(concurring). I concur in the result reached in the lead opinion and write separately to briefly state my reasoning.
Initially, I would indicate that I do not read Smith v Dep’t of Public Health, 428 Mich 540, 644-648; 410 NW2d 749 (1987), aff’d sub nom Will v Michigan Dep’t of State Police, 491 US 58; 109 S Ct 2304; 105 L Ed 2d 45 (1989), as narrowly as does the lead opinion, nor do I read Johnson v Wayne Co, 213 Mich App 143; 540 NW2d 66 (1995), as broadly as the lead opinion appears to do. I do not read Johnson as obligating this Court to recognize a cause of action in all cases in which a plaintiff alleges a violation under the Michigan Constitution against an individual defendant. Rather, I interpret the language in Johnson, with which the lead opinion takes issue, as merely addressing the nature of the proof necessary for a plaintiff to prevail in a suit against an individual defendant under the Michigan Constitution, only after such a cause of action has been found to exist. In Johnson, this Court stated:
*680[Although this claim is one against the individual defendants only, we believe that the requirement that a custom or policy be shown to sustain a constitutional tort must also be met. That is, where a plaintiff alleges a constitutional tort against governmental employees only, the plaintiff must show that the alleged constitutional violation occurred by virtue of a custom or policy that the governmental employees were carrying out. [Id., 150-151.]
Johnson is silent with respect to the propriety of inferring a constitutional tort but, rather, presumes that such an inference is appropriate, and then disposes of the claim on the ground that the plaintiff failed to present the proof necessary to prevail in the suit. Id., 150-155. I concur with the lead opinion that the panel in Johnson wrongly applied the custom or policy requirement because that analysis applies to a claim against a governmental entity but not, in my opinion, to a claim against an individual. However, because I would resolve this case on an alternative ground, I find it unnecessary to join the majority’s decision to review the evidence and come to a different conclusion than the jury.
In Smith, supra, Justice Boyle, joined by Justice Cavanaugh, discussed the propriety of inferring a cause of action under the Michigan Constitution. Justice Boyle “would recognize the propriety of an inferred damage remedy arising directly from violations of the Michigan Constitution in certain cases.” Smith, supra, 647. Relying upon Bivens v Six Unknown Federal Narcotics Agents, 403 US 388; 91 S Ct 1999; 29 L Ed 2d 619 (1971), Justice Boyle opined that “there are circumstances in which a constitutional right can only be vindicated by a damage remedy and where the right itself calls out for such a remedy.” Smith, supra, 647. However, “[w]here a stat*681ute provides a remedy, the stark picture of a constitutional provision violated without remedy is not presented.” Id. Because four justices in Smith agreed to remand the case to the trial court to determine whether a damages remedy was proper under the Michigan Constitution, “whether damage remedies are available under our constitution [is] an issue as yet unresolved in our jurisprudence.” Middlebrooks v Wayne Co, 446 Mich 151, 175-176; 521 NW2d 774 (1994).
Although I recognize that a majority of. our Supreme Court in Smith agreed that “[a] claim for damages against the state arising from violation by the state of the Michigan Constitution may be recognized in appropriate cases,” Smith, supra, 544 (emphasis added), I believe that the analysis employed by our Supreme Court in reaching this holding could be equally applicable to a claim for damages against an individual, acting in his official capacity, arising from a violation by the individual of the Michigan Constitution. I arrive at this conclusion because our Supreme Court in Smith relied upon Bivens, supra, in recognizing the possible propriety of inferring a damages remedy directly from the Michigan Constitution. Id., 644-652. In Bivens, the United States Supreme Court recognized a cause of action arising directly from the Fourth Amendment of the federal constitution against individual federal officers. Bivens, supra, 389. Thus, the same analysis used by our Supreme Court in Smith for deciding whether to infer a cause of action from the Michigan Constitution would also apply to a claim against an individual defendant. It may well be that a state constitutional violation claim against an individual will be *682more limited than a claim against the state because other remedies are available against the individual, but such a determination would have to be made case by case.
Nevertheless, I concur with the majority that a damages remedy should not have been inferred from the Michigan Constitution in this case. Plaintiffs alleged violations of the Michigan Constitution, Const 1963, art 1, §§ 11 (search and seizure) and 17 (due process). Notably, however, plaintiffs also sought damages against defendants under 42 USC 1983, alleging violations of the analogous provisions of the federal constitution. It was acknowledged at oral argument that plaintiffs’ claims against the individual officers under § 1983 were pending in federal court at the time this case came to trial. Although § 1983 does not provide a remedy for violation of state rights, it does provide a remedy for violation of federal constitutional and statutory rights. Middlebrooks, supra, 175. Because I believe that § 1983 provides plaintiffs with the means to sufficiently vindicate their state constitutional rights through the analogous protections of their federal constitutional rights, I would find that a judicially inferred cause of action under the Michigan Constitution is unwarranted in this case. In other words, this is not a case, such as Bivens, in which the “stark picture of a constitutional provision violated without remedy is . . . presented.” Smith, supra, 647.
Accordingly, because there was no need in this case for the trial court to infer a cause of action against appellant under the Michigan Constitution, the trial court should have granted defendants’ motion for a directed verdict.