Plaintiffs bring this appeal from an order of the trial court dismissing plaintiff William Warner’s claim for loss of consortium resulting from injuries suffered by Linda Warner in an automobile accident. Linda Warner was injured when the car in which she was riding was struck by an automobile driven by defendant. Ms. Warner, joined by her husband and son, brought this action to recover noneconomic losses suffered *643as a result of the accident, alleging serious impairment of body function and permanent serious disfigurement under MCL 500.3135(1); MSA 24.13135(1). The sole issue before us on appeal is whether the trial court erred in holding that loss of consortium does not survive under the no-fault automobile insurance act.
The applicable statute is MCL 500.3135; MSA 24.13135, which provides in part:
"(1) A person remains subject to tort liability for noneconomic loss caused by his ownership, maintenance or use of a motor vehicle only if the injured person has suffered death, serious impairment of body function or permanent serious disñgurement.
"(2) Notwithstanding any other provision of law, tort liability arising from the ownership, maintenance or use within this state of a motor vehicle with respect to which the security required by subsections (3) and (4) of section 3101 was in effect is abolished except as to:
"(b) Damages for noneconomic loss as provided and limited in subsection (1).” (Emphasis added.)
Defendant argues that § 3135 abolishes all tort liability except that specifically described in the statute. We agree. However, we are of the opinion that claims for loss of consortium come within the statute, where the claimant’s spouse has suffered death, serious impairment of body function or permanent serious disfigurement.
We think, that the language of the statute is clear. A person remains liable for noneconomic loss if the injured person has suffered injuries which meet the threshold requirements. The statute does not limit liability only to those losses suffered by the injured person, excluding losses suffered by another as a result of the serious *644injury. Clearly any noneconomic loss compensable at common law may be recovered under § 3135. Once the threshold is crossed, the parties step from the purely statutory land of no-fault back into the common law, with all its virtues and shortcomings. We agree with the interpretation of § 3135 stated in Luce v Gerow, 89 Mich App 546; 280 NW2d 592 (1979):
"MCL 500.3135(1); MSA 24.13135(1), retains traditional tort liability if certain threshold requirements are met.”
The jury in this case having already decided that Linda Warner’s injuries met the threshold requirements of § 3135, William Warner is entitled to press his claim for loss of consortium. Reversed and remanded for trial on the issue of damages suffered by William Warner. No costs.
V. J. Brennan, J., concurred.