some eases, although adopting the Exclusive View, the courts have based their rulings in part on the fact that debtors should not be heard to object to claims they have previously scheduled as undisputed in an attempt to obtain a windfall.25 Others do not expressly limit their rulings on the basis of the parties’ identities, but they do arise in the *347context of a debtor objection to a proof of claim for a credit card debt.26 In two reported cases involving a trustee’s objection to a claim on the basis of lack of documentation, the courts have overruled the objections but on the basis of somewhat different reasoning.27 Thus, this Court agrees with the dissent that it is a bit of a misnomer to lump these cases into one camp or the other because they each differ somewhat in their reasoning and each reported decision can be distinguished on some basis from the present case. While this cuts against the Nonexclusive View as much as it does the Exclusive View, it counsels us to decide this issue, not based on a scorecard of prior decisions, but only on the basis of the language of the statute and the purpose and intent of the Rules.
While the facts of this case require the Court to navigate uncharted waters in this jurisdiction, the language of the statute is clear and unambiguous in establishing an exclusive list of grounds for disallowance. It does not include a failure to conform with the Rule’s requirements. And, the statute makes no distinctions based on the identity of either the objector or the claimant.
B. The Exclusive View Preserves an Objection Regarding Lack of Documentation that Renders the Claim Unenforceable.
Section 502(b)(1) recognizes an exception to claim allowance when the “claim is unenforceable against the debtor and property of the debtor, under any agreement or applicable law for a reason other than because such claim is contingent or unmatured.” Based on this provision in the statute, the Exclusive View recognizes objections to a claim based on lack of documentation, but only when the lack of documentation may render the claim unenforceable as a matter of law. By way of an example pertinent to this case, many states have enacted statutes that render oral credit agreements unenforceable.28 New Mexico law, applicable in this case, has no such statutory provision.29 It continues to apply the common law,30 which has never required credit agreements to be in writing, unless the agreement cannot be performed within one year.31 Even in the case of an agreement that falls under a statute of frauds, a party may be able to prove the existence of a lost writing as long as a writing existed at one time.32 The Truth-In-Lending Act (“TILA”)33 requires credit agreements to be in writing, *348but a violation of this requirement only provides a borrower with a monetary claim against the lender.34 It does not invalidate an otherwise valid agreement.35 Thus, lack of documentation may or may not be grounds for disallowance under § 502(b)(1). But, under the Exclusive View that we adopt today, if a trustee intends to assert a legal argument that the claim is unenforceable under an agreement or applicable law, he must assert a good faith basis for these grounds in his objection. In this case, the Trustee provided no such grounds and the bankruptcy court made no such ruling.
C. The Exclusive View Supports the Overall Purpose of the Rules.
In determining the legal effect of the requirements imposed by the Rules governing claims, this Court’s construction should support the overall purposes of the Federal Rules of Bankruptcy Procedure. Rule 1001 states that “[tjhese rules shall be construed to secure the just, speedy, and inexpensive determination of every case and proceeding.” Thus, any question regarding the interpretation or application of the Rules must bear these overall purposes in mind.
Rules 3001 through 3008 govern the claims allowance process. They set forth when a claim should be filed, who may file a claim, what a claim should include, how objections may be lodged, the burden of proof in claims disputes, and the process for obtaining a judicial determination or redetermination. Rule 3007, which governs objections to claims, sets forth no grounds for an objection. It merely provides a process for asserting the objection and a deadline for a response to the objection. Reading Section 502 and these Rules together, they establish a process by which the vast majority of claims will be allowed without any need for a hearing or a judicial determination. But if the creditor fails to comply with the Rules’ requirements, this speedy and inexpensive process may be derailed. In the face of a proper objection, the creditor will have to establish its claim at hearing, bearing whatever burden of proof exists in proving such a claim in a non-bankruptcy arena.
The Exclusive View fosters the speedy and inexpensive determination of claims in bankruptcy. If this Court were to adopt the Nonexclusive View, it would be imposing a duty on trustees to file an objection to every proof of claim that fails to attach supporting documents, or is otherwise deficient, even in cases where trustees anticipate making distributions to creditors. It would greatly increase the number of claims objections, hearings, and judicial determinations of claims.
More importantly, the Exclusive View aids in the just determination of claims. Under the Nonexclusive View, if the claimant fails to respond, then despite the fact that there is no known actual dispute regarding the claim, the claim would be disallowed. In Chapter 7 cases, this could lead to a windfall to some creditors at the expense of others, by reducing the pool of claims sharing in the pro rata distribution.
*349In Chapter 13 cases, it might provide a windfall to debtors who would have less claims to pay.36 And we bear in mind that any construction of the Rule will apply not only to large consumer lenders who merge with, or purchase loan portfolios of, smaller lenders, but it will apply as well to small companies that provide goods and services to a debtor, but fail to attach an invoice, and to the ex-spouse who fails to attach a copy of the court order establishing maintenance and child support payment obligations.
Although a creditor may be able to amend its proof of claim or appear at a hearing to establish the claim, the practical reality in bankruptcy is that many claim objections are never responded to by affected creditors. Sophisticated creditors may simply choose not to respond. In fact, it may not be cost-effective. In the typical Chapter 7 case, the percentage of distribution on claims is small and entities generally cannot appear in federal court, by filing a response or otherwise, without representation of counsel admitted in the state in which the court resides. Thus, creditors who are non-natural persons may be forced to spend more to respond to a claim objection than they could ever hope to realize from a distribution.37 Unsophisticated creditors, like the small business owner and child support creditor, may not appreciate the need to respond, are too intimidated to enter into the court hearing process without the aid of counsel, and/or may not be able to afford counsel. The Exclusive View does not deprive these creditors of their claims simply because they did not attach documentation or failed to appear at a hearing to establish the claim.
D. The Nonexclusive View is Not Necessary to Curb Against False Claims.
It is not necessary to adopt the Nonexclusive View in order to discourage false claims. Congress has already provided a disincentive by establishing criminal penalties to punish offenders. 18 U.S.C. § 152(4) provides that a person who “knowingly and fraudulently presents any false claim for proof against the estate of a debtor, or uses any such claim in any case under title 11, in a personal capacity or as or through an agent, proxy, or attorney” shall be “fined under this title, imprisoned not more than 5 years, or both.” Official Form 10 itself warns: “[pjenalty for presenting fraudulent claim: Fine of up to $500,000 or imprisonment for up to 5 years, or both. 18 U.S.C. §§ 152 and 3571.”
E. The Nonexclusive View Elevates the Trustee’s Duty to Review Claims Beyond that Envisioned by Congress.
According to the Nonexclusive View, trustees will be hampered in their ability to fulfill their statutory duty to review claims unless the courts require full compliance with Rule 3001. Section 704(5) requires a trustee to “examine proofs of claims and object to the allowance of any *350claim that is improper.”38 But this duty is more narrowly circumscribed than that envisioned by the Nonexclusive View.
Section 704 of the Bankruptcy Code sets forth several duties of a Chapter 7 trustee. Many of the duties are expressed in absolute terms, for example, the trustee shall “collect and reduce to money the property of the estate;”39 “be accountable for all property received;”40 and “investigate the financial affairs of the debtor.”41 By way of contrast, § 704(5) provides that the trustee shall “examine proofs of claims and object to the allowance of any claim that is improper,” but states that he shall do so only “if a purpose would be served.”42 This language implies that trustees should exercise discretion in this area. This discretion should not be employed to attempt to knock down every claim that is technically deficient, but should be reserved for use in instances where they have reason to believe that all or part of the claim may not be allowable for reasons specified in § 502(b).43
In both the Code and the Rules, Congress has recognized a trustee’s need for information beyond what is provided in the debtor’s schedules. First, Congress has established a statutory framework that encourages the filing of proofs of claims. This framework can be viewed in comparison to the different treatment of claims in Chapter 11. In Chapter 11 cases, both § 1111(a) and Rule 3003(b)(1) provide that a debt scheduled by the debtor is deemed filed and shall constitute prima facie evidence of the validity and amount of the claim, unless the debt is scheduled as disputed, contingent, or unliquidated, without any filing of a proof of claim. In Chapter 7 and 13 cases, however, Congress has not *351provided that the schedules alone will grant a claim this status.44 By not affording the schedules prima facie evidence status in Chapter 7 or 13 cases, Congress has given creditors an incentive to file claims.
Congress gave additional support to trustees in § 521(a)(3), which provides that the debtor shall “cooperate with the trustee as necessary to enable the trustee to perform the trustee’s duties under this title.”
Of course, one of the trustee’s duties under section 704(a)(5) is to examine proofs of claims and object to the allowance of any claim that is improper. Federal Rule of Bankruptcy Procedure 4002(4) implements section 521 and provides that the debtor must assist the trustee in the administration of the estate and examining proofs of claims.
The proper procedure under section 701(a)(5) is for the trustee to request that the debtor examine the proofs of claims and report to the trustee as to whether they are proper. If the debtor fails to cooperate, the trustee should request that the court order the debtor to do so.45
Nothing in this Court’s opinion limits the ability of a trustee to conduct either formal or informal discovery on a particular claim. And if the claimant resists discovery, a trustee may file an objection if he has a good faith basis for asserting a § 502(b) objection. For example, if state law provides that the type of claim involved is barred by the statute of frauds if not in writing, then a trustee may have a good faith basis for an objection based on the statute of frauds. The Trustee in this case did not raise such an objection, and in fact may not have a basis for such under New Mexico law.
But we are not suggesting that trustees must initiate discovery on every proof of claim filed without documentation. There is a fundamental difference between the majority and the dissent over the nature of the trustee’s review process. The dissent appears to believe that this duty requires a trustee to substantiate each claim. The majority would expect that a trustee would not file an objection unless there was some reason to believe the claim was improper. In a case such as the present matter, where the Debtor has scheduled the same credit card debt in substantially the same amount, what purpose is to be served by initiating litigation over this Claim? On the other hand, when the claim itself raises a red flag, then the trustee ought to investigate and, if a purpose would be served, file a subsequent objection. For example, in In re Broadband Wireless International Corp.46 the proof of claim at issue attached documents that indicated the creditor had dealt with a related, but separate entity, not the debtor. In that Chapter 11 case, the debtor-in-possession filed the objection, but even if that case had been filed as a Chapter 7 case, a review of the claim itself would have raised a red flag.
The dissent contends that the Court should make a distinction, as do some courts, between the grounds for filing an objection, and those for disallowing a claim. Thus, according to the dissent, it would be proper to object on the basis of no documentation, and then if the creditor did not amend or appear at the hearing to “prove” its claim, the claim would be disallowed because the burden never shifted to *352the trustee to object. But at the end of this process, a court would end up disallowing a claim even though no § 502(b) grounds have been asserted. Consider as well a case in which a former spouse files a claim for past due child support, but does not attach the court order establishing the amount of the support. If the trustee objects due only to the lack of documentation, and the former spouse fails to take any action to request a hearing, must the court deny the claim? Even if the debtor scheduled the same debt?47
In adopting Rule 3001(c), Congress has not set forth a process for the disallowance of claims without supporting documentation. Other portions of Rule 3001(c) make clear that the Rule does not attempt to affect substantive rights over the issue of supporting documentation. This Rule also provides that “[i]f the writing has been lost or destroyed, a statement of the circumstances of the loss or destruction shall be filed with the claim.” For example, if a creditor attached an explanation that his basement had flooded and all his records were destroyed, then Rule 3001(c)’s requirements would have been satisfied. His claim would nevertheless be treated as prima facie evidence of the claim’s validity and amount. Yet the trustee in this hypothetical would have no further evidence to aid in his review or “sifting” of the claims.
Similarly, Rule 3001(d) requires a creditor who claims a security interest in property of the debtor to attach evidence of the perfection of its security interest to its proof of claim. But a long line of cases, from the Supreme Court on down, have held that creditors do not have to file any proof of claim, let alone one which attaches evidence of perfection, in order to maintain their lien right.48 “Unless the collateral is in the possession of the bankruptcy court or the trustee, the secured creditor does not have to file a claim.”49 If a court specifically rules that a particular creditor’s debt is unenforceable or the lien invalid, then such a ruling would change this result. But the mere failure to file a proof of claim with evidence of perfection does not have the effect of limiting or invalidating a secured creditor’s lien rights.50
Congress could have gone one step further and provided in § 502(b) that nonconforming proofs of claims would be subject to disallowance, or at least provided that the list of excluded claims was non-exclusive. It could have made the duty under § 704(5) an absolute duty to object to nonconforming claims. But instead of using a stick to punish creditors who file nonconforming proofs of claims, Congress provided a carrot in the form of a streamlined process for “proving” their claims.
F. The Nonexclusive View Invites Additional Objections Regarding “Substantial Conformity.”
We further reject the Nonexclusive View because it would open a Pandora’s box of issues as to when a proof of claim is deemed to substantially comply with the Rules. First, it would encourage disputes as to whether the attached documents are sufficient. The documentation requirement enunciated in Rule 3001(c) differs *353from the requirement set forth on the front side of the Official Form, and differs also from the description of this requirement on the back side of the Official Form. Rule 3001(c) states that when a claim is “based on a writing, the original or a duplicate shall be filed with the proof of claim.” In section 7 of Official Form 10,51 entitled “Supporting Documents,” it directs the claimant to:
Attach copies of supporting documents, such as promissory notes, purchase orders, invoices, itemized statements of running accounts, contracts, court judgments, mortgages, security agreements, and evidence of perfection of lien. DO NOT SEND ORIGINAL DOCUMENTS. If the documents are not available, explain. If the documents are voluminous, attach a summary.
Paragraph 7 of the Instructions appearing on the back of Official Form 10 states:
You must attach to this proof of claim form copies of documents that show the debtor owes the debt claimed or, if the documents are too lengthy, a summary of those documents. If documents are not available, you must attach an explanation of why they are not available. The language in Rule 3001(c) suggests that a credit card company should attach the original credit agreement, as well as evidence of the actual use of the credit card. The language on the front and back of the Official Form might not require this agreement. The form requires only “supporting documents.” But how much support is necessary? Some courts have struggled to define what documentation is required, with varying success.52
Aside from questions regarding documentation, what other technical deficiencies would support an objection under the Nonexclusive View? For example, section 2 of Official Form 10 requires the claimant to indicate “date debt was incurred.” Would the claim be subject to disallowance if this section is left incomplete? Of course, courts can delineate and construe Rule 3001(a)’s requirement that a proof of claim “conform substantially” to the Official Form. But would this effort be in keeping with Rule 1001’s mandate that the Rules be construed to secure the just, speedy, and inexpensive determination of every case and proceeding? And with § 502(b)’s limitation on the grounds for claim objections? Would any purpose be *354served, when both the debtor and the creditor agree on the amount and validity of the claim as they apparently do in the present case? Why should the Trustee, who administers the estate on behalf of all creditors generally, pit one creditor against the rest over a technical deficiency?
V. CONCLUSION
In conclusion, for the reasons stated, we adopt the Exclusive View’s construction of Rule 3001, reverse the bankruptcy court, and remand for the entry of an order consistent with this decision.53
. See In re Kirkland, 361 B.R. 199 (Bankr.D.N.M.2007). Unless otherwise indicated, all future references to a Rule or Rules are to the Federal Rules of Bankruptcy Procedure.
. In addition, the Trustee filed a Motion to Strike Matters Outside the Appellate Record ("Motion to Strike”) on April 27, 2007, objecting to statements made by B-Line in its Reply Brief. On May 1, 2007, B-Line filed its response to the Motion to Strike, claiming Trustee had raised new arguments on appeal. The matters raised in both the Motion to Strike and the response were minor, and not considered by this Court because they were irrelevant to the Court's analysis or disposition on appeal. Additionally, both parties agree that matters outside of the record should not be considered on appeal. Therefore, for procedural purposes only, we DENY the Motion to Strike AS MOOT.
. Id. at 201 n. 1.
. Id. at 205.
. 28 U.S.C. § 158(a)(1), (b)(1), and (c)(1); Fed. R. Bankr.P. 8002; 10th Cir. BAP L.R. 8001-l(a) & (d). Unless otherwise indicated, all future statutory references are to the Bankruptcy Code, Title 11 of the United States Code.
. Quackenbush v. Allstate Ins. Co., 517 U.S. 706, 712, 116 S.Ct. 1712, 135 L.Ed.2d 1 (1996) (quoting Catlin v. United States, 324 U.S. 229, 233, 65 S.Ct. 631, 89 L.Ed. 911 (1945)).
. In re Geneva Steel Co., 260 B.R. 517, 520 (10th Cir. BAP 2001), aff'd, 281 F.3d 1173 (10th Cir.2002) (“An order on an objection to a claim is a final order for purposes of 28 U.S.C. § 158(a)(1).”).
. Fowler Bros. v. Young (In re Young), 91 F.3d 1367, 1370 (10th Cir.1996).
. Salve Regina Coll. v. Russell, 499 U.S. 225, 238, 111 S.Ct. 1217, 113 L.Ed.2d 190 (1991).
.Cases adopting the Exclusive View include In re Cluff, 313 B.R. 323 (Bankr.D.Utah 2004), aff'd, Cluff v. eCast Settlement, No. 2:04-CV-978, 2006 WL 2820005 (D.Utah Sept. 29, 2006); In re Dove-Nation, 318 B.R. 147 (8th Cir. BAP 2004); In re Heath, 331 B.R. 424 (9th Cir. BAP 2005); In re Mazzoni, 318 B.R. 576 (Bankr.D.Kan.2004); In re Burkett, 329 B.R. 820 (Bankr.S.D.Ohio 2005); In re Shank, 315 B.R. 799 (Bankr.N.D.Ga. 2004); In re Relford, 323 B.R. 669 (Bankr. S.D.Ind.2004), reh’g granted, as amended; In re Kemmer, 315 B.R. 706 (Bankr.E.D.Tenn. 2004); In re Moreno, 341 B.R. 813 (Bankr. S.D.Fla.2006); In re Shaffner, 320 B.R. 870 (Bankr.W.D.Mich.2005); In re Guidry, 321 B.R. 712 (Bankr.N.D.Ill.2005).
. Cases following the Nonexclusive View include In re Taylor, 363 B.R. 303 (Bankr.M.D.Fla.2007); In re Blue, No. 03 C 6979, 2004 WL 1745786 (N.D.Ill. July 30, 2004); In re Stoecker, 5 F.3d 1022 (7th Cir.1993); In re Tran, 369 B.R. 312 (S.D.Tex.2007); In re Armstrong, 320 B.R. 97 (Bankr.N.D.Tex. 2005); In re Henry, 311 B.R. 813 (Bankr. W.D.Wash.2004); In re Jorczak, 314 B.R. 474 (Bankr.D.Conn.2004).
. The schedules are not an admission against interest by the Trustee, but they still provide some evidence, indicating how the Debtor treated this Claim.
. See 11 U.S.C. § 102 (“In this title — (3) 'includes' and 'including' are not limiting.”).
. In re Cluff, 313 B.R. 323, 332 (Bankr.D.Utah 2004), aff'd, Cluff v. eCast Settlement, No. 2:04-CV-978, 2006 WL 2820005 (D.Utah September 29, 2006) (footnotes omitted).
. 5 F.3d 1022 (7th Cir.1993).
. Id. at 1028.
. Id.
. Id.
. 331 B.R. 424 (9th Cir. BAP 2005).
. Id. at 427.
. Id. at 431 (internal quotation marks omitted).
. 318 B.R. 147 (8th Cir. BAP 2004).
. Id. at 152.
. See In re Cluff, 313 B.R. 323, 343 (Bankr.D.Utah 2004), aff'd, Cluff v. eCast Settlement, No. 2:04-CV-978, 2006 WL 2820005 (D.Utah September 29, 2006); In re Mazzoni, 318 B.R. 576, 579 n. 14 (Bankr.D.Kan.2004).
. In re Relford, 323 B.R. 669, 676 (Bankr.S.D.Ind.2004); In re Kemmer, 315 B.R. 706, 717 (Bankr.E.D.Tenn.2004).
. In re Moreno, 341 B.R. 813, 816-20 (Bankr.S.D.Fla.2006); In re Guidry, 321 B.R. 712, 714-15 (Bankr.N.D.Ill.2005); In re Shank, 315 B.R. 799, 811-12 (Bankr.N.D.Ga.2004).
. In re Shaffner, 320 B.R. 870, 873-80 (Bankr.W.D.Mich.2005) (relying primarily on the informal proof of claim doctrine); In re Burkett, 329 B.R. 820, 825-30 (Bankr.S.D.Ohio 2005) (espouses Exclusive View, but in dictum posits that if the claim is not scheduled by the debtor and does not include documentation, then a valid objection may exist).
. See John L. Culhane, Jr., Lender Liability Limitation Amendments to State Statutes of Frauds, 45 Bus. Law. 1779, 1781-84 (1990).
. See id. at 1780-81 & n. 10 (explaining that New Mexico’s attempt to pass such a statute failed in 1989).
. N.M. Stat. § 38-1-3 (1978); Aragon v. Rio Costilla Coop. Livestock Ass'n, 112 N.M. 152, 812 P.2d 1300, 1303 (1991).
. See, e.g., Culhane at 1783 & n. 26.
. Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 137 (1981).
. 15 U.S.C. § 1601, etseq.
. See 15 U.S.C. § 1640(a) (defining civil remedies available under the Act); see also Burgess v. Charlottesville Sav. & Loan Ass’n, 477 F.2d 40, 45 (4th Cir.1973) ("[A] proper construction of the [TILA] indicates that any private action for violation thereof is limited to the statutory remedy and can provide no basis for other relief.”). A borrower may also invoke a right of rescission under TILA, but only if the credit transaction involves a security interest on the principal dwelling of the borrower. 15 U.S.C. § 1635(a).
. Ixonia State Bank v. Ingersoll (In re Ingersoll), 8 B.R. 912, 919 (Bankr.W.D.Wis.1981); First Citizens Bank & Trust Co. v. Owings, 151 Ga.App. 389, 259 S.E.2d 747, 748-49 (1979).
. In re Kemmer, 315 B.R. 706, 717 (Bankr. E.D.Tenn.2004) (acknowledging Chapter 13 debtors’ objection would lead to a windfall to the debtors).
. In re Shank, 315 B.R. 799, 812 (Bankr.N.D.Ga.2004) ("Given the uncertainties of eventual recovery in a given bankruptcy case, many creditors may have no economic incentive to respond to an objection to a claim even if the claim is valid.... Rule 1001's directive requires a bankruptcy court to apply the bankruptcy rules to permit creditors to realize their fair share in a bankruptcy case without unnecessary expense.”)
. 11 U.S.C.A. § 704(5) (West 2003). Following the enactment of the Bankruptcy Abuse Prevention and Consumer Protection Act of 2005 ("BAPCPA”), the sections under 704 were renumbered so that, for example, § 704(5) became 704(a)(5). The pertinent portion of this statute has not changed, but we refer to the former designation because this case, filed before the adoption of BAPC-PA, is governed by the former version of § 704.
. Id. § 704(1).
. Id. § 704(2).
. Id. § 704(4).
. The legislative history on § 704(5) includes the following statements from the Senate Report:
The trustee’s principal duty is to collect and reduce to money the property of the estate for which he serves, and to close up the estate as expeditiously as is compatible with the best interests of parties in interest. He must be accountable for all property received, and must investigate the financial affairs of the debtor. If a purpose would be served (such as if there are assets that will be distributed), the trustee is required to examine proofs of claims and object to the allowance of any claim that is improper. If advisable, the trustee must oppose the discharge of the debtor, which is for the benefit of general unsecured creditors whom the trustee represents.
S. Rep. No. 95-989 (1978), reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5787, 5879 (emphasis added). This report underscores the distinction between those duties of a trustee that are absolute and those that are to be exercised with discretion. Admittedly, this report seems to define "if a purpose would be served” broadly, as any time a trustee anticipates a distribution to creditors. But it also limits the filing of objections to claims that are "improper.” It in no way suggests an expanded view of an "improper” claim beyond that contemplated in § 502(b). It further underscores that the trustee represents the general unsecured creditor body as a whole. His duties should not be construed in such a way that he undermines them by raising technical objections to claims not contemplated by § 502(b).
. See In re Riverside-Linden Inv. Co., 85 B.R. 107, 111 (Bankr.S.D.Cal.1988) ("A trustee, while having the right to investigate claims without court authority, must exercise this right judiciously.”).
.11 U.S.C. § 1302(b)(1) requires a Chapter 13 trustee to "perform the duties specified in ...[§] 704(5)[.]”
. 6-704 Collier on Bankruptcy ¶ 704.09[1] (15th ed.1999) (emphasis added) (footnote omitted).
. 295 B.R. 140 (10th Cir. BAP 2003).
. The dissent suggests that such a claim would be allowed nonetheless because of its priority status. See Dissent at 368. But priority status does not relieve a claimant of the need to file a proof of claim.
. In re Tarnow, 749 F.2d 464, 465 (7th Cir.1984).
. Hoxworth v. Blinder (In re Blinder), 74 F.3d 205, 210 (10th Cir.1996) (citing Tarnow at 465).
. Section 506(d)(2) codified this longstanding judicial interpretation. Tarnow, 749 F.2d at 467.
. The Claim at issue appears on a prior version of Official Form 10, last revised in April, 2001. The current version of the form was revised in April, 2007, but there are no material changes for purposes of this discussion.
. See e.g„ In re Heath, 331 B.R. 424, 432-33 (9th Cir. BAP 2005).
There is no uniform standard for what must be contained in such a summary. Although some breakdown of interest and other charges must be included, it is unclear whether this should cover the entire account history, the last several billing cycles, or only those charges not reflected in the last prepetition monthly statement. See Cluff, 313 B.R. at 335 ("[T]he summary attached to the proof of claim should: (i) include the amount of the debts; (ii) indicate the name and account number of the debtor; (iii) be in the form of a business record or some other equally reliable format; and (iv) if the claim includes charges such as interest, late fees and attorney's fees, the summary should include a statement giving a breakdown of those elements.”); In re Armstrong, 320 B.R. 97, 105 (Bankr.N.D.Tex.2005) (similar list); In re Henry, 311 B.R. 813 (Bankr.W.D.Wash. 2004) (same, but also requiring copy of underlying credit card agreement); Kemmer, 315 B.R. at 714-15 (summary adequate, not necessary for creditor to attach copy of underlying credit card agreement); In re Sandifer, 318 B.R. 609, 611 (Bankr.M.D.Fla.2004) ("[t]wo to four months of credit card statements” attached to some amended proofs of claim were adequate).
. The dissent takes issue with the remand of this matter, claiming it is "vague.” Dissent at 369-70. It asserts that the Court must clarify whether the bankruptcy court must allow the Claim or whether the Trustee may file an amended objection. The Trustee's ability to amend, or for that matter, B-Line’s ability to amend its Claim to state that the supporting documents have been lost, are issues not properly before this Court. Our ruling is expressly limited to overruling the bankruptcy court's disallowance of the Claim based solely on the lack of supporting documentation.