(dissenting).
I join in the dissent of Justice Russell A. Anderson. However, I write separately to highlight two specific concerns. I begin with the blind eye cast by the court on the defendant’s disparate treatment of prospective juror number 2 (juror 2) even when, as dictated by the court, we examine this treatment solely with respect to prospective juror number 1 (juror 1). Juror 1 was presumably Caucasian1 and had a *836nephew who was a Hennepin County Sheriffs Deputy. The nephew was working in the Hennepin County Government Center, where the trial was taking place, at the time of trial. Juror 1 indicated that he did not know much about what his nephew did because he did not see his nephew very often. When asked if the fact that his nephew was a law enforcement officer would affect his ability to be fair, he initially answered, “I don’t have any thoughts on that, I guess,” but later said that he would not give testimony from a police officer any greater weight than testimony from a layperson. The defense asked no further questions on this topic and passed on juror 1.
Juror 2 was African American. At the time of trial, her father, whom she saw approximately once every two years, was a police officer in Atlanta, Georgia. Juror 2 indicated that she had taken a few classes while in high school at some sort of police academy because she was considering becoming a police officer. When asked if her father’s job would affect her decision-making process, juror 2 clearly stated, “I hear both sides. I’m not one to judge before I hear everything. Because my dad is a cop doesn’t mean that I automatically have to, like, listen to everything [the police] say or believe everything that they say.” On further questioning, she stated, “I think that people should not be convicted unless there is 100 percent. I need to see something that is solid in order to convict. I can’t just, I mean — I don’t know. I guess I would have to have solid proof.” Defense counsel followed that answer with a question, “How strongly do you feel about that? Is that something that you agree with, but don’t feel strongly about or is it something that you feel pretty strongly about?” The prospective juror answered, “I agree strongly. Because I would [not] want to convict someone that’s innocent.”
The defense counsel moved to strike juror 2 because he feared “her law enforcement contact” would bias her against the defendant whose defense was based on the theory that the police had behaved improperly. In justifying the strike, the defense counsel stated that his concern was primarily based on the fact that juror 2 had some law enforcement training and in high school had considered becoming a police officer, rather than her father’s occupation. The trial court found that this proffered reason was pretextual and denied the defendant’s peremptory strike.
The court now reverses this determination because the trial court used the “wrong standard.” Specifically, the court asserts that “[t]he district court’s factual determination that the prospective juror could be fair does not support the court’s conclusion that the peremptory challenge was the result of racial discrimination and that conclusion is clearly erroneous.” In doing so, however, the court misinterprets the trial court’s analysis. •
As the United States Supreme Court explained in Purkett v. Elem, 514 U.S. 765, 768, 115 S.Ct. 1769, 131 L.Ed.2d 834 (1995), once a race-neutral reason has been given, “the trial court must * * * decide * * * whether the opponent of the strike has proved purposeful racial discrimination.” While a lawyer may use a peremptory strike to eliminate those jurors who claim that they can be fair, but are otherwise undesirable, when the proffered justification is “implausible or fantastic,” the trial court “may (and probably [will find those justifications]) to be pretexts for purposeful discrimination.” See id.
In that instance the issue comes down to whether the trial court finds the [attor*837ney’s] race-neutral explanations to be credible. Credibility can be measured by, among other factors, the [attorney’s] demeanor; by how reasonable, or how improbable, the explanations are; and by whether the proffered rationale has some basis in accepted trial strategy.
Miller-El v. Cockrell, 537 U.S. 322, -, 123 S.Ct. 1029, 1040, 154 L.Ed.2d 931 (2003); see Hernandez v. New York, 500 U.S. 352, 365, 111 S.Ct. 1859, 114 L.Ed.2d 395 (1991) (stating that “[i]n the typical peremptory challenge inquiry, the decisive question will be whether counsel’s race-neutral explanation for a peremptory challenge should be believed. There will seldom be much evidence bearing on that issue, and the best evidence often will be the demeanor of the attorney who exercises the challenge”). The evaluation of the attorney’s demeanor and credibility is an issue of fact to be decided by the trial court and awarded great deference by appellate courts, to be overruled only if found to be clearly erroneous. See, e.g., State v. Martin, 614 N.W.2d 214, 222 (2000); Miller-El, 537 U.S. at -, 123 S.Ct. at 1041 (concluding that “[djeference is necessary because a reviewing court, which analyzes only the transcripts from voir dire, is not as well positioned as the trial court is to make credibility determinations”).
Because Batson’s third prong is substantially based on the demeanor and credibility of the attorney seeking to use the peremptory strike, this court’s focus on the trial court’s use of the words “fair” in its analysis causes the court to ignore what was actually at issue. In concluding that the' justification given by the defense lacked credibility and constituted pretext, the trial court specifically found that most of juror 2’s answers were more favorable to the defense than the state. This was important because the defense’s entire argument for striking juror 2 was that she would be biased against the defense. In essence, what the trial court found in this ease was that the defense’s justification was implausible and even fantastic based on the juror’s consistent statements that directly contradicted the defense’s justification. Unlike an appellate court, which is looking at a cold record, the trial court has the juror and the attorney before it and is in the best position to determine credibility. Because this determination is granted “great deference,” we are only to reverse if the finding is clearly erroneous, a scenario nonexistent in this case especially when juror 2’s statements are compared to juror l’s statements.
Evidence of bias or fairness has consistently been a basis upon which this court has relied to determine whether a juror was stricken for race-neutral reasons. See, e.g., State v. McRae, 494 N.W.2d 252, 257-58 (Minn.1992) (reversing and remanding when “the record of the prosecutor’s examination of the juror in question fails to support the explanation given by the prosecutor for striking the juror and suggests instead that the prosecutor’s questioning was prompted by the juror’s race and that the juror is a fair-minded reasonable person who was ready and willing to serve fairly, impartially, and with an open mind”). When there is evidence that the questions would elicit the same responses from any fair-minded person, then a strike of a minority based on his or her identical response can only lead to the conclusion that the strike was not race-neutral. State v. McDonough, 631 N.W.2d 373, 385 (Minn.2001); Walton v. Caspari, 916 F.2d 1352, 1362 (8th Cir.1990) (finding that pretext can be established by proving that “prosecutors use their peremptory challenges to exclude African-American venirepersons for a given reason or reasons, but then fail to apply the same reason or reasons to exclude similarly situated, white venirepersons”), quoted in State v. Scott, 493 N.W.2d 546, 549 (Minn.1992).
In McDonough, we concluded that the reason given for the strike of an African-American juror was race-neutral because, when asked the same questions as Cauca*838sian jurors, the African American admitted bias towards the defense and appeared to be influenced by factors not in evidence. 631 N.W.2d at 385-86. Here, we have nearly identical responses from two jurors with “law enforcement contact,” but the defense passed on the Caucasian and struck the African American. Like the trial court, I can only conclude, based on their nearly identical answers, that the reason given for the strike of juror 2 was “fantastic” and therefore pretextual. Therefore, based on the “great deference” we give to trial courts and because there is no evidence that this determination was clearly erroneous, I would affirm the trial court.
It is this history of granting the trial court “great deference,” coupled with today’s decision, that highlights an extremely troublesome trend emerging from this court, one that evinces a hostility towards jurors of color. This court has considered 15 cases, including this one, in which we have resolved Batson issues applying our deferential standard. In each of these cases, except this one, the defendant challenged the strike. In every case we have either permitted or required the exclusion of the juror.
NO DEFERENCE TO TRIAL COURT-STRIKE OF JUROR REVERSED
• State v. Reiners, 664 N.W.2d 826, 2003 WL 21545972 (2003) (no deference granted, determination of pretext reversed and juror excluded)
Defendant: Caucasian
Juror excluded: African American
DEFERENCE TO TRIAL COURT-STRIKE OF JUROR AFFIRMED
• State v. Moore, 438 N.W.2d 101, 107 (Minn.1989) (concluding that the “great deference” awarded to the trial court’s determination warranted a finding that the ruling was not clearly erroneous even though the prosecution listed off the juror’s criminal background only after first discussing the juror’s lack of education and employment as the primary reasons for the strike)
Defendant: African American
Juror excluded: African American
• State v. Everett, 472 N.W.2d 864, 869 (Minn.1991) (stating that “[without in any way endorsing the prosecutor’s reasoning [striking because the juror was too young], we are satisfied that the trial court did not err in accepting the reason given by the prosecutor as sufficient to overcome any prima facie case of impermissible age-based discrimination”)
Defendant: African American
Juror excluded: African American
• State v. Scott, 493 N.W.2d 546, 549 (Minn.1992) (concluding that whether the prosecutor acts with discriminatory intent “is essentially a factual determination which the trial court makes”)
Defendant: Caucasian
Juror excluded: African American
• State v. Stewart, 514 N.W.2d 559, 563-64 (Minn.1994) (inferring from the trial court’s statement, “All right; the record is made” that the prosecution’s proffered reasons for the peremptory strike were race-neutral and deferred to the trial court’s determination that the strike was not racially motivated)
*839Defendant: Caucasian
Juror excluded: Native American
• State v. James, 520 N.W.2d 399, 404 (Minn.1994) (finding that, although the prosecutor’s proffered reasons for the strike were not “compelling,” because the trial court did not find the reasons based on pretext and because this decision is granted great deference, the decision was not clearly erroneous)
Defendant: African American
Juror excluded: African American
• State v. Gaitan, 536 N.W.2d 11, 16 (Min1995) (concluding that “[g]iving, as we must, ‘considerable deference’ to the trial court’s finding on the issue of intent and motivation^] * * ⅜ the trial court’s determination that there was no purposeful discrimination must be sustained”)
Defendant: Mexican
Juror excluded: Mexican American
• State v. Buggs, 581 N.W.2d 329, 339 (Minn.1998) (finding that “the trial court must determine whether there has been purposeful discrimination”)
Defendant: African American
Juror excluded: Caucasian with African-
American daughter
• State v. DeVerney, 592 N.W.2d 837, 844 (Minn.1999) (in noting that considerable deference was to be given to the trial court, we concluded that “[t]he trial court, taking into consideration all the relevant factors, properly determined that DeVer-ney failed to demonstrate that the prosecutor acted with discriminatory intent or purpose, and we therefore affirm the trial court’s ruling”)
Defendant: Native American
Juror excluded: Native American
• State v. Greenleaf, 591 N.W.2d 488, 501 (Minn.1999) (concluding that “[tjhere is nothing in the record to indicate that such a finding was clearly erroneous since the reasons provided by the state for each excluded juror provided ample, nonrace based justifications for the peremptory strikes”)
*840Defendant: Native American
Juror excluded: Native American
• State v. Martin, 614 N.W.2d 214, 223 (Minn.2000) (concluding that the trial court did not err in denying the defendant’s Batson challenge and stating that, “[l]ook-ing to the entire record and with deference to the trial court’s determination of the prosecutor’s credibility, we hold that the finding that the prosecutor acted without discriminatory intent was not clearly erroneous”)
Defendant: Native American
Juror excluded: African American
• State v. Johnson, 616 N.W.2d 720, 725-26 (Minn.2000) (recognizing that “[a]ppellate courts give considerable deference to the trial court’s finding on the issue of the prosecutor’s intent” and concluding that in denying the defendant’s Batson challenge “the trial court did not abuse its discretion in finding the prosecutor’s denial of discriminatory intent credible and in sustaining the challenge”)
Defendant: African American
Juror excluded: African American
• State v. Henderson, 620 N.W.2d 688, 704 (Minn.2001) (concluding, “[biased on the record before this court, [that] the district court did not abuse its discretion because Henderson failed to make out a prima facie case based on questions not asked by the state. Further, we conclude that there is no clear proof that the prosecutor’s stated reason for the challenge was pretextual”)
Defendant: African American
Juror excluded: African American
• State v. McDonough, 631 N.W.2d 373, 386 (Minn.2001) (finding that “the district court did not clearly err when it determined that McDonough did not meet his burden of proving intentional discrimination” when the prosecution used a preemp-tory strike to remove the sole African-American juror on the jury panel)
Defendant: African American
Juror excluded: African American
• State v. Taylor, 650 N.W.2d 190, 202-03 (Minn.2002) (recognizing that appellate courts are to give great deference to the district court’s finding on the issue of pros-ecutorial intent and noting that, “[w]hile additional explanation of the court’s finding would have been helpful, it is reasonable to conclude that the prosecutor was not motivated by racial discrimination”)
Defendant: African American
Juror excluded: Bi-racial (one parent Caucasian and one parent African American)
*841Visually, the result of what we’ve done is striking. In each case except this one,2 we deferred to the trial court’s decision irrespective of whether the trial court conducted the Batson analysis properly or whether we agreed with the trial court’s conclusion. See Taylor, 650 N.W.2d at 202 (noting that the trial court did not apply the “proper Batson analysis at step two,” but nonetheless concluding that the trial court did not clearly err when it upheld the strike of an African-American prospective juror); James, 520 N.W.2d at 404 (noting that the reasons given by the prosecutor were not compelling, but nonetheless deferring to the trial court’s determination that they were not pretextual). If there was no abuse of discretion in Taylor or in James, there should be none here; put another way, if Taylor and James were correctly decided, the court is wrong here. Evidently, the court would like to have it both ways.
In each case except this one, the trial court denied the Batson challenge and upheld the strike of the juror.3 In this case, the trial court sustained the Batson challenge, and today we hold that the challenge should have been denied. The message is clear, short of an explanation that is “not the sort of racially-neutral explanation * * * contemplated in Batson,” McRae, 494 N.W.2d at 257, prospective jurors of color stricken by either party cannot expect to have their right to serve as a juror vindicated. Having deferred to the trial court in every previous case in which we applied our deferential standard of review, it is beyond ironic that, in this case with its Caucasian defendant, when we examine for the first time a finding by the trial court that the peremptory strike was pretextual, we decline to give the trial court any deference whatsoever. Therefore, I dissent.
. The record does not make clear the race of juror 1, but the parties' arguments imply that he is Caucasian. Reiners does not object or *836otherwise indicate that this characterization is incorrect.
. I do note the existence of one other case in which this court reversed the defendant's conviction and remanded for a new trial without considering whether deference to the trial court was appropriate. The court concluded that, even though it could not be determined whether the prosecutor acted with discriminatory intent in striking an African-American prospective juror, the explanation given for the strike was "not the sort of a race-neutral reason * * * contemplated by Batson ” and that the trial court did not consider whether the explanation given was a pretext for discrimination. See State v. McRae, 494 N.W.2d 252, 257 (Minn.1992).
. Indeed, we have affirmed the lower court no matter how "fantastic” the explanation given by the proponent of the strike. In Taylor, the court upheld the denial of a Batson challenge in a case in which the explanation tor the strike, while race-neutral, was what I, in my dissent, concluded was as "fantastic” as that used in Purkett v. Elem, 514 U.S. 765, 768, 115 S.Ct. 1769, 131 L.Ed.2d 834 (1995), and which the majority opinion characterizes as "nonsensical.” State v. Taylor, 650 N.W.2d 190, 202, 211 (Minn.2002). The explanation given was that the prospective juror was indifferent toward police. Id. at 201 n. 8. In that “indifferent” means "[hjaving a neutral or unbiased disposition,” see Webster’s New International Dictionary 1266 (2d ed.1959), and that neutrality and lack of bias are precisely what we expect from a juror, it is unclear what if any explanation today might fall into the category of “not the sort of racially-neutral explanation * * * contemplated in Batson." See McRae, 494 N.W.2d at 257.