(dissenting). The plurality concludes that Hartford failed to meet its burden of proving the existence of an attorney-client relationship between Hartford and the Walther firm. Marten Transport, Ltd. v. Hartford Specialty Co., Majority op. at 25. I cannot agree with this conclusion given the following facts introduced by Hartford:
1. In the course of handling workers' compensation claims, the Walther firm advised Hartford as to the merits of the claims and possible defenses:
*31—Letter dated May 4,1990, from the Walther firm to Hartford, stating, inter alia, "I recommend that you pay applicant permanent partial disability benefits. . . . We do have a safety defense against applicant's claim. ... It appears that we have a strong case on this issue.... I recommend we retain Lawrence Hollingsworth as our vocational expert witness.... Unless I hear from you to the contrary, I will assume you agree with my recommendation.... I recommend we enter into a quick Compromise settlement...."
—Letter dated October 16, 1989, from the Walther firm to Hartford, stating, inter alia, "[a]t this time, I recommend that you continue paying applicant permanent partial disability benefits...."
—Letter dated June 13, 1991, from the Walther firm to Hartford, stating, inter alia, "[w]e recommend that no medical expenses be paid for applicant's current back problem."
—Letter dated November 14, 1991, from the Walther firm to Hartford, stating, inter alia, "we recommend payment of the outstanding bill. . . . [W]e believe it would be bad faith to continue to withhold payment of this bill."
2. The Walther firm on numerous occasions represented itself as the attorneys for Hartford:
—Letter dated February 26,1992, from the Walther firm to Lawrence Hollingsworth, stating, inter alia, "As you are aware, we represent Marten Transport Ltd., The Hartford and Planet Insurance Company for the referenced worker's compensation claim...."
—Letter dated November 28, 1989, from the Walther firm to Mark C. Ryder, stating, inter alia, "We represent The Hartford, your worker's compen*32sation insurance carrier, in defense of the . referenced claim...."
—Letter dated April 26, 1991, from the Walther firm to Richard Shippy, stating, inter alia, "We represent Marten Transport Ltd. and The Hartford for your worker's compensation claim."
; — Letter dated December 26, 1991, from the Walther firm to Thomas M. Franlonan, stating, inter alia, "Please take notice that we represent Marten Transport Ltd. and The Hartford "
—Letter dated September 20, 1991, from the Walther firm to Dr. Paul L. Flicker, stating, inter alia, "As you know, we represent Marten Transport Ltd. and The Hartford...."
—Letter dated December 26, 1990, from the Walther firm to Attorney Thomas E. Lister, stating, inter alia, "As you are aware, we represent Marten Transport Ltd. and The Hartford-"
3. As stated in the court of appeals' decision, Walther negotiated settlements, and held itself out to third parties, including claimants, adjudicatory boards, and a United States district court as the attorney for both Marten and Hartford.
4. Numerous Hartford employees had responsibility for overseeing claims made against Marten and Hartford. These employees indisputably believed that the Walther firm was acting as their attorney in these matters. They stated that had they learned otherwise, they would have retained other counsel to represent Hartford.
The court of appeals, in a unanimous decision, very astutely asked, then answered, a key question:
Marten Transport's argument that Walther was not Hartford's attorney leaves this court to *33wonder, if Walther did not represent Hartford's interests, who did? There is no indication in the record that any officer of Hartford or attorney other than Walther appeared on behalf of Hartford in any of these matters. The trial court's answer to this puzzling question, and one with which Marten Transport agrees, was that Walther's appearance on behalf of Hartford was merely 'pro forma.' Marten Transport, in essence, asks this court to hold that it is possible for an attorney to appear before an adjudicatory body in a contested matter, on behalf of a named party, but not be considered the attorney for that party. Such a holding would require this court to conclude that there exist differing levels of representation, with the lowest level being of such a superficial nature that it cannot be considered representation at all. We have found no legal authority for that proposition, and we decline to adopt that rationale.
I agree with the unanimous court of appeals. There is no question that an attorney-client relationship existed here between Mr. Walther and Hartford Insurance Company. I conclude that these facts give rise to more than an "agency" relationship; rather, as the court of appeals concluded, these facts at the very least, give rise to some level of attorney-client representation. In the important area of attorney-client relationships, we ought not adopt "a little bit is ok" rule. Given the above facts, that is at the very least what the plurality adopts. SCR 20:1.7 provides a bright-line rule easily understood by all practitioners. Creating a "little bit is ok" rule blurs the line and raises the question of where the line is drawn for practioners and those charged with enforcing the code of professional conduct.
*34I further conclude, contrary to the concurring opinion, that this is not the case to apply the single representation rule. See Marten Transport Ltd. v. Hartford Specialty Co., concurring op. at 28. It is questionable whether the single representation rule should even apply in a situation in which the insured hires its own attorney, and then the insured and its attorney take actions and make representations that lead the insurer to believe that the attorney is also representing the interests of the insurer. Such a scenario is arguably present here, and has not been adequately addressed by either party.
Additionally, even if we were to adopt the single representation rule in this case, I would apply it prospectively only. At the time of the attorney-client relationship between Walther and Hartford, SCR 20:1.7 was the standard in this state. Hartford had the right to rely on this standard; Walther had no reason to believe that any other standard applied.
Accordingly, I respectfully dissent. I am authorized to state that Justice JON P. WILCOX joins in this dissent.