(dissenting).
The majority decision starts out on a wrong premise that the UCC is the appropriate authority to find waiver of cement plant sovereign immunity.
A meaningful waiver assumes there is something to waive. That which is already constitutionally provided leaves nothing to waive by statute. While the UCC would ordinarily waive sovereign immunity for cement plant contracts, that purported waiver had been redundant for two generations. The absence of sovereign immunity which allowed this type of action was constitutionally imbedded in 1918 when the people adopted Article XIII, Sections 10 and 11.* In that amendment the state was authorized to engage in cement enterprises. As the majority notes, the Section 11 authorization to pledge the credit of the state directly subjects the state to liability on cement enterprise contracts; any other constitutional provision to the contrary notwithstanding. Wilmington Medical Center, Inc. v. Bradford, 382 A.2d 1338 (Del.1978); Wisconsin Solid Waste Recycling Authority v. Earl, 70 Wis.2d 464, 235 N.W.2d 648 (1975); State ex rel. Warren v. Nusbaum, 59 Wis.2d 391, 208 N.W.2d 780 (1973); Cf. Opinion of the Judges, 43 S.D. 635, 177 N.W. 812 (1920).
Since 1947, SDCL 21-32-2 has governed actions on claims against the state. It reads: “Action on any claim on contract ... against the state shall be commenced within one year after same has arisen.” As the majority states, the cement plant is an arm of the state. Suits against it are suits against the state. They are thus subject to the one-year statute of limitations for actions on any contract claim against the state. This cause of action accrued with the 1978 breach, SDCL 57A-2-725(2), but was not commenced until April 1980. Arcon’s suit is accordingly barred by SDCL 21-32-2.
The majority opinion, however, concludes the UCC statute of limitations extends the time for filing suit to four years. When the dispute arose, SDCL 57A-2-725(l) read in pertinent part: “An action for breach of any contract for sale must be commenced *418within four years after the cause of action has accrued.”
Since the two statutes of-limitation are in apparent conflict it is our duty not to ignore one for the sake of the other, but to give a reasonable construction to both, construing them together to make them harmonious and workable. If possible, both acts are to be reconciled. Karlen et al. v. Janklow, 339 N.W.2d 322 (S.D.1983); Matter of Sales Tax Refund Applications, 298 N.W.2d 799 (S.D.1980); State v. Myott, 246 N.W.2d 786 (S.D.1976).
The UCC provision is general. It speaks of any contract for sale. SDCL 21-32-2 is specific. It relates only to any claim on contract against the state. The two statutes are readily harmonized by reading the four-year UCC provision to apply to an action on any contract involving sale of goods except when commenced against the state. When the action is against the state, the specific one-year statute of limitations applies.
Provisions contained in any chapter of the code may be construed and considered in the light of their codified arrangement. SDCL 2-14-11. However, construction of the scope of the statute is not confined to its particular codified place. The general rule is that the court may write no limitations on the construction of a statute. The majority opinion ignores the universally recognized rule of statutory interpretation that general words are to have a general operation where the manifest intention of the legislature affords no ground for qualifying or restricting them. 73 Am.Jur.2d Statutes § 199 (1974). In determining the scope of a statute, courts must look first to its language. United States v. Turkette, 452 U.S. 576, 101 S.Ct. 2524, 69 L.Ed.2d 246 (1981). By its very words, SDCL 21-32-2 does not confine itself to chapter 21-32. It reads as an island. Being so worded, it should be read as though it were independent of the chapter in which it is found unless the legislature otherwise indicates. To hold otherwise would allow a codifier of statutes to distort the meaning of a statute simply by discretionary indexing.
These guidelines of construction compel the conclusion that the one-year statute of limitations is as applicable now as it was before the UCC was adopted. In enacting the UCC the legislature structured certain suits against the state, but consistent with precedent we must not expand the exposure of the sovereign beyond the preexisting and more restrictive statute of limitations applicable only to the state in favor of a more liberal limitation applicable to all others.
We must be mindful of the case law which holds that statutes in derogation of sovereignty are strictly construed in favor of the state, so that its sovereignty is upheld and not narrowed or destroyed. Duguay v. Hopkins, 191 Conn. 222, 464 A.2d 45 (1983); Andrade v. State, 448 A.2d 1293 (R.I.1982); Greenfield Const. Co. v. Michigan Dept. of State Highways, 402 Mich. 172, 261 N.W.2d 718 (1978). The extent of liability should be definitely fixed by legislative action. Arms v. Minnehaha County, 69 S.D. 164, 7 N.W.2d 722 (1943). We violate that time-honored concept when we fail to strictly construe statutes in derogation of sovereignty. As between the two conflicting statutes, we should accordingly give deference to that statute which least exposes the sovereign.
This construction reads in harmony with the UCC Title. SDCL 57A-1-104 provides:
This title being a general act intended as a unified coverage of its subject matter, no part of it shall be deemed to be impliedly repealed by subsequent legislation if such construction can reasonably be avoided, [emphasis added]
This statute is silent as to prior legislation and we must assume the legislature had full knowledge of SDCL 21-32-2 when the UCC was adopted. The failure of SDCL 57A-1-104 to save itself also from prior conflicting statutes supports the continued viability of SDCL 21-32-2 as a statute of limitations for all actions against the state.
*419If practicable, a uniform act should be given such a construction as will harmonize it with the general principles of law in force before its enactment. 73 Am.Jur.2d Statutes § 340 (1974). The language of SDCL 57A-2-725 places an upper limit of four years for sales actions, but it does not foreclose another statute from modifying its provisions. In fact, the UCC expressly anticipates such an occurrence. SDCL 57A-1-103 provides: “Unless displaced by the particular provisions of this title, the principles of law and equity ... or other validating or invalidating cause shall supplement its provisions.” Principles of law include both case law and statutes such as SDCL 21-32-2. This interpretation draws support from the fact the legislature rejected and declined to adopt § 10-103 of the UCC into South Dakota law. That section would have repealed all acts and parts of acts inconsistent with the Uniform Commercial Code as adopted. There is no indication that the UCC intended to displace contrary statutes of limitation which can be harmonized with the UCC, as can SDCL 21-32-2. SDCL 21-32-2 accordingly supplements by further restricting the limitation of actions provisions in the UCC whenever the state is a defendant.
Just as the UCC added nothing to waiver of sovereign immunity on cement contracts, neither did it add anything to the limitation of actions against the State. It was redundant as to both.
I would dismiss the action entirely for want of timely commencement.
Article XIII, section 10 provides:
The manufacture, distribution and sale of cement and cement products are hereby declared to be works of public necessity and importance in which the state may engage, and suitable laws may be enacted by the Legislature to empower the state to acquire, by purchase or appropriation, all lands, easements, rights of way, tracks, structures, equipment, cars, motive power, implements, facilities, instrumentalities and material, incident or necessary to carry the provisions of this section into effect: provided, however, that no expenditure of money for the purposes enumerated in this section shall be made, except upon a vote of two-thirds of the members elect of each branch of the Legislature. Section 11 provides:
The state may pledge such cement plants and all the accessories thereto, and may pledge the credit of the state, to provide funds for the purposes enumerated in § 10 of this article, any provision in this Constitution to the contrary notwithstanding.