dissenting.
The majority’s conclusion that the result reached in this case is compelled by the clear and unambiguous policy language at issue carves an anomaly into Nebraska law by disallowing the “stacking” of multivehicle uninsured motorist coverage contained in a single policy and by disregarding previous decisions of this court which allow an insured to stack such coverage when holding two or more separate policies.
The term “stacking” refers to an insured’s attempt to recover damages under more than one policy, endorsement, or coverage “ ‘by placing one policy, endorsement, or coverage, etc. upon another and recovering from each in succession until either all of his damages are satisfied or until the total limits of all policies, endorsements, coverages, etc. are exhausted, even though the insured has not been fully indemnified.’ ” (Citation omitted.) Lopez v. Foundation Reserve Ins. Co., Inc., 98 N.M. 166, 168-69, 646 P.2d 1230, 1232-33 (1982).
In relying on this court’s decision in Pettid v. Edwards, 195 Neb. 713, 240 N.W.2d 344 (1976), and the so-called “clarity of the policy language,” the majority misses the crucial question presented in this case. That question is not whether multiple vehicles are insured under one policy or several but whether the insured has paid one premium or several for the particular uninsured motorist coverage sought to be stacked. This court *773has previously allowed injured insureds to stack uninsured motorist coverage when there are two or more separate policies with such coverage in each. Bose v. American Family Mut. Ins. Co., 186 Neb. 209, 181 N.W.2d 839 (1970). Therefore, it seems truly inconsistent to permit stacking in cases like Bose and deny it in cases where all the automobiles are insured under one policy but the same additional premiums are charged as would be charged if they were covered under multiple policies.
Other jurisdictions facing this issue and having statutes similar in all relevant aspects to Neb. Rev. Stat. § 60-509.01 (Reissue 1984) have not allowed the insurer to circumvent the intent of the uninsured motorist statute and deny the insured full coverage of the policy through the use of “limits of liability” clauses. In Chaffee v. United States Fidelity & Guaranty Co., 181 Mont. 1, 591 P.2d 1102 (1979), the insured sought to combine the policy limits of his insurance based on the number of premiums paid on several vehicles insured under one policy of insurance. The appellant, Chaffee, had purchased automobile liability insurance from the appellee insurance company, which policy included a provision for uninsured motorist coverage in the amount of $10,000 for one person in any one accident. All three of the automobiles owned by the appellant were covered by the same policy, and separate, equal premiums were charged and paid for uninsured motorist coverage for each of the vehicles. The appellant’s son, who was an insured by definition under the policy, was injured while riding in an uninsured vehicle owned and operated by a third party. Appellant’s son died as a result of his injuries, and the appellant subsequently obtained a $304,000 judgment in a wrongful death action against the third party. Based on the adjudicated liability of the negligent third party, the appellant attempted to collect on his uninsured motorist coverage, contending that since he had paid premiums for uninsured motorist coverage on three vehicles, he was entitled to combine the policy limits to recover a total of $30,000.
The Supreme Court of Montana held that the appellant was entitled to combine the policy limits for uninsured motorist coverage based upon the number of vehicles for which he had paid premiums under one policy. The court refuted the “faulty *774logic” and reasoning of the “lack of windfall” argument proffered by the insurance carrier as follows:
There are no added risks to justify the full premium paid on the second and third vehicles. The risk in each case should be the same but becomes less, not more, when the coverage on the second and third vehicles is reduced to coverage only while the insureds occupy the second and third vehicles.
(Emphasis in original.) Chaffee, supra at 5, 591 P.2d at 1104. The court further found the uninsured motorist coverage on the first vehicle to be within the state’s statute mandating the offering of such coverage, while the coverage on the second and third vehicles was found to be in violation of that statute. The court added that
[t]he concept of uninsured motorist coverage although issued with the liability policy is not dependent on insured’s negligence or that the insured occupy a vehicle named in the insured’s policy to recover for the insured loss. Federated American Insurance Co. v. Raynes, 563 P.2d at 820. An attempted reduction of coverage of this kind simply takes the heart out of the policy and erodes the coverage to a point of no value simply because the policy on the first vehicle becomes the only full coverage.
(Emphasis in original.) Chaffee, supra at 6, 591 P.2d at 1104. Similar rationale was expressed by the dissenters of our own court in Pettid and is equally applicable to the present case.
The opinion cited with approval by the Chaffee court above is from the Washington Supreme Court. In Federated American Ins. v. Raynes, 88 Wash. 2d 439, 563 P.2d 815 (1977), even when the premium paid for uninsured motorist coverage on the second vehicle was slightly reduced, the court held that the insured could combine coverages under his policy with the carrier, and found the “limits of liability” clause in the policy to be in conflict with the statutory policy providing uninsured motorist coverage. In its opinion the Raynes court reasoned that the insured had paid two premiums for uninsured motorist coverage and was entitled to the full protection which he purchased, noting that form of protection should not control the limits of liability. The “limits of liability” provision in the *775case was, in the estimation of the court, “an attempt to erode the amount of uninsured motorist coverage to which respondent is entitled.” Raynes, supra at 448, 563 P.2d at 820.
In order to allow the “stacking” of multivehicle uninsured motorist coverages in a single policy, other courts have found that “limits of liability” clauses when read in conjunction with “separability” clauses create an ambiguity, and construed the policy in favor of the insured. See, e.g., Blocker v. Aetna Casualty, 232 Pa. Super. 111, 332 A.2d 476 (1975); Gov. Emp. Ins. Co. v. Brown, 446 So. 2d 1002 (Miss. 1984).
I believe, however, that it is unnecessary to search the corners of a policy for ambiguity. As the Alabama Supreme Court has stated, “Cases should not . . . turn on how well the insurer drafts a limiting clause because the law does not permit insurers to collect a premium for certain coverage, then take that coverage away by such a clause no matter how clear or unambiguous it may be.” Great Central Insurance Company v. Edge, 292 Ala. 613, 617, 298 So. 2d 607, 610 (1974).
Shanahan and Grant, JJ., join in this dissent.