¶ 72. (concurring). The majority opinion completely abrogates the common law right to forcibly resist an unlawful arrest in the absence of unreasonable force. By so doing, the majority refuses to admit any exceptions for the future such as the one the facts so compellingly present here.
¶ 73. I would admit a very narrow exception to the general rule enunciated by the majority. Like the majority, I would not permit resistance to an unlawful arrest in the absence of unreasonable force; however, I would allow resistance if the individual reasonably believes that serious and substantial mental or physical health concerns of the individual or a member of his or her family are threatened in a way that are not susceptible of cure later in a court room. I would require an objective, reasonableness standard. This holding would be similar to, but not in complete accord with, the holding of the circuit court, reprinted below.1
¶ 74. This holding would not commit us to the rigidity of the majority's rule of law which could lead to future injustice: witness the facts of this case. It would also comport more with common sense and reality than does adherence to the common law that allows resis*393tance to any unlawful arrest. Finally, it would recognize the'reality that courts cannot always provide adequate redress for the harm caused by an unlawful arrest.
¶ 75. I agree with the circuit court's persuasive statement in dismissing this case:
In the case now before the court, the defendant was acting to prevent the unlawful arrest of herself, an arrest which would result in the police taking her five-year-old son to the police station for an interrogation. While it probably has no legal relevance, it may be noted that all of this furor occurred because another child said the boy was riding a stolen bicycle. The harm to a typical five-year-old child of being taken to a police station and being grilled under these circumstances can be as devastating as watching a family member being beaten. The harm to the child is not of such a nature that it can be vindicated later in a courtroom. The necessity of protecting the child at that moment from the illegal police activity is paramount.
Any other rule would be futile. What parent would stand by while the police treated a five-year-old child in that way? To adopt a contrary rule would have no effect on the way people conduct their affairs.
Order of Dismissal, at 7.
¶ 76. Although Ms. Hobson escapes prosecution as a result of the prospectiveness of the majority opinion, an undoubtedly just result, what about any future Ms. Hobsons? Under similar circumstances, it is simply not reasonable to expect a parent to sit back and do nothing. Our common law should reflect that reality.
¶ 77. I am authorized to state that Justice Ann Walsh Bradley joins in this concurrence.
"[T]he superior social policy is advanced by a rule which modifies the common law rule so as to not permit resistance to an unlawful arrest unless the health or safety of the individual or a member of his or her family is threatened in a way that is not susceptible of cure later in a court room." Order of Dismissal, at 6.