¶ 30. (dissenting). I cannot join the majority's opinion because I conclude that the driver of the snowmobile was indeed "operating" the snowmobile as defined in Wis. Stat. § 350.01.1 would affirm the court of appeals' decision that stopping a snowmobile and turning off its motor is "operation," because such actions require the exercise of physical control over the speed and direction of the snowmobile. Accordingly, I respectfully dissent.
*50¶ 31. The majority concludes that the term "operate" in Wis. Stat. § 350.09 does not include the actions of a driver sitting on a parked snowmobile after having stopped it and shut off the motor. The majority divides the definition of "operate" into two qualifying activities, but concludes that here, the driver is not exercising physical control over the speed or direction of the snowmobile, nor does the driver's conduct qualify as the manipulation or activation of the snowmobile's controls necessary to put it in motion. In drawing these conclusions, the majority seems to rely largely on one fact: the snowmobile's motor was shut off. Although I agree that the facts here indicate that the snowmobile's motor was not running at the time of the accident, I respectfully disagree that because the motor was turned off, the driver was not, under the facts presented, "operating" the snowmobile.
¶ 32. The majority interprets "operate" to require acts of a positive nature, such as having the motor running, so that the snowmobile is prepared for positive movement. I do not draw such a distinction. Based on the plain language of the definition in Wis. Stat. § 350.01(9r), "operate" requires the "exercise of physical control" or the "physical manipulation or activation of any of the controls." I agree with the court of appeals' conclusion in this case that a person's actions in stopping a snowmobile and turning off the motor fall within the definition of "operate." The driver is exercising physical control over the speed or direction of the snowmobile by bringing it to a stop. Moreover, the driver is physically manipulating the controls by turning off the engine. "The fact that such actions stop the snowmobile certainly renders those actions no less controlling of speed and direction than other actions that accelerate the snowmobile or change its course." *51Burg v. Cincinnati Cas. Ins. Co., 2001 WI App 241, ¶ 10, 248 Wis. 2d 145, 635 N.W.2d 622 (emphasis in original). Moreover, "[t]he fact that the manipulation stopped the snowmobile's motion certainly renders that action no less a manipulation of the controls necessary to put the snowmobile in motion." Id. at ¶ 11 (emphasis in original).
¶ 33. As the court of appeals noted, Milwaukee County v. Proegler, 95 Wis. 2d 614, 291 N.W.2d 608 (Ct. App. 1980), supports this interpretation of "operate." In Proegler, the court concluded that a drunk driver, sleeping in a parked car with the motor running, was operating the vehicle. 95 Wis. 2d at 628-629; see also State v. Modory, 204 Wis. 2d 538, 545, 555 N.W.2d 399 (Ct. App. 1996) (concluding that a drunk driver sitting in the driver's seat with engine running and wheels spinning, but stuck on a mound of dirt, was operating the vehicle). The majority here relies on Proegler for the proposition that "operate" requires that the motor be running. I respectfully disagree. Comparing the facts in Proegler to the facts in this case demonstrates how interpreting "operate" in terms of whether the motor is running relies on inappropriate distinctions. To me, a wide-awake person still sitting on a snowmobile after having stopped it and turned the motor off has more physical control over the speed or direction of the snowmobile than a drunk driver sleeping in a parked car with the motor running. See Burg, 2001 WI App 241, ¶ 12.
¶ 34. I find further support for this interpretation of "operate" by contrasting it with the definition of "drive." " 'Drive' means the exercise of physical control over the speed and direction of a motor vehicle while it is in motion." Wis. Stat. § 346.63(3)(a) (emphasis added). The majority's interpretation of "operate"— *52which relies largely on the fact that the motor is running — seems more akin to this definition of "drive," rather than the definition of "operate." Although the majority does not require "motion" in its interpretation of "operate," the majority does require that the motor be running, and the difference seems minimal to me. Focusing on "the exercise of physical control" and "physical manipulation," in a broader sense of action— having either a positive or negative effect over the speed or direction of the snowmobile — makes sense to me in order to distinguish clearly between "operate" and "drive."
¶ 35. Furthermore, I conclude that interpreting "operate" in this way makes sense when applied to the facts here. The accident occurred in the middle, as opposed to the beginning or the end, of Zimmerman's snowmobiling trip. Granted, he was not driving at the time of the accident because the snowmobile was not in motion. He was, however, operating the snowmobile. He started operating the snowmobile when he left on his trip. At the time of the accident he was still operating his snowmobile when he was sitting on it after affirmatively manipulating the controls to stop it and turn off the motor. Moreover, he was physically controlling, albeit in a negative way, the snowmobile's speed or direction.
¶ 36. Finally, interpreting the term "operate" to include both positive and negative acts of physical control over the speed or direction seems logical, especially with respect to snowmobiles. In comparison to other motor vehicles, a snowmobile is small; therefore, it seems possible to manipulate the controls and have physical control over the speed or direction of the snowmobile without having the motor running. By requiring that the motor be running to "operate," the *53majority would have to conclude that if a person is pushing a snowmobile, with the motor off, the person is not exercising physical control over the speed or direction of the snowmobile; to decide to the contrary, would violate the majority's interpretation of "operate."1
¶ 37. I conclude that "operate" is appropriately interpreted to include the exercise of physical control over the speed or direction of a snowmobile in both positive and negative ways. Applied here, Zimmerman was operating the snowmobile. He had recently brought the snowmobile to a stop and turned off the motor, which required the physical manipulation of the controls. Furthermore, at the time of the accident Zimmerman was physically controlling the snowmobile's speed and direction by restricting its movement. Accordingly, I would affirm the court of appeals' decision. For the reasons stated, therefore, I respectfully dissent.
¶ 38. I am authorized to state that Justices WILLIAM A. BABLITCH and DAVID T. PROSSER join this dissent.I also agree with the court of appeals' conclusion that the circuit court's — and now the majority's — interpretation of "operate" renders an ironic result under the facts of this case. Burg v. Cincinnati Cas. Ins. Co., 2001WI App 241, ¶ 12 n.8, 248 Wis. 2d 145, 635 N.W.2d 622. "[T]he operator of a snowmobile that is stopped with its motor off would not be negligent per se, while the operator of a snowmobile that is stopped with its motor on would be negligent per se, although he or she would be better able to quickly respond to a dangerous situation." Id. For this additional reason, therefore,- I respectfully disagree with the majority's reliance on the fact that the motor must be running in order to "operate" a snowmobile.