I dissent.
The majority’s reliance on Alberts v. Gie-bink, 299 N.W.2d 454 (S.D.1980), is entirely misplaced. Alberts was a foreign object case, as it so noted: “Medical malpractice case law is replete with exceptions to statutes of limitations where foreign bodies are left in surgical patients.” Id. at 455. The Alberts case dealt with failure to remove a pin from Alberts’ left knee. Our decision extended the foreign object exception formerly applied only to clamps and sponges accidentally and negligently left in a patient, to include foreign bodies intentionally inserted. As noted in the majority opinion: “ ‘Generally, when a tort involves a continuing injury, the cause of action accrues and the statute of limitations commences when the wrong terminates.’ ” (Quoting Alberts, 299 N.W.2d at 456.) But what application does that theory have in this case? If he was guilty of anything, Billars was guilty of failure to refer Bonnie to an ophthalmologist. He certainly didn’t leave anything planted in her eye. The majority seeks to apply this theory of recovery to a continuing treatment situation. On her return to fit the glasses and pay for them *674there was apparently some negligence for failure to act on the part of Billars, who didn’t even see her. This extends the exceptions to the statute of limitations farther than this court has ever gone before. I would reject that application.
In Alberts, we also made passing mention of the Ohio case of Wyler v. Tripi, 25 Ohio St.2d 164, 267 N.E.2d 419 (1971). The Ohio exception to the statute of limitations was stated in Wyler as follows: “[I]n all medical malpractice cases, the latest time at which the statute of limitations commences running is the time at which the physician-patient relationship finally terminates.” 25 Ohio St.2d at 168, 267 N.E.2d at 421. The Alberts decision is not totally clear as to which theory it was decided on. “The record before the court on the motion to dismiss shows no final act or occurrence sufficient to commence the running of any statute of limitations.” Alberts, 299 N.W.2d at 456. But in any event, it was clearly a decision based on the presence of a foreign object and a failure to adequately diagnose and refer.
Similarly, the majority opinion here does not spell out which theory this decision is based on. We are talking about an exception to the statute of limitations. Certainly an exception should be defined and delineated as to its application. I see this decision as a wholesale repeal of the statute of limitations and accordingly I dissent.