ON REHEARING
SANDERS, Justice.We granted a rehearing to reconsider our holding that the United States Supreme Court decision in Rosenbloom v. Metro-media, Inc., 403 U.S. 29, 91 S.Ct. 1811, 29 L.Ed.2d 296 (1971) barred plaintiff’s recovery. We were concerned with plaintiff’s forceful contention that our broad interpretation of that decision stripped private citizens of substantially all redress for public defamation.
The salient facts may be briefly summarized. As an accommodation, Earnest Francis signed an appearance bond of $100.-00 for Gervey Joseph LaRue, charged with a “peeping tom” misdemeanor under a City of Lake Charles ordinance. Through no *901fault of Francis, LaRue failed to appear for arraignment. On September 23, 1969, the City Court rendered the following judgment forfeiting the bond:
“CITY OF LAKE CHARLES VS. NO. 1852-G Gervey Joseph La Rue Ernest Francis
LAKE CFIARLES CITY COURT PARISH OF CALCASIEU, WARD III STATE OF LOUISIANA
“JUDGMENT OF APPEARANCE BOND FORFEITURE SECURITY BOND
“In the above-entitled and numbered cause, the defendant was charged by an affidavit with Peeping Tom in violation of Chapter_, Paragraph -of the Code of the City of Lake Charles, 1956.
“The said defendant, having been duly notified to appear in Open Court on the 23rd day of Sept., 1969, for the purpose of arraignment and/or trial, and/or fixing for trial, did fail to appear and answer when called, whereupon the City Prosecutor of the Lake Charles City Court moved that the Court forthwith render up judgment decreeing the forfeiture of the $100.00 surety appearance bond deposited with the Marshall of the City of Lake Charles by Earnest Francis - 209 N. Spencer Street.
“IT IS ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED that the surety appearance bond of $100.00 deposited with the Marshal of the City of Lake Charles by the said Earnest Francis, be, and the same is hereby forfeited, and accordingly there be judgment herein and the same is rendered in favor of the City of Lake Charles and against the said Gervey Joseph LaRue, defendant, and Earnest Francis, surety, jointly and in solido, together with 5% per annum interest thereon from and after the date hereof, and for all costs of these proceedings.”
On September 25, 1969, the following news story appeared in the Lake Charles American Press, a daily newspaper having a circulation of about 35,000:
“PEEPING TOM BOND FORFEITED”
“A $100 cash bond forfeiture has been ordered and bench warrant issued for Earnest Francis, 290 Spencer Street, who failed to appear in City Court for arraignment on a 'peeping tom’ charge.
“City Judge Murray Anderson took the action at the request of assistant city prosecutor Ben Short.”
After unsuccessful efforts to contact the proper newspaper official on the day the story appeared, Francis retained an attorney. The attorney wrote the newspaper publisher requesting a retraction and the payment of damages.
In its issue of October 4, 1969, the Lake Charles American Press published the following retraction:
*903“PEEPING TOM STORY IN ERROR”
“The American Press erred September 25, when it said a $100 bond forfeiture had been ordered and a bench warrant issued for Earnest Francis, 290 Spencer Street, for a failure to appear in City Court on a ‘peeping tom’ charge.
“Francis was not the defendant, but had signed an appearance bond for Gervey Joseph LaRue, no age or address available, who was charged on that account.
“City Prosecutor Robert Jacques’ office dropped the ‘peeping tom’ charge against LaRue September 30 and ordered the bench warrant recalled and the bond forfeiture set aside.”
On October 21, 1969, the plaintiff brought the present action for damages. After hearing the evidence, the jury returned a verdict for plaintiff in the sum of $15,000.-00. The Court of Appeal reduced the award to $1500.00. See 241 So.2d 73. On plaintiff’s application, complaining of the reduction of the award, we granted certiorari. 257 La. 602, 243 So.2d 272.
The threshold question is whether The Lake Charles American Press is entitled to the constitutional privilege that sanctions recovery for libel only when the falsehood is published with actual malice, that is, with knowledge that it is false or with reckless disregard of whether it is false or not.
The constitutional privilege was first announced in the landmark case of New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 84 S.Ct. 710, 11 L.Ed.2d 686 (1964), as to publications concerning public officials. There the United States Supreme Court stated:
“The constitutional guarantees require, we think, a federal rule that prohibits a public official from recovering damages for a defamatory falsehood relating to his official conduct unless he proves that the statement was made with ‘actual malice’ — that is, with knowledge that it was false or with reckless disregard of whether it was false or not.”
In 1966, the United States Supreme Court extended the constitutional privilege to publications concerning public figures. Thus, those who thrust themselves into the public limelight have no redress for libel without proof of actual malice. See Curtis Publishing Co. v. Butts (Associated Press v. Walker), 388 U.S. 130, 87 S.Ct. 1975, 18 L.Ed.2d 1094 (1967); Walker v. Associated Press, 251 La. 772, 206 So.2d 489 (1968).
On June 7, 1971, after this Court had assumed jurisdiction of the present case, the United States Supreme Court handed down its decision in Rosenbloom v. Metromedia, supra, extending the constitutional privilege to publications about a private individual’s involvement in an event or issue of wide public interest, though the individual is nei*905ther a public official nor a public figure. The United States Supreme Court held:
“If a matter is a subject of public or general interest, it cannot suddenly become less so merely because a private individual is involved, or because in some sense the individual did not ‘voluntarily’ choose to become involved. The public’s primary interest is in the event; the public focus is on the conduct of the participant and the content, effect, and significance of the conduct, not the participant’s prior anonymity or notoriety. The present case illustrates the point. The community has a vital interest in the proper enforcement of its criminal laws, particularly in an area such as obscenity where a number of highly important values are potentially in conflict: the public has an interest both in seeing that the criminal law is adequately enforced and in assuring that the law is not used unconstitutionally to suppress free expression. Whether the person involved is a famous large-scale magazine distributor or a ‘private’ businessman running a corner newsstand has no relevance in ascertaining whether the public has an interest in the issue. We honor the commitment to robust debate on public issues, which is embodied in the First Amendment, by extending constitutional protection to all discussion and communication involving matters of public or general concern, without regard to whether the persons involved are famous or anonymous. . . .We thus hold that a libel action, as here, by a private individual against a licensed radio station for a defamatory falsehood in a newscast relating to his involvement in an event of public or general concern may be sustained only upon clear and convincing proof that the defamatory falsehood was published with knowledge that it was false or with reckless disregard of whether it was false or not.”
Plaintiff contends that the newspaper may not rely upon Rosenbloom v. Metro-media, because it did not plead the constitutional privilege in the lower courts and because the decision is not retroactive.
Both of these objections are unsound. Defendant pleaded in its answer that the error was made innocently, without intent or culpable negligence. Immediately after the Rosenbloom decision, the defendant filed a motion in this Court formally asserting its rights under that decision. We can require no more.
In Curtis Publishing Co. v. Butts, supra, the United States Supreme Court rejected an identical contention, holding:
“As our dispositions of Rosenblatt v. Baer, 383 U.S. 75, 86 S.Ct. 669, 15 L.Ed.2d 597, and other cases involving constitutional questions indicate, the mere failure to interpose such a defense prior to the announcement of a decision which *907might support it cannot prevent a litigant from later invoking such a ground.”
These First Amendment decisions have been applied retroactively to pending cases and to pre-decision publications. See Rosenblatt v. Baer, 383 U.S. 75, 86 S.Ct. 669, 15 L.Ed.2d 597 (1966); Time, Inc. v. Johnston, 448 F.2d 378 (U.S. 4th Cir. 1971); Cerrito v. Time, Inc., 449 F.2d 306 (U.S. 9th Cir. 1971).
We conclude, therefore, that the constitutional privilege must be considered in arriving at a proper disposition of the present case.
Plaintiff’s assertion that the present case is factually and legally distinguishable from Rosenbloom v. Metromedia, raises serious questions about the impact of that decision on the right of a private citizen to protect his reputation from defamatory falsehood.
The decision, in our opinion, does not mean that the First Amendment proscribes all defamation awards to private citizens. It does mean that when the publication relates to a private individual’s involvement in an event of public or general concern, actual malice must be proved as a basis for recovery.1
The critical question here is whether plaintiff was involved in an event of public or general interest within the meaning of the constitutional pronouncement. We think not.
Plaintiff signed a small appearance bond in a misdemeanor case. Standing as a surety in such a case is citizen-action that the law views with favor. It is not, however, in defamation law, an event of general or public concern.
The only event of general concern here was the failure of the charged defendant to appear in court for his arraignment. The plaintiff was in no way involved in this dereliction. It is true that the news release identified him as the person who failed to appear to answer for his crime. The publisher, however, cannot build a privilege by joining a private individual with an event of public interest when there is no factual connection between the two. For this Court to validate a purely artificial connection would allow an offender to freely pierce the legal shield against defamation.
In Rosenbloom v. Metromedia, supra, the police arrested the plaintiff for distributing obscene magazines. The defendant’s newscast related to this event.
*909The United States Supreme Court concluded :
“[P]olice arrest of a person for distributing allegedly obscene magazines clearly constitutes an issue of public or general interest.” 403 U.S. at 45, 91 S.Ct. at 1820.
The keystone of the privilege is actual involvement, not the unsupported association of a name and an event. We hold that the constitutional privilege is unavailable in the present case.
Having concluded that the privilege is unavailable, we consider the complaint that brought the case to this Court: that the Court of Appeal erred in reducing the jury award from $15,000.00 to $1500.00.2
Plaintiff Francis, a 45-year-old married man, lives in Lake Charles and has a good reputation in the community. He has nine children. For 24 years, he has been employed by Cities Service Oil Company. For the past four years, he has also worked part-time as an insurance agent. As a result of the news release, he received a notice of termination from the insurance company. After the company verified the facts, it withdrew the notice. The record reflects that the publicity had a short-term chilling effect on his insurance business. Additionally, he suffered considerable embarrassment and mental distress from the offensive publication.
In reducing the award, the Court of Appeal stated:
“The offensive nature of the publication cannot be denied but we think the award can be reduced, particularly since the publication was solely the result of an error in reporting by the newspaper.
“The award is reduced to $1,500.00. This should be a satisfactory reparation for the harm done. It is evident that the scars caused by the publication will be lasting and its ill effects hard to escape.”
Article 1934(3) of the Louisiana Civil Code provides:
“In the assessment of damages under this rule, as well as in cases of offenses, quasi offenses, and quasi contracts, much discretion must be left to the judge or jury, . . .”
In a series of decisions beginning in 1963, we undertook to emphasize the vitality of that article in the review of damage awards. See Gaspard v. LeMaire, 245 La. 239, 158 So.2d 149 (1963); Ballard v. National Indemnity Company of Omaha, Neb., 246 La. *911963, 169 So.2d 64 (1964); Lomenick v. Schoeffler, 250 La. 959, 200 So.2d 127 (1967); Miller v. Thomas, 258 La. 285, 246 So.2d 16 (1971).
In Miller v. Thomas, supra, we summarized the jurisprudence as follows:
“From these decisions, two principles emerge: (1) To modify the amount of an award for general damages, an appellate court must find that the trial judge or jury has abused the ‘much discretion’ accorded by the codal provision; (2) The awards in other cases serve only as an aid in determining whether there has been an abuse of discretion and rivet no steel frame of uniformity.”
Both parties cite numerous cases in which courts have made awards in defamation actions. Among the more recent are Greenberg v. DeSalvo, 254 La. 1019, 229 So.2d 83 (1969), award: $4500.00; Thompson v. St. Amant, 250 La. 405, 196 So.2d 255 (1967), award: $5000.00; Kennedy v. Item Co., 213 La. 347, 34 So.2d 886 (1948), award: $7500.00; Sas Jaworsky v. Padfield, La.App., 211 So.2d 122 (1968), award: $45000.00. The cases cited, however, are based upon widely differing circumstances and provide little guidance.
Quite clearly, plaintiff’s reputation was marred by the news release stating that he had failed to appear in court on a charge that connotes a repulsive abnormality. The newspaper, however, promptly published a retraction.
It is well established that a retraction does not exonerate a publisher from liability for defamation. The retraction may never come to the attention of all those who have acquired knowledge of the defamatory publication. It is equally well established, however, that a retraction is a mitigating factor to be considered in fixing damages. Cass v. New Orleans Times, 27 La.Ann. 214 (1875); Tresca v. Maddox, 11 La.Ann. 206 (1856); 50 Am.Jur.2d, Libel and Slander, § 375, p. 899.
With a keen awareness that libel is insusceptible of monetary approximation, we have concluded that the jury abused its discretion. As correctly appraised by a member of the Court of Appeal, the high jury award is the product of errant discretion, but the Court of Appeal award is grossly inadequate. An award of $8000.00 will bring-the damages within a reasonable range. Accordingly, we fix the award in that amount.
For the reasons assigned, the judgment of the Court of Appeal is amended and judgment is rendered in favor of plaintiff, Earnest Francis, and against the defendant, Lake Charles American Press, in the sum of $8000.00 with legal interest thereon from judicial demand until paid and all costs of these proceedings, subject to a credit for any sum previously paid on the Court of Appeal judgment.
. The language throughout the decision emphasizes involvement in an event or issue of general public concern. For example, “relating to his involvement in an event of public or general concern” 403 U.S. at 52, 01 S.Ct. at 1824; “[PJolice arrest of a person for distributing allegedly obscene magazines clearly constitutes an issue of public or general interest.” 403 U.S. at 45, 91 S.Ct. at 1820; “[Bjecause a private individual is involved” 403 U.S. at 43, 91 S.Ct. at 1819.
. In its rehearing brief, Lake Charles American Press contends that plaintiff has acquiesced in the Court of Appeal judgment by accepting a check for the amount that court awarded and as to which defendant made no application to this Court for review. This contention is obviously without merit. See LSA-C.C. P. Art. 2085; State ex rel. Parish of Plaquemines v. Baynand, 204 La. 834, 16 So.2d 451 (1943); Foster & Glassell Co. v. Harrison, 173 La. 550, 138 So. 99 (1931).