(concurring specially).
I am unable to agree that municipal inspection statutes and ordinances invariably create a duty to those who live in the premises inspected.
In these cases plaintiffs do not set forth the provisions of statute and ordinance relied upon as imposing such a duty. The statutes are not cited and the ordinances relied upon are not before us. Consequently, resolving all pleading doubts in their favor, we are unable at this stage of the cases to say it appears to a certainty plaintiffs have failed to state claims upon which any relief may be granted under any supportive state of facts which could be proved. See Weber v. Madison, 251 N.W.2d 523, 525 (Iowa 1977). On that basis I concur in the result.
However, I do not believe anything in our cases or in Code chapter 613A either requires or justifies a carte blanche holding that municipal inspection statutes and ordinances create a duty to individuals. Rather, I believe such statutes and ordinances ordinarily reflect an effort by government to require owners of private property to meet their responsibilities. See Grogan v. Commonwealth, 577 S.W.2d 4, 5 (Ky.1979) (“But in the enactment of laws designed for the public safety a governmental unit does not attempt to perform the task; it attempts only to compel others to do it, and as one of the means of enforcing that purpose it may direct its officers and employees to perform an inspection function.”). In so doing, the laws serve the public at large rather than any particular group or class. See, e. g., § 103A.2, The Code 1979 (“[I]t is the policy of the state of Iowa to insure the health, safety, and welfare of its citizens through the promulgation and enforcement of a state building code.”); § 413.9 (“The provisions of this chapter shall be held to be the minimum requirements adopted for the protection of health, welfare, and safety of the community.”). They usually do not purport to make the municipality itself responsible for defects in the premises.
*675This has been the view of the vast majority of courts which have confronted the issue. The general rule is stated in Cracraft v. City of St. Louis Park, 279 N.W.2d 801, 806 (Minn.1979):
We hold . . . that a municipality does not owe any individual a duty of care merely by the fact that it enacts a general ordinance requiring fire code inspections or by the fact that it undertakes an inspection for fire code violations. A duty of care arises only when there are additional indicia that the municipality has undertaken the responsibility of not only protecting itself, but also undertaken the responsibility of protecting a particular class from the risks associated with fire code violations.
As noted, an exception exists when the inspection statute by its terms shows an intent to identify and protect a particular class of persons. See Halvorson v. Dahl, 89 Wash.2d 673, 574 P.2d 1190 (1978) (statute identifying its purpose as an enactment for the benefit of occupants of a building as well as the public). Whether plaintiffs can bring themselves under the exception noted in Cracraft and Halvorson cannot be determined without knowing the provisions of the statutes and ordinances they are relying on.
Other courts have held a duty to individuals may arise from affirmative conduct. See Royal Indemnity Co. v. City of Erie, 372 F.Supp. 1137 (W.D.Pa.1974); State v. Jennings, 555 P.2d 248 (Alaska 1976); Adams v. State, 555 P.2d 235 (Alaska 1976); Restatement (Second) of Torts § 324A (1965). Like our own case of Fabricius v. Montgomery Elevator Co., 254 Iowa 1319, 121 N.W.2d 361 (1963), those cases involve common-law rather than statutory liability. Whether plaintiffs can prove a common-law basis for recovery in these cases depends upon their proof.
This court applied the general rule in Jahnke v. Incorporated City of Des Moines, 191 N.W.2d 780 (Iowa 1971), and did not depart from it in Symmonds v. Chicago, Milwaukee, St. Paul & Pacific Railroad, 242 N.W.2d 262 (Iowa 1976), or Harryman v. Hayles, 257 N.W.2d 631 (Iowa 1977). In Jahnke the court recognized that an actionable tort depends upon the existence of a duty running from the alleged wrongdoer to his victim. It held that Code chapter 613A did not create municipal liability upon claims where a duty runs to the public at large but not to any individual plaintiff. By contrast, in Symmonds and Harryman the court held that particular statutes involved in those cases did create duties to individuals, travelers on the streets. Those cases come within the Halvorson principle and are not based upon a finding that chapter 613A created new torts.
The general principle to which we adhered before today is expressed in Restatement (Second) of Torts section 288(b) (1965), as follows:
The court will not adopt as the standard of conduct of a reasonable man the requirements of a legislative enactment or an administrative regulation whose purpose is found to be exclusively
(b) to secure to individuals the enjoyment of rights or privileges to which they are entitled only as members of the public; .
Comment c to this section provides:
Other legislative enactments and regulations are intended only for the purpose of securing to individuals the enjoyment of rights and privileges to which they are entitled as members of the public, rather than for the purpose of protecting any individual from harm. Thus a statute may be intended only to secure the public right of unobstructed passage on the public highway, or freedom from excessive noise or immoral conduct in the community. Under some circumstances, where an individual has been interfered with in his exercise of such a public right, and as a result has suffered special harm, distinct from that suffered by the rest of the community, he may be entitled to maintain a tort action for the violation. See, as to public nuisances, §§ 821B and 821C. In the ordinary case, however, harm suffered by such an individual is not within *676the purpose of the provision, and the statute or regulation will be not taken to lay down a standard of conduct with respect to such harm.
The comment recognizes the principle followed in Jahnke and the exception followed in Symmonds and Harryman.
This limitation has not been confined to government as opposed to private duties. We have applied Restatement section 288(c) which provides that statutory breaches are not actionable when the statutory purpose is exclusively “to impose upon the actor the performance of a service which the state or any subdivision of it undertakes to give the public.” Under this principle we have held that statutes or ordinances which require the abutting property owner to repair defects in, or remove snow from, the public sidewalk are for the benefit of the government and not for the benefit of the traveling public. Despite the foreseeability of risk of injury to travelers when this duty is breached, the lot owner is not liable to an injured person. See Case v. City of Sioux City, 246 Iowa 654, 69 N.W.2d 27 (1955); Restatement, Illustration 6 at 32.
Nothing in Code chapter 613A purports to make every breach of statutory duty by a municipal officer, employee or agent a tort. The definition of “tort” in section 613A.1(3) contains nothing unusual. It does not say all breaches of statutory duty are actionable torts. Rather it gives a traditional definition of tort which “includes but is not restricted to actions based upon negligence; error or omission; nuisance; breach of duty, whether statutory or other duty or denial or impairment of any right under any constitutional provision, statute, or rule of law.” It is illogical to say that because a tort action may be based upon breaches of statutory duty all breaches of statutory duty are actionable torts.
Similarly, the liability of the municipality for the torts of its officers, employees and agents during the course of their employment provided for in section 6Í3A.2 presupposes the commission of an actionable tort. It does not expand conduct which is deemed tortious.
Finally, the exemption of liability in section 613A.1(3) for acts or omissions while exercising due care is hardly an affirmative provision imposing liability on the municipality for all other acts or omissions, regardless of the existence of a duty running to the claimant.
The 1974 amendment to chapter 613A did not create duties which did not previously exist. Instead, the changes in the definition of tort and provisions regarding indemnification appear to be a legislative response to this court’s decisions in Vermeer v. Sneller, 190 N.W.2d 389 (Iowa 1971), and Flynn v. Lucas County Memorial Hospital, 203 N.W.2d 613 (Iowa 1973). The legislature redefined tort and notice provisions from a desire to make the chapter applicable to all situations, whether arising from statute or common law, where the municipality had a duty to indemnify. See Roberts v. Timmins, - N.W.2d - (Iowa 1979); Harryman, 257 N.W.2d at 638; 1974 Session, 65th G.A., ch. 1263. The amendment purports to expand protection afforded municipal officers and employees, not to create municipal liability for breach of statutory inspection duties.
This conclusion is supported by the fact the amendment was proposed by the House Committee on Education. The complete explanation attached to the bill by the committee is as follows:
This bill provides that “officer” within chapter 613A includes members of the governing body of the municipality. Presently there is some question whether persons such as school board members are “officers” of a municipality under the municipal tort claims act.
The definition of tort is expanded to include acts which may not presently be covered and is expanded to cover reasonable acts in the best interests of the municipality which might be outside the scope of employment or duty.
The governing body of a municipality is specifically granted authority to purchase insurance out of the general fund which may not presently be possible.
The statute of limitations is extended and made to apply to suits against indi*677vidual employees, officers and agents and the act is made exclusive against the municipality where the tort is within the coverage of chapter 613A.
See H.F. 462, 64th G.A. We have previously given weight to such explanations in ascertaining legislative intent. See City of Altoona v. Sandquist, 230 N.W.2d 507, 509 (Iowa 1975).
Whatever one may believe of the merit of the “growing trend” toward imposing liability upon government for breach of statutory inspection duties, the creation of statutory liability is a legislative rather than judicial prerogative. It is for the legislature to decide whether municipalities can be trusted to see that their officers, employees and agents perform their statutory duties without the compulsion of municipal financial liability when they do not. We have no legislative basis for holding that municipalities will be liable for all foreseeable injuries resulting from defects in premises which are uncorrected because of breach of statutory inspection duties.
I would hold that building codes and inspection statutes and ordinances do not create a duty to individuals unless they do so in express terms or by clear implication.
LeGRAND and McGIVERIN, JJ., join in this special concurrence.