Robinson v. Human Relations Commission

SABERS, Justice (on reassignment).

This is an appeal from an order issuing a writ of prohibition preventing the Sioux Falls Human Relations Commission “from considering, awarding, or ordering monetary restitution, awards or damages in the matter of Brenda Pfister v. Eugene R. Robinson.” The writ did not prevent the commission from proceeding with its hearing if these requirements were met. We reverse and remand.

SDCL 20-12-4 grants municipalities the power to investigate various forms of discrimination. To do so, they may establish a commission on human relations with the authority, among other things, to “hear complaints alleging discrimination with such investigation and inquiry as may reasonably appear necessary.” SDCL 20-12-5. In hearing complaints the commission has the “power and authority” “to take such affirmative action as in the judgment of such commission will effectuate its purposes.” SDCL 20-12-6. Commission decisions are subject to appeal under The Administrative Procedures Act, SDCL 1-26-30 through 1-26-37. SDCL 20-12-7.

Brenda Pfister (Pfister) filed a complaint with the Human Relations Commission (commission) of Sioux Falls alleging sexual discrimination on the part of her employer Eugene R. Robinson (Robinson). When the commission’s hearing panel began allowing testimony about Pfister’s monetary damages Robinson applied for an, alternative writ of prohibition to arrest the commission’s proceedings. The circuit court issued a writ prohibiting the commission from considering, awarding or ordering monetary restitution, but allowing the commission to proceed with its hearing if these conditions were complied with.

The commission raises five separate issues which we condense into two: 1) *866whether a writ of prohibition to prevent the panel from taking evidence on the issue of monetary damages was an appropriate remedy, and 2) whether the commission’s panel had the power to award money damages.

Judicial interference of administrative proceedings is justified only where the plaintiff has presented an extraordinary factual situation or on appeal. Mordhorst v. Egert, 88 S.D. 527, 223 N.W.2d 501 (1974). This is because in the first instance, under the doctrine of separation of powers, an administrative agency is empowered to determine its own jurisdiction. Rapid City Area School District No. 51-4 v. de Hueck, 324 N.W.2d 421 (S.D.1982).

In cases where no extraordinary factual situation exists, this court has required the exhaustion of administrative remedies, citing its preference for the use of appropriate statutory machinery. Gottschalk v. Hegg, 89 S.D. 89, 228 N.W.2d 640 (1975). It is a settled rule of judicial administration that “no one is entitled to judicial relief for a supposed or threatened injury until the prescribed administrative remedy has been exhausted.” Zar v. S.D. Bd. of Examiners of Psychologists, 376 N.W.2d 54, 56 (S.D.1985) quoting Myers v. Bethlehem Shipbuilding Corp., 303 U.S. 41, 50-51, 58 S.Ct. 459, 463, 82 L.Ed. 638, 644 (1938). The reason for the rule is obvious, administrative resolution of the issue may make judicial involvement unnecessary. Zar, supra; Gottschalk, supra.

Furthermore, a writ of prohibition may be only issued where the ordinary course of law does not offer a plain, speedy and adequate remedy. SDCL 21-30-2. In those cases where no extraordinary situation exists, the appellate process satisfies this requirement, “otherwise, all. administrative appeals would be subject to injunc-tive interference.” de Hueck, supra at 423.

In this case, no extraordinary situation exists to justify judicial interference with the administrative process. It is not enough to complain about a possible adverse decision from the commission which had neither decided if discrimination existed nor if monetary damages were appropriate. The commission has the jurisdiction to make a wrong decision as well as a right one. Should that decision be adverse to Robinson, judicial review rather than initial judicial interference is the appropriate remedy. Indeed, as indicated above, the administrative resolution of the discrimination and money damage issues may make judicial involvement completely unnecessary. Zar, supra; Gottschalk, supra.

The remaining issue on appeal, whether the commission’s panel had the power to award money damages, is premature and not properly before us until the commission has acted, de Hueck, supra; State ex rel. Harris v. Common Pleas Ct., Div. of P. & J., 25 Ohio App.2d 78, 266 N.E.2d 589 (1970).

We remand with instructions to dissolve the writ of prohibition.

WUEST, C.J., and MORGAN, and MILLER, JJ., concur. HENDERSON, J., dissents.