(concurring separately). A manufacturer has an obligation to avoid negligence — i.e., "to conform to the legal standard of reasonable conduct in the light of the apparent risk.”1 A manufacturer also has an obligation to provide a product that is reasonably fit for the particular purpose intended.2
As part of the manufacturer’s obligation to avoid negligence and provide a product that is reasonably fit for the intended purpose, there may be an obligation to provide warnings. In the instant case, neither the pleadings nor the moving or responding papers identify with specificity what language would have constituted an adequate warning;3 the plaintiffs brief in opposition to the motion for summary judgment asserted that the plaintiffs subrogors should have been warned "that a fire hazard would be created if glass doors not designed for use with the particular Heatilator fireplace were installed.” I agree with the majority that if such a warning were required, the concession by *156one of the subrogors that he knew that he should not cover the air vents on the fireplace might not obviate the obligation to provide a warning or eliminate the causal relationship between the failure adequately to warn and the property damage that occurred.
I also agree that under the circumstances that the Heatilator fireplace is a manufactured product —as compared to a fireplace constructed "brick-by-brick” — with an inner metal fire chamber, a second and larger outer metal shell, and air vents that lead to a space designed to keep the outer shell sufficiently cool, the product cannot properly be characterized as a "simple tool.”
There might, therefore, be a question for the trier of fact whether the manufacturers had an obligation to provide warnings as part of their obligation to avoid negligence and assure that the product was reasonably fit for its intended purpose. Assuming such an obligation, the trier of fact would be called upon to decide whether the failure adequately to warn caused the damage that occurred.
The summary judgment and the Court of Appeals affirmance assume, without deciding, that the manufacturers’ duty to the plaintiffs subro-gors included an obligation to provide the warning the plaintiff asserts should have been provided. On remand, it is for the trier of fact — or, indeed, the judge ruling as a matter of law if reasonable minds could not differ — to decide if there was such an obligation under the circumstances presented.
Prosser & Keeton, Torts (5th ed), § 53, p. 356. The Court of Appeals spoke of a "duty to warn,” Michigan Mutual Ins Co v Heatilator Fireplace, 126 Mich App 837; 338 NW2d 238 (1983). A legal "duty” refers to whether the relationship between the defendant and the plaintiff gives rise to some obligation on the defendant’s part for the benefit of the plaintiff. See Moning v Alfono, 400 Mich 425, 436-439; 254 NW2d 759 (1977); Prosser & Keeton, supra, p 356. The relationship between a product manufacturer and a person affected by the use of the product gives rise to legal obligations on the part of the manufacturer. See Moning v Alfono, supra, p 439.
Piercefield v Remington Arms Co, Inc, 375 Mich 85; 133 NW2d 129 (1965).
In addition to the content of a warning, a separate issue — not before the Court at this time — is how such a warning should have been provided.